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Abstract
This research project investigates the sources of legitimacy in hegemonic
Cuban discourse, understood to have supported the stability of the Cuban
system during crises and challenging times, such as the end of the Cold War
and the 1990s Special Period. Evidence was drawn from the Cuban press,
namely Granma, Bohemia and Verde Olivo, in two critical periods: the 1980
Mariel episode and the 1994 maleconazo disturbances as two examples before
and after 1989 in order to compare the sources of legitimacy and identify
continuities and shifts. The two periods represent recent examples of
instability, which dominated the attention of the whole nation. The evidence is
based on textual examination using discourse analysis as the method of
investigation. The research is written in the discipline of political history, with
elements taken from cultural studies and political communication.
The project is based on the assumption that the sources of legitimacy
represented a significant, but not exclusive factor which may have encouraged
the population's loyalty by reflecting their attitudes and concerns and
channelling them in a particular direction. The discourse also interpreted
reality to support the legitimacy of the system. This might have contributed
significantly to the stability of the whole system, and its ability to survive the
post-1989 transitions experienced in other communist countries. The research
examines the content and internal mechanics of the discourse, its assumptions
and endogenous references, taking into account the specific context of the
single-party communist state in control of the country's media and mass
organisations. By suppressing alternative discourses, the system increased the
impact of the hegemonic discourse, especially if compared to pluralist political
systems. The discourse might have contributed to the continuing loyalty of the
population by explicitly and implicitly stressing endogenous sources of
legitimacy intelligible to the Cuban audience, reflecting its particular historical
experience and political culture. The research investigates the sources of
legitimacy traceable in the"discourse, to demonstrate what made it tick
internally and why some Cubans might have decided to remain loyal to a
system that they perceived as legitimate and defending their interests,
attitudes, concerns and identities.
Collaterally, the research addresses the topic of migration, which was a main
issue during both crises, and the way the perceptions of migration shifted over
time in order to protect the legitimacy of the system confronting large
outflows of discontented people. The research demonstrates how the system
interpreted events in its favour, and how it prioritised different sources of
legitimacy, such as independence, patriotism, socialism, material prosperity,
social provision, culturalism and the US embargo in order to encourage
loyalty. The research takes into account the regional Hispano-Caribbean
context, reflecting the identities of the Cuban population in their perceived
difference from Anglo-Saxon America and its socio-political model. The
research looks in more detail at the key sources of legitimacy during the
challenging 1990s when the system was near a possible collapse. The research
enhances our understanding of how the sources of legitimacy shifted over time
to reflect new realities and to support the system. The research sheds further
light on the system and the structure of the system's endogenous ideology in a
post-structuralist sense, stressing the role of language and the complex and
extended definition of ideology. For this reason it takes into account Cuban
semantics, linguistics and endogenous meaning of words and concepts.
The existing academic literature focuses on explaining the stability of the
system before and after 1989 by analysing Cuban history, institutions, culture,
international relations and other aspects, but there is insufficient focus on
legitimacy, politics and media addressed to the population as a possible factor
in the system's stability. It does not investigate sources of legitimacy in
relation to the content and internal mechanics of the discourse constructed to
appeal to Cubans. This research answers these questions and thus enhances
our understanding of the system. The research provides one possible answer to
the question of how the system might have maintained stability, what sources
oflegitimacy it argued for, how it argued for them and how it interpreted
current issues to encourage loyalty. It demonstrates how the system interpreted
migration to cancel its potentially destabilising impact, and how it shifted the
interpretations of the sources of legitimacy over time, especially in relation to
the different global context before and after 1989.
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Part I: Setting the Context
Chapter 1
1.1. Introduction
Cuba, its political system and internal mechanics have long been a mystery for
many interested in this Caribbean island, perceived by some as isolated. The
island's ability to survive since 1959, despite many obstacles both at home and
from abroad, gives rise to the question: How was this possible? What made it
tick? Why may the system have been perceived as legitimate? These questions
have gained further significance since 1989 and the transitions in many ex-
communist countries in the former Soviet bloc. This dissertation provides one
answer, as well as insights into the Cuban system, based on evidence mostly
from 1980 and 1994. The subject of the research project was approached from
a Cuban perspective to shed more light on how events and issues were
interpreted on the island. Cuban cultural and historical references shared by
Cubans as a nation were taken into account, and were given great importance
in interpreting the evidence. The dissertation examines in depth Cuban
political history and relates findings to it.
Any understanding of the island has to take into account the specific regional
and national context, without which any analysis would be incomplete. This
context, among other topics, includes Cuban history, its post-colonial
patriotism, media censorship, developing country context and more. Above all
the context of post-colonial nation-building, frustrated until 1959, as the most
important driver of the system, needs to be kept in mind when reading this
text. As Karl Marx pointed out,
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they
please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by them~elves,
but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted
from the past." (Marx 1852).
Hence, the Cuban system was also set in its own particular historical context.
"The colonisation of Cuba by the Spanish conquistadores was
accompanied by the cruel and relentless extermination of the
indigenous population. By 1550 as a consequence of inhuman forced
labour, hunger, and disease, only some five or six thousand of the
100,000 Indians, calculated to have existed at the beginning of the
sixteenth century survived. The Indians were the first victims of the
bloody epoch of colonisation and the original accumulation of capital.
There followed the unbridled exploitation and gradual but systematic
extermination of entire generations of black slaves ...." (Zorina 1975:
2).
The research provides one perspective on why Cuba might have survived
1989. After 1989, Cuba found itself in a time of increased antagonism with
some of its former allies such as Czechoslovakia, and found itself more
isolated, experiencing some of the worst economic problems since its 1959
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Revolution'. The new context greatly challenged the stability and future of the
system. These extremely difficult times forced the system to reflect on its
raisons d 'etre, and respond to the current concerns and attitudes of the
population in order to avoid a sudden collapse along the lines of Eastern
Europe few years earlier. This dissertation provides a new perspective on
Cuban political history during the period. To answer the research questions, it
considers the system's endogenous ideas such as Cuba as a society under siege
and at war, Cuban patriotism and history of struggle for independence, its
national heroes, such as Jose Marti and his concept of Nuestra America,
condemnation of active opposition against the system, the triumphant
revolutionary symbolism of 1959, imperialist exploitation, Marxist
interpretations of democracy, the US embargo, and immaterial socialist values
conflicting the US capitalist model, amongst others.
Examining Cuban politics and especially the country's survival of 1989 is a
highly controversial topic, which as such was difficult to tackle in a serious
research project and unforeseen research problems had to be addressed and
resolved to complete the research. Perhaps, because politically-oriented
research on Cuba has to confront many challenges, there appears to be a lack
of academic research transgressing two existing delimitations: first, literature
written with somewhat limited critical approach, even if using excellent data
from within the system; second, critical analyses written from a liberal
democratic perspective, often lacking substantial research data from within the
system that would provide better understanding of the situation from within.
The latter are at times written from an outsider's perspective, and miss
important contextual data related to the culture and history of the Cuban
nation. This lack can make them incomplete, as capturing the context is crucial
for understanding what makes the system tick. This research addressed this
gap, with its own limits of objectivity, and tackles sensitive topics from a
critical position also using data gathered from within the system. As academic
research, this investigation goes beyond journalistic literature, which may be
one-sided or have a clear political agenda. This research combines a wide
variety of sources, including those published on the island. even if they tend to
be rather uncritical and "within the revolution", By doing this, it centres on a
certain middle ground, as an academic investigation based on historical
evidence from within and outside the system.
The evidence, the research and analysis were approached within the Cuban
context, where communist ideological boundaries were openly set, and
Granma, in particular, served as the key delivery vehicle of information from
the Cuban Communist Party (CCP), allowing no space for alternative opinions
in the context of one possible acceptable truth, constructed by the leadership.
Since 1959, dissenting intellectuals have been marginalised, siphoned off or
suppressed in the name of national security, and thus the Cuban public at large
has not encountered alternative interpretations of reality that would offer other
conceivable solutions.
IThroughout the dissertation, "Revolution" refers to the historical event in 1959 and
"revolution" to the system and more complex process since 1959.
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"In the 1960s, counterrevolutionaries as well as gays, Jehovah's'
Witnesses, and other unfortunates who did not fit the revolutionary
profile were imprisoned with minimal recourse to legal procedures."
(Alfred Padula in Baloyra & Morris 1993: 25).
This research seeks above all to enhance our understanding of why the Cuban
system may have survived the challenges of 1989, looking primarily at its
internal mechanics, but also considering external factors and the symbolism of
the collapse of communism in other parts of the world. The question is not
only how the system survived the 1989 crisis, but also how the revolution
survived internal crises, how it adapted to new circumstances and what might
have allowed it to cope with the 1990 to 1994 material deprivation, the worst
since 1959, when discontent was rampant and the future was in question. To
achieve this, the research uses explanatory tools and concepts that have been
overlooked in the literature on Cuba, or have not been addressed in a similar
depth and detail. By examining crises, we can make interesting inferences
about the possible reasons for the revolution's ability to cope. Emphasis is
placed on understanding Cuban political communication within its national
context of the single-party communist state, where access to alternative
sources was significantly restricted, with the media officially controlled by the
leadership.
To interpret the revolution before and after 1989, the research focuses .
primarily on legitimacy in relation to the changing circumstances, to explam
the system's survival. Other possible factors are also acknowled~ed~ to reveal
the full complexity of the situation and suggest further research. m different
directions that would greatly complement the conclusions ~fthl.s research. The
existing literature provides different pictures of the re.volutlOn Sl?Ce 1959, and
its legitimating components, which changed during. d~~ferent periods for
internal and strategic reasons, namely the 1959-~0 ml~lal.mass s~pport ~fthe
triumph, the 1970s economic challenges, institutlOnahsatlOn, alliance with the
Soviet Union and constitutional changes. 1980 brought new c~allenges as
support from the Soviets started declining, a new post-revolutionary
generation of Cubans reached maturity and the country was thrown into the
midst of shifting currents from glasnost and perestroika to the outright
collapse of Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe in 1989. The worst for the
revolution followed thereafter during the 1990s. The reasons why the system
argued for its legitimate right to exist differed during these periods, with some
reasons persisting and others being added or even dropped. The post-1989
period appears as the most interesting, since Cuba survived the political
changes of its former allies, going against the currents of the time and keeping
its communism and revolutionary system. This inspires the questions, what
happened during the crucial post-1989 period, and how did it change in
comparison to the pre-1989 times? Did Cuba retreat to its original aspirations
and ideas of 1959-60, as a country not constrained by the pragmatic alliance
with the USSR, or did it carry on with little difference in terms of its internal
political culture and project? Were socialism and communism still emphasised
after 1989, despite the negative publicity of other countries adopting the
neoliberal Washington Consensus? How may Cuba have survived the
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shocking material deprivation on the island during the first half of the 1990s, if
material provision represented for some an important legitimating force that
was now missing? This research answers these and other questions by
examining the shifts in the system before and after 1989 and then making
analytic conclusions and inferences on the basis of the findings, to enhance
our understanding of how the revolution reconsidered its essence to save the
system from a collapse, and what aspects it emphasised to encourage public
support. Let us now first consider the existing interpretations of the system,
before going into more detail on the analytical tools and evidence.
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1.2. Interpretations of the Cuban System since the 1960s
The existing literature on Cuba is vast, especially if we include non-academic
titles, as the country has been both a great source of inspiration, as well as an
object of criticism. Many authors have examined Cuban politics, history and
other aspects of the system, hence this chapter looks at some of the most
important interpretations of the revolution and how it survived different
periods. The chapter considers first the overall body of relevant literature, and
then considers in more depth the key authors that have looked at the
legitimacy of the system since 1959.
Interpretations of the First Two Decades of the Revolution
Initial interpretations of the system were influenced by the recent nature of the
Cuban Revolution, and often examined its origin. US liberal explanations such
as Theodore Draper's were often critical of the process, and assigned the
system's raison d'etre to Castro's skilful megalomania and lust for power,
assigning a lesser role to the initial mass support and grass roots nature of the
system (Draper 1961, 1965). Draper concluded that the system was based on
Castro's political skills as a more recent version of Latin American
caudillismo, even naming it "his revolutionary schiozophrenia" (Draper 1961:
26). He maintained that the system was based more on Castro's political
ambition and skills, than socialism, communism or popular support:
" ...it is not what it claims to be. It belongs to a new type of system ...the
revolution that brought him into power is so ruthlessly distorted that
his entire political development begins and ends in fantasy .... Fidel
Castro-as much a demagogue as idealist, as much adventurer as
revolutionary, as much anarchist as Communist or anything else-was
suddenly and unexpectedly catapulted into power without a real party,
real army, or a real program." (Draper 1961: 26).
In a somewhat similar way, Andres Suarez perceived the basis of the system
as a conspiration between Castro and the Partido Socialista Popular, again
disregarding its popular basis (Suarez 1967). Originally Cuban and with direct
involvement in the revolutionary process, Suarez documented Castro's uses of
power and his motivations to take the island towards socialism for
opportunistic reasons and his ability to radicalise Cubans (Ibid.). Similar to
Draper, Suarez perceived Castro's lack of ideological conviction, exploiting
the Cold War for his own ends. The system was therefore based primarily on
Castro as a manipulative politician, labelling the system as "Castroism" rather
than communism, which the latter adopted for strategic reasons to guarantee
Soviet support (Ibid.). These and other authors, implied the central role of
Castro, a theme that took on a life of its own in the works of many other
authors, assuming the system survived due to Castro's charismatic personality.
The initial focus of these liberal analyses shaped the subsequent thinking
about the revolution and its essence.
Lloyd Free, on the other hand, researched attitudes of the Cuban people on the
island after the Revolution and published his findings in his book Attitudes of
the Cuban People toward the Castro Regime in Late 1960. Free found that 86
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percent of the respondents supported the Government and 43 percent could be
called fervent supporters. He noted that many of the fervent supporters
mentioned the extraordinary qualities of, and their supreme faith in, Fidel
Castro (Free 1960). Gustavo Torroella, a Cuban researcher, found during his
research of the attitudes of over one thousand Cuban youths in the early 1960s
in his book Estudio de la juventud cubana, that they also greatly supported the
system. Zeitlin confirmed this notion with his research into the attitudes and
post-revolutionary conditions of Cuban workers, and their involvement in
political processes and changing power-relations in the workplace (1962,
1970). Zeitlin, Torroella and Free, confirmed the notion of the original
popularity of the revolutionary system, and communism:
"Como se observa en el Cuadro No.9, el concepto que tiene la
juventud cubana del progreso consiste en el avance de la sociedad
hacia el socialism-comunismo." (Torroella 1963: 51).
The three authors concluded that amongst the main sources of legitimacy
behind the popular support were social emancipation and real benefits, such as
social provision or workers' rights, as well as workers' involvement and
politicisation by the revolutionary process, which benefited the population
soon after 1959. The system's legitimacy seems to have been based on
involvement of Cubans in political processes, as recognised in 1960 by
Richard Fagen and his emphasis on the impact of the Literacy Campaign that
involved and socialised the population (Fagen 1969). Kapcia supported the
notion of popular support based on the literacy campaign and land reforn;, as
two prominent examples of processes that brought real benefits to many m
post-colonial Cuba and "ensured a lasting loyalty" (Kapcia 2008: 52-~3).
Other authors, such as Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, confirmed this
perspective, examining the benefits brought to many Cub~s, mainly l~~~ess
farm workers and labourers, during the early agrarian policies and the initial
wide consensus in revolutionary Cuba (Huberman & Sweez~ 196 ~: 78). These
were part of the essentially peasant character of the Revolution, WIth deep
roots in historic inequalities and dependence ofpre-1959 Cuba. Huberman and
Sweezy argued for the "peasant character of the rebel army" and the
Revolution, appealing to the interests of the poorest sectors of Cuban society,
who gained the most from the subsequent processes which, for them,
legitimated the system during the first decade of the revolution:
"The reason for existence of the Cuban peasant under the old order was
thus very simply to be exploited for the benefit of others." (Ibid: 80).
The new relations were confirmed by the Agrarian Reform Law in May 1959,
after the initial focus of the revolutionary regime on correcting abuses caused
under Batista (Ibid: 145). They wrote about the "unwavering support of the
plain working people" convinced that the Revolution served their interests,
and whose betrayal would represent the loss of all they believed in (Ibid: 178).
The crucial role of the agrarian reform was equally stressed by Azicri, who
also discussed nationalisations of private enterprises, as the revolution sought
to eliminate social privilege (Azicri 1988: 29). Huberman and Sweezy
concluded that, initially, the system was not based explicitly on communist,
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but mostly on patriotism and humanitarianism, which guaranteed wide popular
support (Huberman & Sweezy 1961: 145).
"All these factors interacted with the upsurge of mass living standards
to create a quantity and quality of popular support for the revolutionary
government which has few if any historical parallels." (Ibid.)
In addition, they argued that economic achievements were a significant force,
allowing the revolution to survive the first decade (Ibid: 108). This was,
however, combined with other factors, such as the exhilaration which came
from overthrowing the domination of foreign and domestic bosses, or national
pride in standing up to the United States (Ibid: 203). The defiance of the
United States was also confirmed by Scheer, Zeitlin, Bonsal, Farber,
Boorstein, who recognised the historical confrontation with the United States
and its behaviour towards Cuba, and the resulting attitudes on the island, as an
important factor in the success of the Revolution (Scheer & Zeitlin 1963,
Bonsai 1971, Farber 1976, Boorstein 1968). Fagen supported this notion with
his focus on the changing dynamics of Cuban political culture, by focusing on
the 1961 literacy campaign, the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction and the
CDRs. During the early 1960s, Cuba was not interpreted primarily as
nationalistic, with Ram6n Eduardo Ruiz recognising the role of nationalism
only in 1968 (Ibid: 630).
According to Azicri, the opening of education and public health ensured the
loyalty of the people. The crucial role of the health reform was also supported
by Hugh Thomas, who as a result labelled the Revolution "immensely
popular" (Thomas 1998: 1486). Edelstein also stressed the role of the post-
revolutionary redistribution of property and other real benefits, placing great
emphasis on the achievements with respect to a general social transformation
improving equality, health, education, and secure employment, national
sovereignty and dignity. Kapcia argued for the extension of these egalitarian
policies towards not only social, but also racial opening (Kapcia 2008: 46),
further strengthening public loyalty in the 1960s.
Hugh Thomas covered Cuban history in great depth in 1971 and then again in
1986, and emphasised the historical roots of the Revolution, dating back to the
18th century (Thomas: 1971). The historical roots and legitimacy of the system
were also supported by Damian Fernandez, Azicri, and Louis J. Perez. Kapcia
labelled these historical roots later with his concept of cubanla revolucionaria
[revolutionary Cubanness], to stress the cultural element and radicalisation of
Cuban patriotism:
"In order to understand how this newer cubanla corresponded to the
earlier version, however, we should examine its component beliefs and
'codes', its array of political-historical myths and its discourse. This is
especially necessary because myths and discourse have historically
been the most effective ways in which the codes (and thus the whole
ideology) have been inculcated, preserved, embodied, understood, and
transferred across generations and between groups. We are not talking
here of ideas, but rather of beliefs and values, that is the substance of
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which a genuinely consensual ideology consists ... Thus 'activism'
extolled Maceo's resistance at Baragua in 1878 rather than the previous
surrender of Zanj6n; extolled the self-sacrifice of Marti rather than the
'betrayal' by the 1908 Constitutional Convention's acceptance of the
Platt Amendment..." (Kapcia 2008: 92).
The historical and cultural roots of the Revolution were taken futher by Nelson
Valdes. He wrote about the packaging of the revolutionary rhetoric, which
promoted endogenous ideas of morality, duty, honour and a concept of an
absolute truth, as major components of the country's historical heritage
(Valdes 1979). Valdes examined the idea of Cuban millenarianism, or la
generacion del centenario, which fulfilled the long frustrated longings of the
Cuban people as a sovereign nation, supporting the link between Cuban
historical heritage and patriotism (Ibid.). According to him, the term la
generacion del centenario was used by politically active yO\lt\~'Qeo"Q\e (:)\ \\\e
ea\.\':J '\.\\.\.e~ \.\\. ()\.~e\. \() C()Th.Th.eTh.~\.a\e )Q~e"Marti's birth in 1853, as a specific
link. between national heritage and the revolutionary system. Further
examining the historical roots of the system, Valdes identified Antonio
Guiteras as an anti-imperialist like Marti, but also an anti-capitalist, thus
predefining the ideology of the Revolution. He argued that these Cuban
heroes, together with Eduardo Chibas, placed great emphasis on the moral
behaviour of leaders, ruling on the basis of unquestioned support of the
people, thus representing a historical legitimacy of the subsequent system
reflecting this heritage (Ibid.). According to Valdes, there was no significant
socialist influence in the ideology of the 26th of July Movement, implying that
ideological socialism as we know it was not central for the Revolution in its
early years, but was integrated later.
Kapcia categorised the content of the revolutionary rhetoric into culturalism,
youthism, re-generation and ruralism (Kapcia 2008: 92). Similar to Valdes and
others, he also identified explicitly moral foundations and support in the
countryside as two key components of the system (Ibid: 93). According to
Kapcia, the system initially stressed voluntarism, consciousness and anti-
materialism as the revolutionary values underpinning the system (Ibid: 103),
with frequent biblical metaphors of the myth of David as a "powerful biblical
and mythical legitimacy" (Ibid: 104). The endogenous historical codes
contained in the revolutionary rhetoric as part of the legitimating matrix of the
system were also examined by Saul Landau. Landau analysed the specific
meaning of communism in Cuba in relation to its historical and anticolonial
struggle against foreign interests, and the United States in particular, with this
confrontation sustaining the system:
"Cuban communism developed as a direct result of US hostility, not
from a Soviet plan, and that the Cuban revolution remained part and
parcel of a larger anti-imperial, anticolonial movement. To this day, the
ethnocentric press corps does not place Cuba's revolution in the
context of its own and world history, nor do most reporters see the
revolutionaries themselves as members of a historical fraternity forged
in a common commitment dating back to at least 1868." (Landau 2006:
123).
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Along with Azicri and others, Landau argued for the historical and
geopolitical sources of legitimacy dating from before the Revolution (Landau
2006: 127). As Balfour wrote later, the implicit message was that to carry out
the great task of development, Cubans could not be left to their own devices
because they had been conditioned by decades of neo-colonialism,
underdevelopment and dependency (Balfour 2009: 128). Azicri, however,
placed greater emphasis on the interplay between popular support and outside
pressure:
"Domestic and international political dynamics, pressures, threats, and
attacks against the revolution, as well as massive support for it by the
majority of the Cuban population, provided both the context and the
forces pitted against each other throughout this difficult period. The
regime has usually explained its policies as a continuation of Cuba's
tradition in its struggle for independence since the 1860s." (Azicri
1988: 28).
The outside pressures were also emphasised by Richard Gott, as the beginning
of the Cuba-under-siege atmosphere that allowed the political leadership to
justify its decisions and policies:
"These attacks along the Cuban coast were to continue throughout the
1960s, a perpetual irritant to the government and to the population, and
an excuse for the Cuban government to maintain an ever more
powerful and intrusive secret service. As in the days of Spain, the
island's captain-general was obliged to take strong-ann measures
against the 'pirates' - and those who supported them on the island."
(Gott 2005: 209).
The notion of Cuban nationalism was supported by most Cuba experts,
including Lawrence Whitehead and Kapcia, representing a key theme in the
existing literature as a characteristic process of post-colonial emancipation.
Kapcia, examined the way nationalism was often indirectly evoked in Cuban
discourse, where the revolution meant the same as Patria [homeland],
providing a crucial connection between the local and national (Kapcia 2008:
84). Sebastian Balfour also viewed nationalism as the dominant source of
legitimacy of the system during the 1960s and the 1970s, with constant
appeals to patriotism, exemplified by the exemplary role of the heroes of the
Revolution. In addition, Balfour emphasised the personality cult as a belief in
the infallibility of Fidel Castro, and the values of the revolution:
"The official ethic of the Revolution was an extension into everyday
life of the Sierra campaign. The new virtues that Cubans were
encouraged to adopt were austerity, discipline, selflessness and
comradeship." (Balfour 2009: 76).
Fernandez, extended the debate by shifting the focus onto the role of emotions
in Cuban political culture, as the key component of the system and its
inherent, radical nationalism:
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"Modem projects such as nationalism, ironically, relied primarily on
feelings, not reason or imagination exclusively. Emotional attachment
to a place, its symbols and myths, and the sense of solidarity with
strangers (Le. co-nationals), where the cornerstone of national identity.
Revolution, another modem notion, required more than cost-benefit
calculation to spread its fire; it demanded affect and disaffect."
(Fernandez 2000: 5).
Fernandez concluded that affection and passion defined the character of
politics in Cuba, based on a strong emotional foundation, even before 1959,
regardless of governments and regimes." (Ibid: 41). He even labelled Cuban
political culture a "political religion" (Ibid: 63), and identified charisma as
contributing force. As other authors mentioned earlier, Fernandez also
concluded that during the 1960s the system relied also on significant material
benefits that the revolutionary government redistributed in-line with its
emphasis on egalitarianism. Thus, Fernandez summarised that material
benefits along with "affection, passion, political religion, and charisma
mutually reinforced each other" (Ibid: 69). He identified the importance of the
cultural foundation of the system and historical foundations based on
frustrated Cuban nationalism (Ibid: 33) as well as the initial role of inclusion
of most Cubans in processes of political socialisation as key factors:
"Soon after the advent of the revolution the state undertook several
major campaigns to socialize individuals according to revolutionary
norms ....values such as collective spirit, conciencia [conscience],
egalitarianism, self-sacrifice, patriotism, internationalism, and loyalty
to Fidel Castro and the symbols of the revolution ..." (Ibid: 88).
The notion of the emotional basis of the system's legitimacy was previously
supported by James M. Malloy, who concluded that the Revolution built an
emotional connection with the Cuban masses in the year 1962 to 1965,
building "a large store of affective commitments for the new regime among
the masses" (Malloy 1974: 34).
To an extent, Fernandez and Malloy attributed legitimacy primarily to
affective commitment, overtly simplifying the complex mechanics of system
legitimation.
In his book Cuba in the 1970s, Carmelo Mesa-Lago examined the second
decade of the revolution, which he labelled as the decade of
institutionalisation, as part of the radically shifting interpretation of the
revolution Interpreting its origins and the 1973 reform, he argued that the
system rejected the division of state power into three branches-executive,
legislative and judiciary-as a bourgeois institution (Mesa- Lago 1974a: 67).
This concept was later retained in the 1976 Constitution. He labelled Cuba as a
"personalistic-charismatic regime" (Ibid: ix), assigning the initial source of
legitimacy to Fidel Castro, which allowed the system to maintain the unity of
the Cuban people. During the 1970s, however, this was being increasingly
replaced by institutions as Castro's "charisma-as a unifying force in the
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Revolution-was eroded." (Ibid: 155). In 1974, Andres Suarez continued to
argue for the importance of Cuban media and historical legitimacy of the
system:
"The effort of the Cuban news media to identify Castro's goals with
those of Jose Marti are obvious." (Andres Suarez 1974: 5).
In the introduction of Cuba, Castro, and Revolution, Suchlicki interpreted
Castro's support of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia as a turning point, as
a contradiction to the Cuban sense of national independence. Similar to
Dominguez and others, he emphasised the role of Fidel Castro (Suchlicki ed.
1972: 18). Unlike most other authors, Suchlicki attributed the system's
legitimacy to the grip of the armed forces, making him an outlier in the
community of authors focusing on the island (Suchlicki 1972: 19). In addition,
Suchlicki identified the embargo as an important source of legitimacy,
supporting the continuing siege mentality, which facilitated the mobilisation of
the population and justified the demands for personal sacrifices and providing
a justification of economic failures. (Suchlicki ed. 1972: 21).
Dominguez interpreted the 1970s by examining Cuban political evolution and
prioritised an interpretation of the revolution's roots in Cuba's political, as
opposed to its social or economic, confirgurations before 1959. Similar to
Mesa-Lago and Suchlicki, Dominguez assigned the primary role to Castro:
"In January 1959, therefore, the old Cuban political system was fragile,
while the resources legitimating revolutionary politics were vital,
including the first, the best, the supreme political resource, then and
thereafter, Fidel Castro himself." (Dominguez 1978: 196).
Dominguez, however, also explained why he thought that institutions were
growing in importance even though, unlike Mesa-Lago, Dominguez
maintained Castro's supreme role:
"Under the two previous twentieth-century political systems in Cuba
no single leader had been available to act as the focal point of the
legitimation-or relegitimation-of Cuban politics ....Castro had charisma,
and charisma provides an authority that rests upon the extraordinary
quality of the ruler as a person as it is perceived by the citizenry.
Charisma depends on the leader's conviction that he does not depend
on election by his followers but had been 'elected' by a supernatural
authority, either God or some 'historical force,' and on the citizenry's
sharing that conviction. Charismatic authority is very unstable and
must be routinized if it is to remain successful. The routinization of
charisma began very slowly during the 1960s as government
legitimacy began to depend more on other people, institutions, and
policies; it was not until the 1970s that the process appeared to be
taking hold .... many Cubans distinguished between the failures of the
government, which they might be willing to criticize, and Fidel Castro
himself, who is exempt from criticism." (Ibid: 197-198).
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Dominguez continued stressing the role of the revolutionary leader during the
1970s, but extended further the system's justifications to pre-1959 Cuba as a
reference point, and the growing role of institutions. He also argued for the
important role of the media in regards to the interpretation of the past:
"Although the power of, and reliance on, charismatic leadership as a
source of legitimation has declined in Cuba, it is still a pillar of the new
order ....The Cuban revolution was legitimated not only by charisma but
also by performance. The message repeated in speeches, in newspaper
articles, in broadcasts, in virtually all significant appeals for popular
support has been that the revolution delivered Cuba from a terroristic,
corrupt, abusive and illegitimate political system. This message
generated an immediate source of support. When in the spring of 1960
Lloyd Free asked people about their fears or worries for Cuba, the
single most important response was 'a return to the past' .... This
negative legitimacy-the concept that the present government is
legitimate because it saved the country from the past-was prominent at
the time of Free's survey and is still voiced in official political
statements ...." (Ibid: 199).
Similar to Kapcia and others, Dominguez continued to argue that the system
relied on real achievements in terms of material and social redistribution,
development, and eradication of illiteracy, which continued to legitimate the
dystem during the 1970s. Marifeli Perez-Stable broadened this notion by
arguing for the impact of economic growth since the 1970s to 1980s (Perez-
Stable 1993b: 74-75), together with the revolution represented by Castro
(Perez-Stable 1993b: 71). Dominguez also argued for the key rol~ of Cuban .
nationalism, as another dominant legitimating force, and the specific semantic
meaning of the concept in the country's discourse:
"Another equally early source of legiti~~cy was na~ion~lis~. .
...Nationalism affirmed the cultural, political, and historical integrity of
the Cuban nation. Often nation is used to mean the working people of
Cuba, or the worker-peasant alliance .... class enemies are also national
enemies .... The revolution is legitimate at least in part because its
enemies, both within and outside its borders, are so despicable. Class
enemies are described as 'worms'; foreign enemies, as 'imperialists'"
(Dominguez 1978: 200).
Dominguez summarised the "four elements in the legitimation of the
revolutionary rule" as including charisma, political deliverance, distributional
performance, and nationalism (Ibid: 201). He stressed that political
participation in general elections did not legitimate the system, but only
contributed to it along with the more important underlying "contact with the
masses" (Ibid: 298).
Referring specifically to the 1970s, Azicri presented a number of stabilising
factors, with the 1976 Constitution providing a new political and legal
framework combining Cuban and Soviet Marxism-Leninism with endogenous
Cuban ideas (Azicri 1988: 39). This was combined with the first national
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elections since 1959 held in October 1976 (Ibid: 40), also a legitimating factor.
He recognised the direct communication with the Cuban people at mass
gatherings as a particular exercise of revolutionary democracy, and we can
understand it as a Cuba-specific source of legitimacy addressed in this
research (Ibid: 241). Similar to Dominguez and others, Azicri brought
attention to the growing legitimating role of institutions during the 1970s:
"The institutionalization process expanded the revolutionary
government's legitimacy. The source of its legitimacy somewhat
shifted from Castro's original charismatic leadership and the core of
revolutionary values to the newly created socialist institutions.
However, Castro's centrality continues as the main source of the
revolution's traditional legitimacy, and he is the leader towering above
all individuals, and institutions. Thus the polity is still ruled by a
uniquely qualified charismatic leader, who is also the system's founder
and major architect." (Ibid: 70).
The role of participation in mass organisations was described in more detail by
Casal, confirming the strong participatory ethos of the system, as a potential
source of legitimacy by involvement:
"The Organos de Poder Popular [Organs of People's Power] delegates
have the duty to listen to problems, complaints, difficulties, etc.,
brought in by citizens of their districts. Furthermore, they are required
to transmit requests to the corresponding municipal, regional or
provincial organization and to report back to their electors on their
requests ... Ol'P delegates have scheduled weekly office hours to talk to
their electors .... The masses participate directly in the process of
discussion and approval of fundamental laws, etc., from the Family
Code to the Constitution. These discussions take place at the work
centers and also through the mass organizations such as the CDR.
Significant modifications of the laws can emerge (and have emerged)
from these dicussions .... The mass organizations are another instrument
for participation of the masses in decision-making. These organizations
(CDR, FMC, Central Organi- zation of Cuban Trade Unions, National
Association of Small Farmers, Federation of University Students of
Cuba, Federation of Intermediate Education Students of Cuba, and the
Union of Pioneers of Cuba), 'gather in their midst the various sectors
of the population' and 'represent specific interests of the same',
according to the first draft of the Cuban Constitution (Article 7). These
mass organizations during the early years of the Revolution had as
their main goal mobilizing the people to accomplish specific
revolutionary tasks (voluntary work, demonstrations, vigilance, etc.).
Thus, they were instruments for participation but mostly at the
implementation level. Since 1970, these organizations have
strengthened their membership, increased their scope of action and
gained an increasing role in decision-making." (Casal 1975: 84, 86-
87).
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Referring to the 1970s, Balfour argued for the continuing presence of the
immense energy released by the Revolution, but also a presence of an "Afro-
Cuban discourse of the Revolution" where "Angola was a reaffirmation of the
strength of the Revolution for many Cubans and a welcome source of national
pride after the reverses of the late 1960s and early 1970s." (2009: 128).
In comparison to the interpretations of the 1960s, the literature and depth of
analysis have not only grown substantially as revolutionary Cuba generated
growing interests among leftist sympathisers as well as liberal critics, but the
early interpretations also shifted from focusing excessively on the role of
Castro (eg. Draper), to more complex and system-focused analyses (eg. Mesa-
Lago, Dominguez). Following the initial focus on the reasons and history of
the Revolution itself, authors examined the underlying processes, such as
nationalism or radicalisation, and subsequently looked more at the new
challenges to the system and its responses. Altogether, the literature covering
the first two decades identified a whole range of factors that may have
contributed to the stability of the system and its survival of numerous
challenges.
Interpretations of the 1980s and 1990s: Collapse of the Socialist Bloc
Azicri analysed Cuban political traditions and the system's structure of the
first half of the 1980s in his 1988 book Cuba: Politics, Economics and
Society. He addressed the topic of legitimacy in a chapter entitled The Cuban
Republic, still emphasising Castro's personality, arguing that: " ...this created a
system whereby the regime's authority has always been highly centralized in
and around Castro ...Castro further defined the revolution as being Marxist-
Leninist, 2 December 1961" (Azicri 1988: 26-27). Azicri examined 1980
Mariel, interpreting it as a renewal of the system, concluding that Mariel
reawakened the revolutionary consciousness, even if it encouraged some
inside, and many outside, the island to question the regime's legitimacy.
"Mariel was too controversial internally and externally to be settled easily.
Opposing interpretations were given as to its causes, meaning, and
consequences for Cuba ..." (Ibid: 43). According to Azicri, Cubans were
looking for ways of preserving the system, with nationalism playing an
increasingly legitimating role to support socialism (Ibid: 98).
Fernandez interpreted the events of the 1980 Mariel and concluded that for
many Cubans, the spectacle of the boatlift was a breaking point: "[Cubans]
could not accept living under a system that encouraged that kind of behaviour;
basic moral norms were transgressed in a system that portrayed itself as a
highly moral." (Ibid: 87-88). He did not explain, however, why Cuba could
have possibly survived such a crisis. Nor did he explain on the basis of what
evidence he reached such a generalising conclusion. He examined the erosion
of legitimacy without establishing his use of the concept and its mechanics,
attributing overt emphasis to the role of emotional legitimacy, with little
attention to the different decades and internal evolution of the system. Despite
not setting out his methodology and evidence, Fernandez instinctively
identified a whole range of issues that were part of the Cuban discourse.
Nevertheless, part of his conclusion was that nationalism was growing in
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importance in regards to the loyalty of the people, as it appealed widely to
popular sentiment:
"The revolution required an emotional infrastructure to triumph over
Batista as well as to sustain itself in power. Realising that the Cuban
masses were losing that loving feeling, Fidel and other leaders
emphasized themes and leitmotives that pulled at the heartstrings of
Cubans, specifically nationalism in its Cuba-the-besieged-island
variant and the glories of the revolutionary struggle. Since the 1980s
the government launched two major campaigns to do just
that. ...Without the revolution there would not be an independent patria .
...An attempt to reignite the politics of passion and the crusade for
absolute moral ends." (Ibid: 116).
Fernandez also argued for the role of international crises, which, he believed,
had been used to encourage nationalist passion among Cubans (Ibid: 117). He
suggested the system relied primarily on popular support. Louis A. Perez Jr.
also addressed nationalism aimed at the United States as a contributing factor.
Similar to Fernandez, Perez argued that anti-US attitudes were promoted by
the revolution as a legitimating issue, especially after the Bay of Pigs invasion
(Louis A. Perez Jr. 1992: 501). In addition, Perez Jr. supported the notion of
emigration as a key factor that guaranteed the internal success of the system
(Ibid.).
The question of Cuban economics received renewed attention in relation to the
1980s and especially the 1990s as declining economic performance greatly
challenged the system, had a negative impact on its legitimacy, and was
understood by liberal scholars as an important factor in the collapse of the
countries of the Soviet bloc. Andrew S. Zimbalist analysed Cuban economics
and other aspects of this period in great detail. According to Zimbalist, the
siege mentality and related repression remained relevant in the late 1980s and
1990s and helped to secure stability:
"Indeed, Castro and the Party justifiably perceive Cuba to be more
under seige from external forces today than at any time in the
revolution's past. This perception has always brought increased
repression at home. The incarceration of political dissidents, the
operation of the brigadas de respuesta rapida, the enhanced control
over the media, the cancellation of the satiric film Alicia en el pueblo
de maravillas (Alice in Wonderland) and other signs all point to
increased repression, concurrent with the suggested liberalisation
reforms of the Fourth Party Congress. The regime sees the repression
as requisite for its survival. It is probably right. ...Castro is still viewed
as the legitimate defender of Cuban sovereignty by large numbers of
Cubans. It is improbable in the extreme that the 40% to 50% of the
Cuban population that is black or mulatto will accept passively the
vision of Cuba's future offered by right-wing, white Cuban exiles in
Miami. Large numbers of white or mulatto Cubans are also prepared to
defend the Castro government. As long as the perceived alternative is
violence along with the highly publicised visions of the Cuban
16
American National Foundation, even strong critics of the Castro
government will defend it." (Zimbalist 1992: 11-12).
Like Huberman and Sweezy in the 1960s, Zimbalist concluded that economic
growth between 1965 and 1984 was 6.3%, which was a "very healthy, if not
impressive, rate of growth and stands out in sharp relief when compared to the
growth experienced in the rest of Latin America" (Zimbalist 1987: 93). The
crucial role of economic growth in legitimating the system was again revisited
by Claes Brundenius, who argued for the important interplay between
economic growth coupled with equity (Brundenius 1984). Brundenius argued
this was a legitimating factor during the 1960s, 70s as well as 1980s, despite
the growing economic problems (Brundenius 1981: 165). Zimbalist provided
several contributing factors to explain the legitimacy of the system and its
survival after 1989, including repression, Castro's personal legitimacy and the
fear of a possible return of Cuban exiles, with the last one shared with the
conclusions of Darren Hawkins. Hawkins, however, expanded this explanation
by poiting out that, besides the fear of Cuban exiles, Cubans also feared a
possible disintegration into chaos or civil war (Hawkins 1998, 2001). Darren
Hawkins addressed the question of post-Cold War Cuba and its legitimacy,
explaining that despite the 1990s as a decade of economic difficulty and the
rise of a post-revolutionary generation, Cuba appeared to maintain a minimal
standard of legitimacy. Hawkins also concluded that, on the whole, Cubans
still believed in the political institutions more than in its alternatives. In
addition, he concluded that low levels of blank or spoiled ballots during
elections suggested continuing legitimacy (Hawkins 2001: 77).
This was accompanied by the legitimating force of socialist programmes, such
as free medical care and education, subsidized food and transportation (Ibid:
80). Most importantly, sharing with the findings of this research, Hawkins
warned that liberal democratic political institutions were "deeply tainted" due
to their association with "corruption, underdevelopment, and poor governance
during their brief existence from 1940 to 1952." (Ibid: 80). Referring to the
economic, social and political problems in Latin America and Russia since the
1990s, Hawkins established that such new post-Cold War context failed to
persuade Cubans of the qualities of liberal democracy. He also identified the
established revolutionary norms as key legitimating factors that retained their
hold in the 1990s. On the basis of this interpretaton, we can assume that the
symbolic meaning of the possibility of the United States prevailing over
revolutionary Cuba represented a threat of a return to the Batista terror,
making the revolution a safer option under most circumstances, including the
most extreme hardship of the 1990s. This provided a major legitimating force
and encouragement of popular support. To strengthen the explanatory
potential of this factor, Hawkins also explained the construction of meaning of
pre-revolutionary Cuba in its discourse, and the important role of the country's
media: .
"The Cuban regime constantly reinforces images of a miserable pre-
revolutionary life through the media and the educational system. To the
extent that Cubans believe the argument that the revolution has
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improved their lives and there is evidence that a large number does."
(Ibid: 81).
Focusing specifically on the mid-1980s, Gott argued that the Cuban leadership
started organising Cuban defence in terms of a "people's war" to resist a
possible American attack, as a result of declining Soviet defence assistance
(Ibid: 274). The system at the same time started emphasising nationalism as
the main source of loyalty:
"Cuba's government no longer justifies its existence on the attempts it
once made to construct socialism. It emphasises instead its heroic and
long-lasting nationalist struggle against the United States, a campaign
that still strikes a sentimental chord in much of Latin America." (Gott
2005: 324).
Similar to Perez Jr., Gott attributed the stability of the system partially to the
periodic syphoning off of the disloyal parts of the population (2005: 212), in
contrast with the manifestations of support that accompanied it. After Mariel,
the continuing marches to demonstrate support represented an important
legitimating force and demonstrations of faithfulness to the Revolution (Ibid:
268). The notion of the importance of emigration was also confirmed by the
sociological research of Ernesto Rodriguez Chavez, who researched evidence
since 1959. Chavez looked at the shifting perceptions on emigration and
emigres in regards to Mariel and the maleconazo, concluding that emigration
was since the 1980s increasingly perceived as economic and gradually lost its
political content. He based this conclusion on sociological data and the fact
that a growing number of black and less educated Cubans were leaving,
following similar migratory patterns in the rest of the region from developing
to developed countries, and especially the United States. Cuban emigration
was increasingly being defined within this context and thus acquired a new
meaning. For these reasons, the phenomenon lost its delegitimating potential.
Kapcia extended the emigration argument further, recognising its role of
getting rid of dissenters, but also releasing potential unemployment. Kapcia
however saw emigration as also having a possibly negative impact on
legitimacy (Kapcia 1995: 10).
The theme of popular support was also addressed by Nelson Valdes, who
argued for the sweeping appeal of the patriotic revolution beyond ideological
questions, as a dominant legitimating force relevant both during the 1980s, as
well as after 1989 (Valdes 1992: 207). Valdes also addresses the question of
Cuban discourse and its endogenous context, as well as its limited horizon:
"Political language discloses codes-that is, recurring categories with
culturally defined meanings. The codes express imbedded ideas that
shape our perception of reality. They manifest shared assumptions,
whereas other aspects of observed reality are excluded." (Ibid: 208).
According to Valdes, we can observe a clear continuity in some of the basic
values of the revolution before 1989. He argued that even in 1940, most
political parties in Cuba shared a common terminology and rhetoric
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emphasising national independence and justice. According to Valdes,
Marxism only converged with the already existing basics of Cuban political
discourse during the 1960s and 1970s, with its focus on equality and
exploitation, while emphasis on morality retained its prime position (Valdes
1992: 213). This consistent internal composition of the discourse can thus be
understood as a persisting source of legitimacy of the system, helping to
explain its continuity despite the decline in the legitimacy of communism
worldwide. Valdes emphasised the role of the far-reaching endogenous roots
of the revolution in the following words:
"The marriage of politics, nationalism, and morality was initiated by
Felix Varela. A moral person, he wrote, was one who was useful to the
fatherland ...Cuban revolutionaries may define themselves as Marxists
and rugged materialists, but below the surface declarations one finds
utopian socialists consistently submitting to the logic of a moral code."
(Ibid: 214).
According to Valdes, the insulting approach toward the United States or
toward the dissent on the island can be understood within the country's
political culture pre-dating the Revolution, originating from a belief that one's
opponent is treacherous, understanding opposition as betrayal (Ibid: 217). He
identified a self-sacrificial component of the revolutionary culture, and
attributed it to the endogenous "Catholic-Hispanic values" also emphasising
discipline (Ibid: 216). The emphasis on sacrifice for the country, according to
Valdes, also had deep roots in the country's political culture and such
expectation was thus perceived as historically legitimate:
"Death permeates Cuba's historical and political imagination. The
willingness to die for a political ideal or for the nation represents the
highest form of patriotism and a true measure of altruism." (Ibid: 221).
This political culture, combining endogenous concepts of morality and
patriotism, thus contributed to the legitimacy of the system, since it it
encouraged self-denying support under any circumstances. This allowed Cuba
to cope with an overwhelming enemy at the Bay of Pigs, in Angola or simply
in isolation as during the Special Period. Along with others, Valdes recognised
nationalism as the prominent underlying force, stretching even beyond the
limits of self-preservation:
"Jose Marti taught...Nationalism, as the secular religion of a country
struggling for independence, accepted suicide as long as it was done
with a national purpose." (Ibid: 223).
This notion of the continuing prime role of nationalism in regards to the
system's legitimacy was also strongly supported by Kapcia, especially due to
its unique relevance to most Cubans across regions or ideologies, resulting in a
strong unifying capacity desperately needed by the political leadership
(Kapcia 2000: 234). Along with Balfour and others, Kapcia also argued for the
increasing role of nationalism in the 1990s, with a new trend to redefine the
Party in more nationalist, cubanista, terms emphasising the Revolution's
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historical roots and Cuban character. This resulted from a need "for a more
responsive structure to reclaim lost legitimacy and broaden its appeaL."
(Kapcia 1995: 23) (Balfour 2009: 155-159). Saul Landau supported the
continuing primacy of Cuban nationalism, as a result of similar processes after
World War II in other developing countries in Africa, the Middle East and
Asia that rose up against their colonial masters, adopting an anti-imperialist
discourse as other countries including Ghana, Algeria, Syria, Egypt, India or
China (Landau 2006: 118, 122).
The stability of the system during the 1980s and 1990s was addressed by Isaac
Saney, who examined the country's legal system, foreign relations, race
relations and emigration. Saney mentioned the contradictory meaning of
Cuban emigration for different political groups, and their use of the issue for
political ends. He argued that legitimacy continued to come from the longevity
of the system as such, and commented that elections, for example, were
connected in the minds of the people with corruption and disenfranchisement
(Saney 2004: 48). Saney focused on the particular structures of the
government and political practices, arguing they were perceived as legitimate
on the basis of Cuba's historical development and experience. He identified in
particular, the concept of the single-party system within Cuban national
history long before Marxism-Leninism:
"The necessity for a single party derives from Marti's writing on the
imperative of forging national unity and his experience in building the
Partido Revolucionario Cubano [Cuban Revolutionary Party-PRC].
The single-party system was conceptualised as 'an alternative to the
foreign imposed political process, in which Cubans were incited to
divide themselves along the lines of one or other of the political parties
each of which fought to attain political power for itself." (Ibid: 46-47).
Cuban academic Fernando Martinez Heredia with his co-author also
prioritised the historical foundations of the system within the developing, post-
colonial world. Similar to other authors and this research, they asserted that
the system was based on the initial support for the Revolution, and its
symbolism as a Cuban nation-building project, standing for change and
progress:
"The victory of the people's army and the tremendous struggles that
followed thoroughly destroyed and discredited the previous system.
Revolutionary accomplishments left far behind prior illusions, and
overcame assaults, enormous changes, miserable circumstances, chaos,
deprivation, mistakes, trials, and misfortunes. In the process the
foundations of Cuban socialism were erected, with new bonds of
solidarity formed between the people, the communities, and the nation.
The authority of the revolutionary leadership was conclusively
legitimized ... The consensus and continued legitimization of the Cuban
Revolution has in many fundamental ways been shaped by the political
behavior of the masses. The power of the state is not only of popular
origin, but it is identified as the appropriate means for producing
change, for defending the revolution, and for guaranteeing popular
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victories, progress, and the continuation of the regime. In spite of its
tenacious bureaucratization, shortcomings in the service sector, and
various mistakes, it would be unwise to think that Cubans tend to reject
this powerful state; on the contrary, their experience has, on balance,
been positive and the power of the state is viewed as belonging to
them." (Martinez Heredia & Pierce 1991: 22).
The authors identified differences between Cuba and former communist
countries, emphasising the need to perceive the island within its own regional
context, in many ways different from Eastern Europe, instead situating Cuba
in Latin America, as a small, underdeveloped, militant country of the
developing world, and its deep rooted historical conflict with North American
imperialism (Martinez Heredia & Pierce 1991: 19). The authors asserted that
Cuban socialism was less based on theoretical imperatives, and more on the
revolutionary history, which from its inception leaned towards socialist
policies in line with egalitarianism, emancipatory development and
redistribution. They argued for the role of specific components of the
revolution, and explained the meaning of this master signifier as a supreme
foundation. According to them, the central promises of the Revolution were:
"(a) permanently freeing Cuba from foreign domination, and
guaranteeing Cuba's sovereignty and self-determination; (b)
mobilizing, educating, and organizing the popular forces in the midst
of tremendous anticapitalist changes ...; and (c) restructuring from the
ground up the means of production and the reproduction of the forms
of social life, political power, and the body of prevailing ideas and
beliefs so that the economy, political power, and ideology would
remain in the hands and at the service of the majority." (Martinez
Heredia & Pierce 1991: 19). "This specific meaning of the revolution
and socialism then explains the limited impact of the ~ol1apse o~ other
socialist countries at the end of the Cold War." (Martinez Heredia &
Pierce 1991: 27).
The authors found a similar function of the system's communication processes
as this research, concluding that the people and the leadership maintained
direct communication, as a basic feature of the system improving its abilty to
remain stable at all times (Martinez Heredia & Pierce 1991: 33). This notion
was supported by Rafael Hernandez, who pointed out the key role of Cuban
media (Hernandez et al. 1991: 41).
Along with other Cuba experts, Julie M. Feinsilver argued for healthcare as a
major legitimating force in the context of the developing world (Feinsilver
1993). According to Feinsilver, this source oflegitimacy was increasingly
gaining prominence during the late 1980s and then also during the 1990s:
"The priority Cuba places on health-care investments despite the costs
is partially accounted for by the government's striving for legitimacy
in an adverse geopolitical situation. Because they are not freely elected,
socialist governments rely on their ability to meet the socio-economic
needs of their populations to legitimize their regimes." (Feinsilver
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1993: 200). "The inability of the Castro government to provide
adequate food and other basic consumer goods during this time of
adversity has led many to question the legitimacy of his rule.
Nonetheless, prior success in meeting basic needs helps to explain why
this government has survived so long after the fall of the Berlin Wall."
(Ibid: 211).
Feinsilver argued for an interaction of a number of factors that contributed to
the survival of the system into the 1990s, also including "nationalism, tight
domestic security, and more important, the lack of alternatives." (Ibid: xv).
Despite her argument about the deligitimating impact of the economic crisis
that some saw as terminal, Kapcia examined the impact of the crisis on the
system's legitimacy and stability in greater depth, and concluded that the crisis
was economic rather than political (Ibid 1995: 7). This research examines
further the different sources of legitimacy in the 1990s, reflecting the loss of a
relatively good economic performance of the 1980s.
Writing in the 1990s, Carmelo Mesa-Lago argued that the system would
collapse (Carmelo Mesa-Lago 1993), along with Enrique A. Baloyra and
James A. Morris (Baloyra & Morris 1993) and Juan M. Del Aguila (Del
Aguilla 1994). When Cuba, as one of the remaining communist countries
remained however, the reasons for the survival received renewed attention in
academic circles. According to Kapcia, Cuba experts came with different
answers:
"For some, its roots were to be found in the past and the system's
exceptionality. Damian Fernandez saw it in a continuity of Cuba's
politics of affection, solidarity and loyalty, while Antoni Kapcia
emphasised the system's underlying ideological cement, picking up a
theme which had been largely unchallenged to that point. ...The
question of the crucial role of Fidel Castro regained its explanatory
force in the 1990s." (Kapcia 2008c: 640, 644).
A general agreement on the topics has not been reached, even though authors
do often recognise a mixture of different factors that might have contributed to
it (nationalism, social provision, and culturalism).
Kapcia examined in detail Cuban national identity before and after 1959 and
also Cuban discourse in terms of words used to define "Cubanness", as well as
why the system survived the 1980 and 1994 crises and the end of the Cold
War. He argued for a "growing crisis of party legitimacy" since the late 1980s
(Kapcia 2000: 204). Through internal debate since the Rectification, the
system addressed problems of inefficiency, corruption and the rise of a
"bureaucratic class" (Hable 1991: 57-65; Bengelsdorf 1994: 91-4) (Kapcia
2000: 205). The beginnings of this process dating back to the mid-1980s were
interpreted by Kapcia as a way of explaining the system's survival of 1989
and the 1990s:
"Even before the post-1989 crisis in Eastern Europe evolved, therefore,
the Revolution was in the throes of both its own triple crisis and a
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process of self-questioning and debate, which, indeed, may be one
reason for the system's eventual survival beyond that new and
frightening challenge .... While the post-1989 crisis was enormous, it
was actually wider and older than it seemed, with its roots in internal
tensions, problems, debates and crises that were somewhat familiar to
many Cubans and were already being addressed along familiar lines. In
that sense, the real crisis point for Cuba was not 1989 or 1991, as it
seemed, but 1984-5; once the cycle of debate and contest was under
way from that date, the adjustment to the supplementary crises,
although more urgent and more extreme than any had imagined, was
actually just that - adjustment of the existing strategy, and not so much
a fundamental revision." (Kapcia 2000: 207).
In the 1990s, Kapcia perceived a return to Che as a unifying symbol relevant
to both the young and old in Cuba, and a source of legitimacy with its origins
in the 1960s (Kapcia 2000: 210-211). He termed the August 1994 crisis as the
worst since the 1960s (Kapcia 2000: 217). The evidence was also the 30 per
cent of abstention or spoiled ballots during the 1992 municipal elections
(Kapcia 2000: 217).
Along with Gott, Perez Jr. and others, Kapcia interpreted Cuban migration as a
way for the system to release discontented or exhausted Cubans, many of
whom were connected to the black market, and argued that the system used
the issue as an embarrassing weapon against the United States (Kapcia 1995:
1-2). Most importantly, he interpreted the events of July-August 1994 also as a
crisis at government-to-government level, instead of an internal issue of the
system (Kapcia 1995: 2). According to him, the 1994 crisis was a result of the
increasing tensions in Cuban society since 1989, and to a limited extent of an
increasing alienation of the younger generations, who were "less amenable to
the repetitions of older slogans and demanding alternative solutions" (Ibid: 9).
Kapcia argued that the episode "represented a collective protest against and
escape from the daily grind of existence in the Cuba of 1994" in an
environment riddled with boredom, loss of hope, rising petty crime and
expanding black economy "into which even the most loyal citizens are obliged
to descend in order to survive." (Ibid.). With these descriptive details, he
stressed the depth and seriousness of the crisis, inspiring further questions
about the ability of the system to survive it, especially in the midst of extreme
material deprivation, seen by other authors as an important legitimating factor
(eg. Feinsilver) - one of the questions addressed by this research.
Kapcia argued that the continuing guarantees of social provision, healthcare
and education remained as the prominent sources of legitimacy, along with
guarantees of full employment and a crime-free environment (Ibid.). Hence,
he argued that "issues of 'democratisation' were often shelved provided that
the benefits of 'citizenship' continued to be guaranteed." (Ibid.). The system
was based on a strong "participatory ethos" (Kapcia 1995: 8). In particular, he
perceived a legitimating role of the parlamentos obreros [workplace
assemblies] that served to discuss the serious problems during the 1990s,
involving the average Cuban in decisions, making it more difficult to blame
the government (Ibid: 13). The role of participatory politics was also
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supported by Edelstein, who argued that the population socialized before 1959
was formed within an authoritarian political culture in which opportunities for
participation on the part of the working class and the peasantry did not exist,
and hence the revolution brought real involvement in the country's political
organisations during the institutionalisation of the revolution, thus delivering
grater equality and participation, if judged in the Cuban national context
(Edelstein 1995). Kapcia also investigated more recent destabilising factors,
such as the new emphasis on profit and tourism that he interpreted as
contradicting the ideology underlying the system (Kapcia 1995: 10). Tourism
generated increased tensions with the black economy, and this was
accompanied by growing inequality (Ibid: 11-12).
Kapcia interpreted Cuba in view of the recent transitions in Eastern Europe,
and argued that in Cuba there was no organised opposition group similar to the
Church or Solidarity in Poland, which might have contributed to the survival
of the Cuban system since 1989 (Ibid: 20). He analysed the reasons behind the
stability of the system in the following words:
"".there are more basic reasons why an alternative system is not at this
stage a likely, or even desired, outcome for many Cubans. The first is
the residual, if weakened, loyalty of a sufficient number of citizens to a
system (and a leadership) which, for all its faults, has much still to
offer, has firm popular and historical roots (unlike many of the pre-
1989 Eastern European systems), and which, by allowing benefits to be
allocated extensively and safety valves to operate, may still enjoy
majority support." (Ibid: 21).
Edelstein supported this notion of a different national context in Cuba, and
found that Cuban nationalism had a completely different role to nationalism in
Eastern Europe, since in Cuba it was in favour of the system, while in Eastern
Europe it was rather against it due to it being a Soviet satellite (Edelstein
1995: 24). Edelstein concluded that this was a major factor, which contributed
to the stability of the system despite the collapse in other communist countries:
"In Cuba the government is correctly seen as the defender of the
nation, while the prospect of a return of the Miamians in the event of
the fall of the government is repugnant to most Cubans." (Edelstein
1995: 24).
Kapcia estimated that the population included one third committed, a third
somewhat loyal, and another third opposed (Ibid: 22). He also identified
renewed concerns about the possible return of batistianos and the impact of
such an event on the social provisions granted by the communist system, as
another pro-stability factor, which had an impact not only on the loyalists, but
also on the undecided (Ibid: 22). He argued for the system's ability to adapt
and shift as a contributing factor for its survival (Ibid.) - a topic addressed by
this research in terms of shifting interpretations of the Cuban discourse and its
inherent sources of legitimacy.
According to him, during the 1990s the system increased its emphasis on the
past achievements of the revolution (public health and education), even if
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"The historical role which Castro had assigned Cubans of standing up to the
US was difficult to sustain when they were going hungry." (Ibid: 153).
Kapcia's argument about popular involvement in political processes was also
supported by Balfour, who argued that:
" ...in the wake of the corruption trials of 1989 ...the leadership had
launched a campaign of mass assemblies to shore up the legitimacy of
the regime ...the Cuban leadership tended to play down analogies with
the October Revolution in favour of the autochtonous origins of the
Cuban Revolution and its Latin American connections ....Socialism
became a synonym for the peculiar nature of Cuban experience, though
Cuban leaders continued to use the rhetoric of Marxism-Leninism. The
works of Che Guevara, a fierce critic of Soviet revisionism, were once
again promoted by Castro Castro renewed the Guevarist appeal to
justice and egalitarianism Castro's continued legitimacy among
Cubans rested above all on his appeal to beleaguered nationalism .
...Castro's demands for ever greater sacrifices by the Cuban people
could be justified by the 'blockade' of Cuba and political centralisation
legitimised by the sense of siege." (Balfour 2009: 155-159).
This chronological summary of relevant literature, focusing on the themes of
this research, provides a widely encompassing perspective on what other
scholars concluded about the Cuban system and its legitimacy. Nevertheless,
most, if not all, of the authors recognise to a larger or lesser extent the role of
Fidel Castro and his perceived charisma. In view of the major focus on
Castro's charisma as a source of legitimacy, a special section is dedicated to
this theme, so far purposely excluded from the chronological order.
Charismatic Leadership of Fidel Castro
A large number of interpretations of Cuban history and politics refer to
legitimacy in greater or lesser connection to Fidel Castro's charismatic
leadership, as an important base-layer of the system. Leycester Coltman, Tad
Szulc, Hawkins, Azicri, Balfour, Fernandez and many others see this as a key
source oflegitimacy. In most cases, the authors do not provided a precise
definition or the mechanics of the concept. Some, however, have been more
specific. Referring specifically to 1962 to 1965, Malloy called it an emotional
"affective commitment" by the Cuban masses, a notion later developed by
Fernandez, suggesting a direct link to the system's legitimacy (Malloy 1974:
34). As a result, the connection between leaders and followers was powerfully
affective and constituted charismatic authority (Ibid: 64). Mesa-Lago labelled
Cuba a "personalistic-charismatic regime" (Mesa-Lago 1974a: ix), but along
with Valdes added institutionalisation (bureaucracy) as a way of securing
long-term stability CValdes 1979: 16). Huberman and Sweezy acknowledged
the role of Fidel's charisma, defined as "the inborn gift of being able to inspire
in people a mixture of passionate love and blind faith" (Huberman & Sweezy
1961: 177). Thomas argued that Castro's "magnetism and oratory" have
enabled him to direct Cuba "very much according to his own designs"
(Thomas 1998: 1485).
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One of the few that defined charisma as a source of legitimacy was
Dominguez:
"...charisma provides an authority that rests upon the extraordinary
quality of the ruler as a person as it is perceived by the citizenry.
Charisma depends on the leader's conviction that he does not depend
on election by his followers but had been 'elected' by a supernatural
authority, either God or some 'historical force,' and on the citizenry's
sharing that conviction ... Castro reiterated the legitimacy of his claim
to rule, as coming from history-as-god .... The cause, the idea, history
incarnate in the people elects the leader to serve, to implement, and
hence to rule: the essence of charismatic legitimation .... many Cubans
distinguished between the failures of the government, which they
might be willing to criticize, and Fidel Castro himself, who is exempt
from criticism." (Dominguez 1978: 197-198).
Reviving the topic after the 1960s and 1970s, Hawkins related charismatic
authority to the survival of Cuba after 1989, arguing that it "offered the regime
a degree of legitimacy missing in most other Communist countries." (Hawkins
2001: 14). He stressed that this was even more valuable, since Cuba was the
socialist country most dependent on Soviet aid (Ibid.).
Fernandez defined the concept as a relationship between the people and the
leaders, seen as based on attachments akin to those inspired by religious
feelings such as rapture, faith, hope, elation, devotion, and love (Fernandez
1974: 64). He focused the attention on the biblical metaphors in the discourse
as a source of charismatic authority, along with events such as the landing of a
dove on Castro's shoulder on 8th January 1959 and, what he perceived, a
"deification of Fidel Castro" (Fernandez 2000: 74):
"In that speech [History Will Absolve Me] Castro portrayed himself as
a man with a mission entrusted to him by history." (Fernandez 2000:
71)
Other authors, such as Kapcia, argued in favour of a greater focus on deeper
structural and historical forces, but also recognised the role of charisma:
" ...Castro's personal intervention in August 1994 turned a dangerous
moment of popular discontent into a pivotal moment of popular
support, it reminded us that structural explanations alone cannot
suffice. Second, Castro's protracted departure from the active political
equation may make such approaches more relevant than before."
(Kapcia 2008c: 647).
Balfour, on the other hand, prioritised the use of language by the leader:
"Castro's popularity was due not only to what he said but also to the
way in which he said it. His power of rhetoric and flamboyant style
captured the imagination of the world's mass media and ensured that
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Cuba received an attention out of all proportions to its international
importance." (Balfour 2009: 132).
There appears to be a broad consensus amongst most Cuba experts that a force
broadly labelled as charisma and emanating from Fidel Castro did contribute
to the legitimacy and stability of the system. Cuba experts deal with Castro's
charismatic leadership despite his own repeated reminders that the revolution
was not personified by him or anyone else, but was instead a historical
process. Further questions will arise in research focusing on the Cuba after
2006 and the gradual disappearance of Fidel Castro from public eyes. With its
focus on the time up until 1994, this research makes occasional references to
charisma, in relation to speeches by Castro and the way he appealed to popular
sentiment with his own rhetorical style, understanding the concepts along the
lines of Balfour. The concept is, however, a minor explanatory tool for the
conclusions of this research, prioritising instead the focus on discursive
strategies and more tangible sources of legitimacy in the discourse. To some
extent, some evidence of this research can be used to shed more light on how
charisma functioned through the means of public or televised speeches and
interviews, to reaffirm the respect and trust in Castro and the language he used
to reflect this by strengthening an already existing emotional connection with
the audience by appealing to widely held attitudes. This might have allowed
Castro to generate bonds of trust and loyalty.
Defining charisma as the interplay of language and affective emotions, this
research looks into what was being said, how, and with what ideas, concepts,
cultural references, reflecting certain specific attitudes and issues within the
Cuban field of meaning, thus interpreting reality into a political project with a
direction.
Contribution of this Research
The existing literature offers a whole plethora of factors that may have
contributed to the longevity of the Cuban system during challenging moments
and at different periods. The initial analyses overemphasised the alleged
manipulative role of Castro, and were for this reason extended by more
system-oriented analyses. Some themes, such as the role of nationalism or
Castro's charismatic leadership have been present throughout, while others,
including the 1970s institutionalisation and pragmatic alliance with the Soviets
have been added. Since 1959, the analysis deepened to include endogenous
cultural and historical codes (eg. Valdes, Kapcia) and other topics. Overall, the
existing authors have not compared systematically the possible legitimating
factors between different decades, and especially after 1989, either because
their writings preceded this date, or because they provided a chronological
historical narrative or systemic analysis. They have also not looked at the
legitimating forces at the base of the system in general, to compare them with
new evidence from the island and the situation during the troubling first half
of the 1990s, to elucidate how the system reflected the new domestic and
international circumstances in order to secure its future. Some authors have
examined the legitimacy of the system, but not in a comparative way as a tool
to understand the longevity of the Cuban system. Instead, in many cases, they
have identified different processes and factors, but did not assign them the
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important role of generating legitimacy, while shifting or remaining constant
in time, conveyed to the populace through the country's discourse. Hence,
even though the authors often do touch on the topics that helped the revolution
survive, they examined them from a non-comparative, sometimes non-
systematic, historical perspective. Authors that have covered pre- and post-
1989 Cuba have not compared the sources of legitimacy from both periods to
demonstrate what the system kept and what it replaced to reflect the new
challenging situation after 1989.
Politically oriented research on Cuba has to confront many obstacles, such as
conducting such projects on the island immersed in its under-siege political
culture and suspicion towards unfamiliar outsiders gathering information.
Especially sensitive topics using evidence from the 1980 Mariel boatlift and
the 1994 maleconazo are very difficult to research in Cuba, since doing so
may be perceived as too controversial for the communist system. Having
successfuly transgressed these limitations, this research improves our
understanding of the system. A good range of writings from authors such as
Jaime Suchlicki, Jorge Dominguez, Susan Eckstein, Susan Kaufman Purcell,
David Rothkopf, Leyva de Amoa or Juan J. L6pez cover Cuba from a political
perspective, but are all too often constrained by their liberal bias. Other
publications by Cuban researchers on the other hand, such as Arnaldo Le6n
Silva, Jorge Ibarra, Luis Suarez Salazar, Ernesto Rodriguez Chavez, Roberto
Gonzalez Gomez, Soraya Castro Marino, Luis Acanda Gonzalez, or Rafael
Hernandez, tend to cover Cuban politics and history from an equally biased
and perhaps insufficiently critical position, either due to their belief in the
system or self-censorship present in Cuban academia. This research goes
beyond this dichotomy and takes more of a middle ground, providing a more
balanced interpretation.
An important part of the literature is written from a historical point of view,
analysing several decades, or in some cases, even the whole of Cuban history.
These sources include authors such as Azicri, Kapcia, Dominguez, John M.
Kirk, Suchlicki, Thomas, Gott, Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, and others. Many of the
books were published before 1989, or if published afterwards, focus on
different aspects of the system. They do not analyse in similar depth the
sources of legitimacy of the system, its discourse and survival of 1989.
Interestingly, more recent large-scale research of the public was conducted by
Gallup in 2009, which confirmed that 47 percent of Cuban respondents
continued to approve of their political leadership (Gallup 2009), suggesting
some continuity in the perceived legitimacy of the system. These rare cases of
quantitative research on the island continue to support the thesis that the
system has relied, amongst other factors, on legitimacy possibly correlating
with popular support, which has allowed it to survive many challenges since
1959. This research complements such analyses by providing possible reasons
that may have contributed to the perceived legitimacy of the system.
The various sources (Kapcia, Azicri, Huberman and Sweezy, Azicri,
Edelstein) examining post-revolutionary social transformations as key sources
of legitimacy inspire the question of how the system promoted these
achievements, if at all, some thirty years later, when they became an
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established part of the system, possibly taken for granted by the younger
generations, in the midst of the material hardship of the late 1980s and the
early 1990s. The question of the role of socialism, as examined by Valdes for
example who concluded that the system was not about socialism between
1959-60, inspires the question of what was socialism's role in the 1980s and
especially the 1990s. Kapcia's notion of the important role of endogenous
codes provides an opportunity to investigate these further, in regards to the
1980s and especially the 1990s, in order to shed more light on the internal
mechanics, language, patterns of reasoning and shifts. Hence, this research
addresses these and covers a number of gaps, and research limitations. It
extends our understanding of the system, and provides a new angle on Cuba's
political history using an alternative and critical methodology, which has
received significant attention in the humanities and social sciences over the
past decade.
To provide new insights into the Cuban system, this research examines the
sources of legitimacy on which the system relied in a detailed, systematic and
comparative way, to demonstrate what changed across the 1989-91 divide, and
what remained unchanged from 1959. This research explores these shifts and
continuities in the revolution before and after 1989 by focusing on evidence
from two dates either side: the 1980 Mariel episode and the 1994 maleconazo
disturbances. The 1980 Mariel crisis took place when Cuba was still closely
allied with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The 1994 Malec6n riots, on
the other hand, took place in the context of the post-1989 changes in many
formerly communist countries, which started adopting liberal democratic
political models. During crises, the system highlighted the reasons why it was
legitimate and justified, and the sources of legitimacy were the most
prominent, allowing for an easier identification. The two examples are of
interest because they offer rare examples of significant unrest in Cuba that
completely dominated the country's attention for months, and encouraged the
employment of the sources of legitimacy sustaining the system. Examining the
discourse and demonstrating which sources were put forward is one way of
answering why some Cubans might have remained loyal to the system t~at
survived long after 1989. This research project enhances our understandmg of
what the discourse contained, and why it might have worked with the
culturally and historically conditioned audience, possibly implying further
inferences about the stability of the system. The analysis of the evidence
investigates and compares more specifically the sources of legitimacy in the
discourse during both crises. This allows for a greater understanding of how
the political leadership communicated news and ideas to the population, and
how it adapted to new challenges. It also allows for a greater understanding of
how the leadership argued for the legitimacy of the system, despite criticism
and diplomatic pressure from foreign governments and international
institutions. The sources of legitimacy provide insights into the possible
reasons for the stability of the system before, and most of all, after the end of
the Cold War, when the pressure ofneoliberal discourses on Cuba increased
tremendously. In relation to the available literature, this research extends our
understanding of the system by using a different methodology than most of the
available literature. It sheds more light on why the system may have appealed
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to some Cubans. It offers new perspectives on Cuban national and political life
from an alternative historical perspective.
The central assumption is that the Cuban political system relied on sources of
legitimacy specific to 1980 and 1994 to encourage stability before and after
1989 in view of different contexts. The system was based on endogenous
sources of legitimacy, such as the values of the 1959 Cuban Revolution,
patriotism, Marxist political ideology and Cuban history. The sources of
legitimacy can be perceived as one possible factor that could have contributed
to the stability of the system, which had previously siphoned off most of the
opposition and delivered real benefits to the revolutionaries. To identify these
sources of legitimacy, the research relies on evidence from the hegemonic
Cuban discourse reflected in the country's media. It compares two crises, and
the sources of legitimacy contained in the discourse to see if they changed and
if so, why. As other discourses, the Cuban discourse reduced the complexity
of reality into a simplified hegemonic discourse encouraging continuity. By
focusing on sources of legitimacy traceable in the discourse at different times
in history, this research complements other available analyses, which look at
other factors, such as economics, ideology or institutional processes.
The evidence and conclusions enhance our understanding of the possible
reasons of the long-term stability of the Cuban system, especially during crises
as key moments of destabilisation. During such times, the discourse focused
more than ever on its sources of legitimacy helping to sustain the system in the
eyes of the public. Crises provide a good example of how they were
subsequently interpreted with a meaning that would help sustain the system
without contradicting it. The related processes of interpretation represent
revealing examples of the system's internal mechanics. To analyse legitimacy,
this research uses the concept of a hegemonic discourse, which contained its
sources. Hence, the research uses discourse analysis to examine the evidence,
to make conclusions about shifts and continuities in the discourse, and then
also relate them to the existing literature. Hence we can decide if the sources
of legitimacy, most of them already identified by the authors above, such as
socialism, Fidel Castro, nationalism, material provision, social provision,
developing country exploitation etc., shifted, remained the same or changed in
terms of their meaning, fine nuances or patterns of argumentation. In this way,
we can understand better what happened in Cuba after 1989, in comparison to
the last decade of the Cold War. Not excluding other factors, this research
offers an answer why and how the system may have survived the collapse of
other communist states after 1989, by reflecting new realities and concerns in
its internal discourse to encourage loyalty. Further inferences can be made
about the general stability, essence and direction of the system.
By addressing specifically questions of the sources of legitimacy from a
critical perspective based on a critical methodology, this research goes beyond
liberal sources and traditional historiography. It sheds further light on
questions that have not been previously addressed in a similar way and to the
same extent, allowing us to understand how the discourse interpreted reality,
what sources of legitimacy it presented explicitly and implicitly, and why such
interpretations might have appealed to the public. Undoubtedly, Cubans, as the
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audience, represent a key component in the country's long-term stability since
the triumph of the Revolution in 1959, and even more so after 1989. The
objective of the research is to explore how the Cuban leadership might have
encouraged a particular way of thinking about the issues of the time. It is
therefore logical to examine the media through which the leadership
communicated with the population, with the likely intention to mobilise the
population into supporting and defending the system. Texts that were directed
at Cubans thus constitute the focus of the analysis, since they sent
predetermined messages and acted as a means for transmitting the leadership's
ideology. By the means of examining the discourse, this study covers in great
detail how sources of legitimacy that may have appealed to Cubans were
employed, reflecting Cuba's cultural and political history and the current
context. This focus represents a topic not researched in the past to a similar
extent.
The press in a country such as Cuba represents valid evidence of the
communication of the leadership with the general public, especially since the
examined newspaper and magazines were under direct control of the
leadership as a recognised instrument of the revolution. The press reflected
reality and interpreted it in a particular way, integrating it into the existing
political project. The two crises represent crucial moments of a more
fundamental national discussion, and represent examples of the construction of
meaning in favour of systemic stability. Despite the fact that both crises were
rather Havana-centred, they were highly important, as they were followed by
widespread popular mobilisations and incited nationwide discussions about the
revolution, the system and its future. The identified sources of legitimacy are
examined in relation to widely held attitudes in Cuba, Cuban values, concerns,
desires, culture and history, as part of a system that originated in 1959 and
belonged to Cubans as a young, post-colonial nation. The important role of the
media was described by a Havana-based analyst:
"To a large extent the rhythm ofpoliticization reflects the use of the
mass media as a means of political orientation and ideological
education. Fidel Castro used television to discuss major national
problems, orient the masses, explain the political situation, and even
make public decisions. This massive political education contributed to
a rapid change in the culture of the population. The classic example is
the dramatic spread, within barely two years of the triumph of the
revolution, of popular knowledge about socialism and communism."
(Hernandez et al. 1991: 41).
The research provides valuable insight into the mechanics of the discourse, its
lines of reasoning, argumentation, and interpretation communicated to
Cubans. The Special Period of the 1990s was one of the most challenging
periods for Cuba since 1959. Parallel to the transitions that were taking place
in post-Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe during the same period, the Cuban
system carried on despite the extreme material hardship on the island. This
inspires the question of how the system managed to maintain enough support
in such a challenging environment in order to prevent a collapse. This research
help us to understand why some Cubans might have remained loyal to the
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system, as the discourse reflected their identities and provided them with pro-
governmental subject positions backed by endogenous sources of legitimacy,
within a particular historical framework of reference.
Key political issues and evidence were identified from the extensive coverage
of the two years, and then critically examined in great depth and detail,
looking for particular problematization of the issues of the time and the
implicit and explicit use of sources of legitimacy. The evidence represents the
means by which Cuban reality was interpreted. Comparison of the two years
allowed for a clarification of the sources of legitimacy persisting over time.
This can help us understand why Cuba remained closed and opposed to
alternative political models, and followed a different non-transitional path
compared to other former communist countries at times, when some, such as
Francis Fukuyama, have predicted the end of history (Fukuyama: 2006). By
looking at how the system coped internally with political changes after the end
of the Cold War, this research significantly differs from the existing literature.
By using examples that took place before and after 1989, as well as looking
collaterally at the interpretation of neoliberalism in the discourse, this research
provides a new perspective on why and how Cuba might have survived the
major changes after 1989. Unlike other shorter analyses of this period, this
dissertation focuses fully and in detail on these topics and the period.
Let us now consider the concepts of legitimacy and the detailed methodology
applied to the evidence, before examining the evidence and then comparing
the two examples in the subsequent analytical chapter.
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Chapter 2
2. 1. Legitimacy and its Sources
To understand the longevity of the Cuban system, this research uses the
concepts of legitimacy and looks for its possible sources in the unique
historical context of the island. As a contested concept, legitimacy and its
sources have been examined by a number of classical authors such as Plato
(The Republic), Aristotle (Politics), John Locke (1869), J. J. Rousseau (1762),
as well as by more recent scholars such as Max Weber (1922, 1964), Antonio
Gramsci (20 11), Karl Deutsch (1963), Larry Diamond (1999, 2009),
Guillermo O'Donnell (1986, 2010), Jurgen Habermas (1988), Carl Friedrich
(1963), Robert Dahl (1959, 2000), David Easton (1965), Seymour Lipset
(1959), Lucian Pye (1966), John Schaar (1970, 1981) and others. They defined
the concept within their own body of work and, above all, their theories of
society, political systems and political philosophy. John Locke for example,
based his theory of political legitimacy mainly on the consent of the people as
its source (Locke 1869). Antonio Gramsci linked legitimacy to his concept of
"cultural hegemony" whereby ideology becomes common sense resulting in
consented coercion under the mask of consent (20 11). If a political system and
its practices are accepted as legitimate, the system is also stable even in
unstable times or in the midst of temporary instability due to economic
difficulties or other factors, more recently examined by Habermas (1988) for
example into an economic crisis, rationality crisis, legitimation crisis, and
motivational crisis.
Max Weber identified three sources oflegitimacy: traditional (tradition and
history), charismatic (supernatural character of the leader) and legal-rational
(established laws, customs, institutions and constitution) (Weber 1978). Most
of the authors recognise that the concept of legitimacy is key in understanding
the raison d'etre of political systems, or we could say their stability.
Somewhat similar to Locke, Mattei Dogan argued that:
"If people hold the belief that existing institutions are appropriate or
morally proper, then those institutions are legitimate." (Dogan 2003:
116).
Seymour Martin Lipset on the other hand defined legitimacy as the capacity of
the system to engender and maintain "the belief that the existing political
institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society" (Lipset 1959: 77).
Juan Linz also emphasised the importance of institutions and defined
legitimacy in short as
"the belief that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the political
institutions are better than any other that might be established, and
therefore can demand obedience" (Linz 1988: 65 in Dogan 2003).
Legitimacy is unlikely to reach unanimity, and it is not recognised equally by
different groups in a society, which is composed of the committed, the
apathetic popular strata as well as various rebellious groups, dissidents or even
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armed terrorists, with many in between. Moderate supporters include a large
number of those only partially convinced by the legitimacy claimed by the
rulers (Dogan 2003: 119). In addition, other authors such as Peter Stillman
recognised the crucial role of endogenous values in a society in relation to
legitimacy, whose definition relates to the values of the society (Stillman
1974: 32).
Other authors, such as Susan Eckstein, stressed that legitimacy produces a
reservoir of support guaranteeing the co-operation of the citizens even in the
case of quite unpleasant policies (Eckstein 1966). This is particularly relevant
to our understanding of the 1980 and 1994 crises, since legitimacy can be
perceived as a reservoir of goodwill on which the authorities can draw in
difficult times, and which "increases considerably the Willingness of the
people to tolerate shortcomings of effectiveness." (Dogan 2003: 120-123). For
this reason, the concept of legitimacy and its sources is a suitable analytical
tool to understand the stability of Cuba during crises as well as before and
after 1989.
During interviews in Cuba, Luis Suarez, a reputable Cuban political scientist,
stressed the historical origin of legitimacy in different societies, such as Cuba
or the United Kingdom, where some practices are perceived as legitimate
because of tradition, that is, they have been in place for a sufficient amount of
time to be beyond questioning by the people (Luis Suarez, Havana 2010), thus
strongly supporting the crucial role of historical legitimacy and tradition,
which is not objective, but particular to different systems. This suggests the
need to investigate systems from a perspective of social constructivism, to
uncover their particularities and endogenous references. Such focus is one of
the main parts of this research.
A simple and universal definition of legitimacy and its origins is not available.
It is, however, possible to narrow the concept down to the popular acceptance
of a governing law or system as a source of authority based on a specific range
of ideas and concepts relevant to the subjects of the system. Across different
authors dealing with legitimacy, there is a common recognition of the gradual
development of legitimacy resulting in an established tradition on the bases of
which practices were previously routinised, so that they appear natural and
there is little imagination of a different scenario. This definition is well
summarised by Raymond Duncan, a US political scientist who has written on
Cuba:
"By legitimate authority is meant a relationship between state and
subjects, in which the general population perceives the government as
'proper,' in the sense that its authority and rule are acknowledged by
those subject to it, and the person or institutions exercising that
authority (government, party, mass organizations) are seen as
possessing some special quality, knowledge, or skills not possessed by
the subjects. Legitimacy means popular compliance with and support
of a regime's authority and policies without exclusive reliance upon the
threat or use of coercive force ...." (Duncan in Baloyra & Morris 1993:
232).
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Questions of legitimacy are preceded by questions such as: Why do people
voluntarily follow and obey their rulers and why do people accept and
maintain authorities and institutions? Such questions are even more relevant
when aimed at the Cuban system, which has been subject to significant
criticism by intellectuals on both the left and right of the political spectrum,
international NGOs and many governments. Some of them perceive the
system as illegitimate due to a perceived absence of elections allowing various
parties and recognised by international observers. Sources of legitimacy
contained in the country's discourse represent one way of understanding why
some Cubans might have remained loyal to the system despite such external
criticism, allowing, only to an extent, for a possibility of Locke's rule by
consent.
This research understands the sources of legitimacy as a set of principles and
ideas justifying a political system. In other words, legitimacy of a political
system is the justification of it in relation to the history and principles of a
community and the subjects of the system. In this way, this research
recognises Weberian notions of legitimacy, especially historical legitimacy
(also Suarez) and, to a lesser degree, charismatic legitimacy. Legitimacy is
based on a number of sources, which underpin it and generate compliance or
support, thus securing stability, even in difficult times as recognised by Locke,
Dogan and others. Such sources include an interpretation of history,
persuasive reasoning, charismatic leadership and other factors. This research,
nevertheless, touches in different parts on many of the sources of legitimacy
examined by these authors, including the impact of demonstrated popular
support (Locke), morality of the system (Dogan), endogenous values
(Stillman), or the belief in institutions (Lipset and Linz). This research also
identifies additional sources of legitimacy, such as nationalism or material
prosperity.
To examine these sources in Cuba, the research relies on the analytical tool of
discourse analysis, recorded in the country's print media and political
speeches. This research assumes the role of a Gramscian hegemonic discourse
in modern societies with mass communications, which communicate
legitimacy of a system to its subjects and argue for the raisons d 'etre of it
(Gramsci 2011). In this way we can better understand the way the Cuban
discourse contributed to the Gramscian rule by consent in Cuba, rather than
rule by pure force (Ibid.). Accepting the Gramscian focus, we can penetrate
and comprehend the depths of Cuban cultural hegemony linked to political
stability through consented coercion and masks of consent (Ibid.). We can
investigate the way ideology was presented as common sense and how it
articulated widely held feelings, again a Gramscian notion (Ibid.).
Due to the diverse composition of legitimacy of a system, its internal
mechanics differ from case to case. Hence it is revealing to study the Cuban
discourse in order to investigate its own sources of legitimacy and the ways
they were communicated or shifted over time to encourage loyalty and prevent
rebellion, uprising or a revolution. In addition, Discourse Analysis Theory
argues that these sources in a discourse are not given, but rather selected,
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constructed and conveyed in a specific way. By focusing on a discourse, we
can understand the sources of legitimacy and internal, contextual structures of
meaning, following Gramsci's suggestion that ideas cannot be understood
outside their social and historical context (Ibid.).
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2. 2. Discourse Analysis as a Tool to Examine Sources of
Legitimacy
Suitability of Discourse Analysis
Discourse analysis allows us to identify and trace the development of the
sources of legitimacy as deployed by the Cuban system at different times to
reflect new realities. It allows for an examination of the construction of
ideology in a wider sense, including language and discourse, and the
interpretation of reality. Discourse analysis provides valid insights into the
ways the system coped with crises by stressing different sources of legitimacy
of the current national and international context. In this way, the method
demonstrates how the system used endogenous references and meanings to
subtly as well as bluntly suggest its sources of legitimacy. In other words, the
method shows what was said and how. By focusing on language, the research
makes more evident the implicit suggestions, assumptions and sources of
legitimacy, which may be otherwise more difficult to spot and understand. The
method provides a focus that allows for a comparison, to demonstrate shifts
before and after 1989. Unlike traditional historiography examined earlier,
discourse analysis is a research alternative, going deeper into the inner
workings of the system. In this way it allows us to understand better how the
discourse reflected popular attitudes and concerns.
The research examines sensitive issues with a perspective from within the
system, difficult to research in Cuba. At the same time, the research retains a
critical perspective based less on ideology, and more on the principles of
discourse analysis, based on the assumption of general limits of all discourses
across countries, ideologies and times. The basis of the critical position lies in
critically examining discourses and the simplifications they contain, their
constructions, sources of legitimacy, and internal dynamics. Unlike most other
analyses, this research analyses the fine and detailed mechanics as well as
content, difficult to penetrate by outsiders and non-Cubans. Discourse analysis
allows identification and comparison of shifts reflecting internal changes, as
well as the end of the Cold War.
The methodology provided a tool for a valid examination of key print media,
which served as crucial vehicles of interpretation in the single-party
communist state, where the media were closely controlled by the political
leadership. The research project and the methodology acknowledge and take
into account the specific nature of the Cuban case, where access to alternative
discourses and sources of information for the general public during the
researched period was restricted. This was taken into account during the
analysis and in regards to the conclusions. The analysis took into account the
role of the dominant discourse, which was even more influential than in
pluralist systems, where diverse discourses compete.
The research also comprised of the examination of underlying values and
patterns of reasoning in the evidence, embedded in the Cuban field of
meaning. The methodology allowed the examination of the concepts that were
used in the discourse to interpret reality, to be intelligible within the Cuban
context. These discourse contained a number of central pillars, or master
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signifiers, aimed at Cubans, reflecting specific attitudes, concerns, culture and
national history, which acted as crucial sources of legitimacy. Particular
attention was given to the endogenous Cuban content of the discourse, based
on the country's historical experience, culturally-bound meanings, and the
specific use of endogenous concepts, references, ideas and arguments. The
evidence was analysed in terms of what was covered and how, and what might
have been omitted.
The Concept of Hegemonic Cuban Discourse
The central concept of the research is referred to as "hegemonic Cuban
discourse", which is used as a label for the communication and messages that
were constructed by the Cuban political leadership, and sent mainly through
Granma, the official newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party. This
communication, however, also included public speeches, or coverage in
magazines such as Bohemia and Verde Olivo. Throughout the dissertation,
"hegemonic Cuban discourse" is abbreviated to "hegemonic discourse" or
simply "discourse" to avoid excessive repetition. Hegemonic discourse refers
mainly to political communication aimed at putting across the sources of
legitimacy, implicitly and explicitly, which represented justifications of the
continuity of the system. The hegemonic discourse reflected people's concerns
and attitudes, as opposed to other parts of the discourse that was perhaps more
critical (in Temas or Contra Corriente) in order to support the stability of the
system during crises as well as in response to shifting circumstances before
and after 1989. The concept of the hegemonic discourse does not include
discourse amongst Cubans during actual physical interaction, but refers
specifically to the evidence gathered from printed sources, which also
included speeches and interviews. The discourse represents a construction
reflecting public attitudes and concerns, creating a Gramscian consensual
hegemony (Gramsci 2011) that can be understood as supporting stability. The
discourse is understood to contain crucial sources of legitimacy that implicitly
and explicitly argued in favour of the system, thus providing one possible
answer to Cuba's survival after 1989. All discourses are understood to have
the capacity, and in fact an inherent aim, to become hegemonic to achieve
dominance and stability of the related political project. In this way, they may
be more effective in the long term, compared to repression or violence, since
by reflecting and channelling popular concerns and new realities they create
consensual hegemony. This consensual hegemony then maintains the
perception of the continuing legitimacy of a political project and its
institutions. This represents a tool for explaining the longevity and stability of
political systems in changing circumstances and at different times.
The research relies on a combination of two schools of discourse analysis, one
emphasising the study of language and the way ideas are expressed, based on
pre-suppositions, expected common sense, assumptions and intertextual
messages. This can be called the Critical Discourse Analysis school (CDA)
(Fairclough 1989, 1995). The second prioritises the content, construction of
meaning, and inner structures of a discourse and is called Discourse Analysis
Theory (DAT) (Howarth 2000). In order to examine ideologies of power
relations involved in a discourse and its mechanics, both schools draw on the
writing of a range of authors including Antonio Gramsci (2011), Louis
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Althusser (1999,2007,2008), Karl Marx (1992), Jurgen Habermas (1988),
Martin Heidegger (1962), and most of all Michel Foucault (1977) and Pierre
Bourdieu (1982).
First Methodological Component: Critical Discourse Analysis
Critical Discourse Analysis examines the vocabulary, grammar, cultural and
historical references and metaphors, implied ideas, implicit messages,
assumptions, presupposed knowledge, unsaid expectations, assumed "common
sense", connotations, expected background knowledge, frequency and
emergence of new terms and concepts, as described by Norman Fairclough
(1989, 1995, 1996), Pierre Bourdieu (1982) and other language-oriented
analysts. It also analyses language shifts over time, comparisons used by a
given author, indirectly and subtly conveyed ideas and suggestions,
accentuation, parallels, projected images, rhetorical techniques, and the
general presentation of ideas conveyed. It investigates the particular wording,
i.e. how it was said. The analysis involves discussion of the ideological effects
of the discourse and its possible purpose within its historical context, allowing
for valuable insights into a discourse that is not ours and would be otherwise
distant or even unintelligible (Fairclough 1989).
" ...the media operate as a means for the expression and reproduction of
the power of the dominant class and bloc. And the mediated power of
existing power-holders is also a hidden power, because it is implicit in
the practices of the media rather than being explicit." (Fairclough
1989:43)
By analysing the socio-historical conditions in which a given discourse
establishes its legitimacy, we can uncover the sources of legitimacy, and
understand why the discourse may have appealed to the audience. CDA allows
for an analysis of power in semantics, assuming that a discourse is held
together by a logic that reflects existing social relations and sustains a
particular form of perception of reality. There is a complex dialectical
relationship between the change oflanguage and perceptions. For this reason,
centrality is placed on language as a symbolic and signifying system affecting
cultural development, and reflecting the change in perceptions. Discourses
serve as a medium of interpretation, suggesting necessary action, by the means
of which a society tackles challenges and maintains continuity. Discourse thus
represents the means for producing and maintaining new and existing codes of
reality. The links between the codes and reality are described by language
analysts as a link between the signifier and the signified. A hegemonic
discourse entails a fixed lexicon, semantics, and even syntax, where the use of
terms from outside the code produces the same kind of automatic negative
reflex as an error in spelling or punctuation (Hernandez 2003).
In Discourse and Social Change for example, Norman Fairclough explains
that discourse plays a part in the construction of "social identities" and
"subject positions" for social subjects, but also in "the construction of systems
of knowledge and belief' (Fairclough 1992: 64). Focusing on the mechanics of
the construction of systems of knowledge and belief is particularly relevant to
this research, which investigates how, through language, the Cuban leadership
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tried to encourage citizens to defend the system by understanding current
issues and reality from a particular point of view. Fairclough views discourse
as a "fonn of social practice, rather than a purely individual activity or a reflex
of situational variables" (Fairclough 1992: 62). His approach is comprised in
investigating: "vocabulary" "cohesion" "grammar" and "text structure"
(Fairclough 1992: 75). Fairclough suggests a focus on alternative wordings
and their political and ideological significance, together with the meaning of
words used and their meanings as representations of hegemony (Fairclough
1992: 77). He also emphasises the examination of metaphors in the text in
order to examine "the ideological and political import of particular metaphors,
and conflict between alternative metaphors" (Fairclough 1992: 77). Fairclough
suggests the need to consider the "ideological investment" which can be
inferred from the different ways in which events or statements are signified
(Fairclough 1992: 77). By focusing on language, its structuring, content and
form, we can gain significant insights into the Cuban system of knowledge
and belief as well as the assumptions about social relationships, reality and
identities that were built into the text (Fairclough 1992: 78).
"Mass-media discourse is interesting because the nature of the power
relations enacted in it is often not clear, and there are reasons for seeing
it as involving hidden relations of power ....media producers address an
ideal subject...Media discourse has built into it a subject position for an
ideal subject, and actual viewers or listeners or readers have to
negotiate a relationship with the ideal subject." (Fairclough 1989: 41)
Within this school, ideology is understood as pervasively present in language,
which represents the exercise of power through the manufacture of consent.
Connections between language, power and ideology can be analysed in terms
of why is something said and how it is said. Ideology is often, even if not
exclusively, conveyed in a rather subtle way (Fairclough 1989).
Second Methodological Component: Discourse Analysis Theory
The Discourse Analysis Theory methodological component of this research
project is based on the writings of Ernesto Laclau and David Howarth, as
recent innovators within the political science research tradition (Laclau &
Mouffe 2001, Howarth 2000). OAT places greater emphasis on the
interpretation of historical events and potentially destabilising events, and the
construction of meaning of reality. Combining the two enhances our
understanding of the internal mechanics and communicative strategies of the
discourse, but also how the meaning of the two crises was constructed and
how arguments were conveyed to the population in order to reinforce the
stability of the system during difficult times and the end of the Cold War.
OAT is situated in-between the two poles of positivist scientific search for
objectivity, value neutrality and causal relations, or even predictions, on the
one hand, and hermeneutical theories, relying mostly on contextualised self-
interpretations of agents that may lack deeper theoretical underpinnings and
possibilities for generalisations. Contrary to the Kantian notion of observing
and experimenting with real phenomena in the social world, which is the basis
of positivist research, discourse analysis takes into account the fact that social
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structures do not exist independently of the activities they govern. They are
fundamentally different from the physical world where scientific discovery is
possible and "...we cannot sever beings from the relational contexts in which
they appear, and from the particular interpretations that constitute their
meaning." (Glynos & Howarth 2007: 30). The result is a contextualised
research, which requires a passage through the self-interpretations of the
actors engaged in the practice under study. The objects of study within DAT
are established regimes of practices. The aim is to critically explain their
stability or transformation. The aim is also to capture the various conditions
that make them work and tick, in order to explain their essence by examining
their discourse that sustains them. The task is to demonstrate how political
projects or social practices maintain stability and hegemony.
Discourses are understood as systems of meaning and practice that constitute
the identities of subjects and objects submerged in them, and the worldview of
which they are part:
"In other words, empirical data are viewed as sets of signifying
practices that constitute a 'discourse' and its 'reality', thus providing the
conditions which enable subjects to experience the world of objects,
words and practices." (Howarth et al. 2000: 4).
The method accepts Foucault's concept of power, which is conceptualised not
only as a direct influence of A on B, but also more subtly through practices
that make up subjects, their identities and modes of being, and often work on a
more unconscious level. Power is subtle and is already part of the subjects'
identities and social relations. This subtle role of identities and established
common sense is similar to CDA. Hence, the discourse analyst focuses on
their creation, disruption, mechanics and possible transformation, together
with the related negotiation and persuasion that makes discourses stable,
despite ongoing historical change. Politics is understood as the struggle
between opposed sets of meanings embedded in different ways of life, and
Heideggerian being-in-the-world, which are at the origins of different social
realities. The poststructuralist ontology emphasises the connection between
the political dimension at the bottom of institutional practices, by arguing that
every social order is marked by a number of competing tendencies and internal
inconsistencies. Stability is achieved by exclusion and hegemony. DAT allows
for the study and explanation of the stability of systems and the particular
ways, by which they generate legitimacy through the construction of a
hegemonic discourse. It brings to the surface the misleading appearance of
social reality as given, rather than constructed at particular moments in
history, and then maintained.
The focus is on the way a political system achieves stability though
communication with the public. It is a tool for examining the ways in which
moments of instability, such as economic depression or social unrest, are
interpreted or symbolised within a discourse, and integrated into it with a
constructed meaning. Social reality of practices is embedded in a particular
hegemonic discourse which sustains it. The boundary between the social and
political dimensions is understood as blurred. Political discourse, however, is
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where the social dimension is negotiated. From the poststructuralist
perspective, every regime is marked by an outside, which also to some extent
constitutes its identity, but at the same time represents a threat of subverting it
(Le. the Other). This ontological perspective is based on the claim that all
regimes are political constructions that involve the exclusion of certain
possibilities. DAT also examines the grip of an existing system on its subjects,
by providing an imagined utopia to be reached in the future, which is a source
of direction and effective leadership. It imagines, pictures and promises a
future fullness, which is to arrive when a particular obstacle is overcome.
Images of omnipotence or victimhood are often used. Interpretation of reality
in a discourse comprises Foucault's techniques ofproblematization, .
archaeology of knowledge and genealogical analysis: "a movement of critical
analysis in which one tries to see how the different solutions result from a
specific form ofproblematization" (Foucault 1997: 118-19). The constructions
of a discourse contribute to the legitimation of the resulting policy, which is
the outcome of a hegemonic discourse weaving together a number of strands
of discourses to achieve dominance and organisation of the field of meaning.
This is to immobilise the identities of objects and practices, thus achieving
hegemony, stability and continuity.
Discourses can be understood as theoretical horizons, within which the being
of objects is constituted, and which conceal the world beyond them, leaving
them as the unknown and insecure. Most subjects that inhabit the discourse
and its system of practices cannot think, or even be, outside it; this creates the
notions of insiders and outsiders (Glynos & Howarth 2007). DAT allows for
the understanding of how a discourse constructs a particular narrative, which
sets the terms of debate and the range of possible solutions. A discourse
contains central signifiers which act as its central pillars (or we could say
sources of legitimacy). DAT allows for criticism of the closed and reductionist
nature of discourses. DAT also allows one to bring to one's attention the
constructed and political character of a discourse and its internal mechanics
intended for a particular audience. The discourse analyst focuses on the
negotiation and persuasion that makes discourses stable over time. This is
particularly relevant to answering the main research question: how the Cuban
discourse worked and what its sources of legitimacy were.
DAT focuses on understanding different webs of meaning constituting a
discourse, with its particular terms of practices, and ideas, or, in other words,
the study of different languages of reality (Glynos & Howarth 2007: 52). DAT
establishes the link between meanings, beliefs, institutions and legitimacy in a
given system. This can be captured in the language of a discourse, as language
is socially shared and makes reality possible, being part of our consciousness
as well as unconsciousness, and making particular ways of thinking and being
possible. The analyst can explain people's choice of rhetoric by identifying
their relevant beliefs, and situating them within their appropriate discourse
(Bevir & Rhodes 2005: 179). Hegemonic discourses contain other smaller
discourses, which are excluded or repressed. This is the case in all social
structures, irrespective of the overarching ideologies or discourses. The
method allows the study and explanation of the stability of different regimes
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and the particular ways in which they generate legitimacy - an ideal fit for the
study of the longevity of the Cuban system.
Since objects and actions are understood as meaningful, the researcher studies
the historic specificity of these meanings and the overall framework of
reference of the whole system, reflected in the system's discourse. The
discourse provides available subject positions, with which social agents can
identify. This also defines the structure versus agency debate, by
understanding the limited choices of a subject in relation to the possible
identities within the available and intelligible structure, and the limited
possibility to choose between them, thus acknowledging a certain degree of
limited individuality. The analysis enables the researcher to understand how a
discourse constructs a particular narrative, Le. "a coherent universe of
discourse" (Glynos & Howarth 2007: 68), maintaining that opinion leaders are
not governed by any underlying metaphysical principle or ground (Glynos &
Howarth 2007: 179), but rather interpret reality in order to maintain the
existing system. DAT allows for critique within the tradition of
deconstruction, which challenges the closure from within by describing and
unravelling concrete specificity (Glynos & Howarth 2007: IS5). The critique
discloses the internal mechanics of hegemonic projects focusing on their
historical and normative specificity, providing insights into the ways in which
subjects identify with, and are gripped by the given discourse appealing to
their attitudes and sentiment.
DAT uses texts, ideally from challenging times. DAT understands crises and
their subsequent interpretation in a discourse as key moments for the survival
of a political system. The system either collapses or manages to negotiate
through the discourse with the population to retain its hegemonic position,
constructing a narrative. The discourse can present its narrative as given,
natural or the only one available, whereby it gives meaning to the destabilising
event or issue supporting the stability of the system. By doing this, the
discourse remains hegemonic and dominates other alternative discourses that
would have provided a different interpretation potentially resulting in a
different direction or socio-political system. DA T investigates the process of
interpreting an event and construction of the narrative. It analyses the process
through a selected discourse and the references, cultural and historical
concepts and ideas that were involved in the interpretation. It investigates the
internal mechanics of the discourse and the context of the negotiation. It can
compare the hegemonic discourse with alternative discourses, or can discuss
the apparent closure of the hegemonic discourse and its denial of possibilities
beyond its own apparent horizon.
Combining the Two Approaches: Mixed Methodology
There are many affinities between the two schools already mentioned, making
them suitable for a mixed method. Both, for example, accept that evidence can
be a mixture of speeches, reports, manifestos, historical events, interviews,
policies, or even institutions. These are approached as texts or writing in the
Derridean notion that there is nothing outside the text. Suitable ethnographic
methods also include thick descriptions, interviews, and textual analysis of
official documents. Both allow for a comparison of data and also use case
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studies. Contrary to positivists, who often understand case studies as a limited
tool of study providing little possibilities for generalisations, and
hermeneuticists, ethnographers and interpretivists, who use them as self-
explanatory narratives, CDA and DAT steer a somewhat middle course,
allowing for generalisations, based on a presentation of a persuasive narrative
rather than empirical testing.
Both methods study established discourses, and their internal mechanics and
assumptions. CDA places greater emphasis on the packaging of a discourse, in
terms of what language and references were used, and what assumptions and
presupposition it contained as commons sense to communicate ideas rather
subtly and indirectly. By investigating a discourse and its interpretation of
events based on statements, metaphors and hegemonic practices, Fairclough
(CDA) converges to a great degree with DAT, making both variants of
discourse analysis complement each other. Similar to the recognition by CDA
that a discourse is used unconsciously by the subjects, DAT recognises that
most subjects immersed in a discourse cannot see beyond the discursive
horizon that it represents: subjects tend to use what has been made available to
them. DAT emphasises the need to understand the whole of a discourse, in
order to analyse particular examples, which rely on the whole structure that
gives meaning to abstract concepts, new events or challenging moments. The
two methods complement each other, since DAT provides a greater theoretical
underpinning for research into political history, and accepts crude texts such as
political speeches, while CDA provides the tools to uncover culturally and
historically relevant references and meanings that make a discourse
intelligible, relevant and appealing to the concerns of a given public. CDA is
grounded to a greater extent in linguistics with a more sensible approach to
language, while DAT is grounded in political research and history - yet both
make their conclusions based on textual analysis and the study of a language
and a discourse. Both schools are part of the family of discourse analysis and
represent alternative research methodology to positivist quantitative analysis.
Both schools of discourse analysis stand for the practice of researching
information understood as discursive forms. Both schools understand the main
function of a discourse as a tool for winning others' consent, or at least
acquiescence, in their possession and exercise of power.
The differences between the two methods are apparent in the detailed
descriptions of their research practices, focus and theoretical assumptions.
CDA prefers more subtle texts, while DAT can use explicit evidence. This
difference of selection of evidence can be perceived either as a conflict, or an
opportunity to approach a text through two different lenses, which both give
slightly different interpretations of the same evidence. CDA places greater
emphasis on the unconscious use of a discourse by its users, unaware of its
historically constructed patterns of interpretation. Thus it analyses what is
presupposed in a discourse. DAT recognises to a greater extent that such
discourse is actually constructed by individuals that intend to retain its
hegemonic character. CDA understands language as a representation of social
reality (linguistics), while DAT assumes the construction of a political project,
based on an interpretation of history and reality that supports it and ensures its
hegemonic position in an environment, in which it is constantly challenged by
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other discourses and events that contradict it. DA T understands opinion
leaders as striving to maintain hegemony of their discourse that allows them to
rule and remain in power by consent generated through the discourse.
CDA assumes unconscious processes of language users, who take thinking
patterns of a discourse as given, but which can be modified in conjunction
with social reality. DAT does not address the unconscious processes
embedded in language, which assume, presuppose and rely on the underlying
established common sense taken for granted. In this sense, CDA is a better
methodology for uncovering such assumptions, thus allowing for a deeper
investigation of the internal mechanics. On the other hand, DAT is better for
investigating historical processes and stability of political systems. With CDA
we learn more about the implicit sources oflegitimacy, while with DAT we
can address the broader picture of the whole system. While CDA is a more
subtle tool dealing with language and its more gentle ways of generating
consent, DAT brings our focus more on the way concepts are used and how
the discourse is structured in terms of content. By combining the two methods,
we gain two slightly different perspectives on largely similar evidence, thus
gaining further insights into the system.
The methodology has received significant attention in recent years as a
methodology complementing more established positivist and statistical
methods used in political research and social science. This specific approach
gives the dissertation an innovative angle as such, compared to many other
traditional writings on Cuban history and politics, based solely on historical
data, and classical approaches. Rather than focusing solely on historical facts,
the research examines Cuban discourse from an internal perspective. It
examines how it reflected widely held attitudes and national memory to argue
for legitimacy and thus continuity after 1989.
Use of Terms
In the following text, Cuba is referred to as both communist and socialist,
. since this term has been used interchangeably in Cuban discourse as well as in
many other texts referring to pre-1989 Eastern Europe as a Socialist Bloc. The
concept of the "Cuban framework of meaning" is used and refers to the
general worldview of Cubans, based on their endogenous values and the world
m which they are embedded and from within which they are understanding
reality. This is closely related to the term "discursive horizon", which refers
~xpli.c~tlyto the limits and borders of hegemonic Cuban discourse. The term
implicitly stresses the limits of discourses, which tend to deny the world
beyon~ their horizons. The concept of the "field of meaning", also used in the
following text, is closely related to the discursive horizon, as the sum of what
is available and on which bases reality is interpreted and meaning assigned to
a range of concepts and events. Another term used in the text is "an agent of
interpretation", a term which designates an opinion leader in a society, whose
views may be likely to be adopted in order to make sense of the world in terms
of the past, present and future, somewhat close to the charismatic component
of Weber ian notions of legitimacy.
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The following text also uses the concept of the Other, used to refer to those
outside of the Cuban political unit labelled as "we" or "us", which contributed
to the constitution of Cuban identity by referring to what it was not, and those
beyond the boundaries of the widely accepted characteristics of Cuban society
as a coherent community, with its own set of values, history and culture.
Cuban national identity relied on the Other to define its boundaries and
national character. Thus, the Other is part of what defined or even constituted
the self of Cubans as individuals. The Other involved the exclusion of those
living in Cuban society that defined their existence beyond the boundaries
respected by the majority. In this way, Cubans understood themselves in
relation to the Other as part of a process of reaction and identity formation.
The Other allowed the discourse to distinguish between familiar and alien,
home and abroad, worthy of trust and worthy of distrust, the accepted and the
rejected or condemned.
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2. 3. Evidence
Reasons for Choosing 1980 Mariel and 1994 maleconazo
In order to investigate sources of legitimacy, crises were identified as suitable
moments, when the sources were the most prominent and played an important
role in supporting the stability of the system. In addition, crises were selected
before and after 1989 in order to allow for further comparisons of pre- and
post-1989 as a date after which communism was greatly challenged
worldwide. The two crises provide comparative examples of continuities and
adaptation of the sources of legitimacy in different national and international
contexts. The available crises, closest to 1989 were only two: the 1980 Mariel
and 1994 maleconazo and for this reasons they are the most suitable and other
crises were not selected. By comparing the discourse, as recorded by the
country's mainstream media, we can see which sources oflegitimacy changed
and if so why. We can also compare how the structure and mechanics of the
discourse changed, in terms of interpreting emigration or the specific meaning
of socialism and patriotism. By the means of such a comparison on either side
of the 1989 crisis, we can gain insights into how the discourse shifted and
what implications this may represent.
The Mariel and maleconazo episodes were selected as recent examples of
potentially destabilising, and certainly challenging, moments for the system.
They provide two examples of times when the discourse argued the most for
the system's legitimacy trying to support the hegemonic consensus of the
population. At the same time, the two events could have ended in a collapse of
the system, but in the end did not. This implies that, potentially, the system
could have used a hegemonic construction put on them, giving them a
meaning in favour of the system, and then subsequently reintegrating their
legitimating meaning back into the discourse. This could have contributed to
the continuity and stability of the system as the meaning of these events did
not contradict it and reflected people's attitudes and concerns conveyed with a
language they were familiar with.
The 1980 Mariel and 1994 maleconazo episodes were selected as the only
significant internal moments of destabilisation in Cuba after 1980. They
represent two challenging moments that generated internal discussions about
the ~our~es o~ l.egitimacy of the system. The loss of the Soviet Union and the
declme m legitimacy of communism worldwide, due to the collapse of a large
part of the communist bloc, represent further destabilisations. By analysing the
di~course, w~ can gain further insights in regards to how the system coped
WIth these shifts, As a consequence of these transformations, Cuba experience
extreme hardship during the 1990s, further inspiring the question of how the
system responded to this to encourage loyalty and avoid a collapse similar to
other communist countries in and after 1989. Thus, by comparing the two
episodes we can make further inferences in regards to Cuba's survival of
1989. Both episodes involved serious discussions about migration, which itself
is revealing, and could have been a highly destabilising issue. The two
examples were identified as suitable in relation to the underlying methodology
of discourse analysis:
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"...having immersed oneself in a given discursive field consisting of
texts, documents, interviews and social practices, the researcher draws
on her or his theoretical expertise to make particular judgements as to
whether something counts as an 'x', and must then decide upon its
overall import for the problem investigated .... An integral part of
judging whether a particular empirical phenomenon counts as an
instance 'x' consists in deciding what the precise relevance and
importance of 'x' is in constructing a narrative that explains a
phenomenon." (Glynos & Howarth 2007: 184).
Evidence from Cuban print media including speeches was used for practical
reasons and to suit the constrained research environment in Cuba. Evidence
was gathered during two research visits of Cuba, one in January 2008 and the
second in April-May 2010, of a combined time of two months, which provided
opportunities for observation, interviewing and library research. The research
activities included interviews conducted by the author on the island. The
interviewees included Cuban academics, former Government officials and
members of the general public in Havana in April and May 2010. The main
part of the evidence was extracted from Cuban printed periodicals, but
indirectly also included political writings and other forms of text produced by
the Cuban Government and academia. The selection of sources was conducted
objectively, with the selection criteria based on their relevance to the topic,
accessibility and availability. The combined discourse analysis methodology is
a suitable method, since printed media represent a valid source of evidence to
investigate sources of legitimacy encoded in a discourse. Printed media
interpret events and issues on the basis of the underlying discourse, and
contain subtle presumptions, historical references, and established meanings,
which represent suitable evidence to trace the sources of legitimacy and
internal mechanics of a discourse. The researched data was analysed from
different points of view aiming to be as objective as possible. This research
and its conclusions are based on the focus on the sources of legitimacy in the
hegemonic discourse accessible through widely available government-
regulated newspapers. For this reason, large-scale interviews with ordinary
Cubans were not necessary, as the main evidence included government-
controlled printed sources in order to examine the shifts and continuities in
terms of the deployed sources of legitimacy. For these reasons, interactions
with Cubans and the environment during the two research visits were only
complementary research activities for the project. Challenges of researching in
Cuba were considered during the research design, which was at different
stages pragmatically modified in order to provide an achievable and
academically valid research project.
To investigate the sources oflegitimacy of the Cuban system, this research
project uses evidence from Cuban print media, including Granma, Bohemia
and Verde Olivo. The research is based on a textual analysis of these sources.
Granma is a particularly useful source of evidence, as it tracked the country's
public life on a daily basis, and was written for the general public. For many
Cubans, Granma was an important source of information. Further evidence
was gathered from magazines Verde Olivo (published weekly unti11988) and
Bohemia (published fortnightly). The magazines provided information in a
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more leisurely manner, also including short stories or entertainment such as
crosswords. They complemented Granma as they often reprinted its most
important articles in full or abbreviated. In some cases, they also covered some
topics in greater detail. Verde Olivo was to some extent aimed at army
personnel and was written as such, but was nonetheless also widely read by
the general public as the military was highly integrated into Cuban society, as
a society of guerilleros [guerrillas] and combatientes [combatants] under
siege, where each citizen was expected to defend the homeland. Since the
1990s, the military was closely involved in the management of a significant
number of the island's enterprises, and to this date coordinates relief
operations during the hurricane season, assisting the civilian population. The
military was highly integrated in the Cuban government, linked in through
Raul Castro, who was the head of the armed forces. The language used in
Verde Olivo contained a military tone. The magazine Bohemia was aimed at
the general public, providing information in the most relaxed tone of the three.
Like Verde Olivo, it also reprinted major articles from Granma, or
paraphrased them. Cubans who did not read Granma or Verde Olivo were
likely to grab an issue of Bohemia on a Sunday afternoon for some digested
news from the country, combined with entertainment. The two magazines
complement Granma as well as each other in terms of covering most of the
Cuban public. Granma was, however, the prime source, as the other two
information outlets provided a relatively limited coverage of current issues.
The data from more than two years provided an extensive amount of evidence,
out of which the most relevant and key articles were selected in relation to the
research focus. The evidence from the two years was compared in order to
identify shifts, similarities, patterns, differences and omissions. This
comparison revealed more clearly its sources of legitimacy, and allowed for an
observation of how they were affected by changing internal factors and the
external global context. The project required careful selection of the most
directly focused, relevant and exemplary texts from the extensive body of
possible evidence. Articles covering major issues, migration, situation in
. Cuba, relations with the United States, and those containing arguments for the
legitimacy of the system, were selected and analysed as the most relevant to
this research. The texts included public speeches by Fidel Castro and .
Government officials, testimonies from the public and interviews as printed in
Government-controlled media, editorials, Government announcements, and
analytical articles of the time. They were written by journalists from Granma,
Bohemia and Verde Olivo, as well as by officials and Fidel Castro.
The evidence used was selected objectively, only in respect to the research
focus. It is worth pointing out that the 1980 Mariel crisis chapter is also based
on articles from Verde Olivo, a magazine that was discontinued during the
1990s because of economic problems and lack of paper. For this reason, the
1994 maleconazo chapter is not based on evidence from Verde Olivo. This
difference did not have a negative impact on the conclusions, since around
eighty percent of the evidence in both chapters is based on Granma, and the
two magazines represent only complementary evidence, with Verde Olivo
playing only a minor role, yet still worth including. In the maleconazo chapter,
a few articles from Granma Internacional were used, but these include
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exclusively transcripts of public speeches given to Cubans in Cuba (in most
cases transmitted on Cuban national TV and radio), thus constituting valid
evidence as part of the discourse aimed at the Cuban public. The detailed work
with the original language allowed for a true penetration and understanding of
the discourse, despite linguistic and cultural barriers. The linguistic and
cultural skills of the author were greatly enhanced during the two research
visits to Cuba, which involved interviews and a first order experience with the
environment and immersion in its discourses. On the other hand, the limitation
of the researcher as a geographic and cultural outsider provided greater
distance from the evidence, and greater potential for a critical approach.
The coverage from these two periods is a revealing example of the internal
mechanics of the system, allowing for an investigation of how events were
covered, what subtle messages were sent, and which endogenous references
were used in the process. In addition, the two crises provide examples for
comparison of the similarities, differences and shifts in the sources of
legitimacy, the mechanics of the discourse itself set in vastly different global
political contexts. In addition, they provide interesting insights into the
internal reaction of the system to the neoliberal discourse. The time difference
of almost fifteen years between the two crises provided additional space for
shifts and changes. Both episodes involved issues of emigration, and the
reaction of the discourse to it. The national debate focused on some of the
most basic pillars (sources of legitimacy) to communicate clearly the reasons
for the rest of the population to stay on the island and remain loyal to the
system.
The Cuban Communist Party had direct control over the country's media, and
social and political organisations. The coverage of the events in 1980 and
1994 took place in a similar environment, and awareness of it is important
when considering the impact of the examined evidence. It would have been
difficult for a Cuban to have a different opinion outside the overwhelming
majority, after some thirty-five years in an ideologically highly integrated
system, involving every institution and every person through various mass
organisations, including children and the elderly. Some of these, mainly
Comites de Defensa de la Revoluci6n [Revolutionary Committees] 1, were
used during the 1980s:
"to intimidate dissidents and keep them in their homes ...the Cuban
leadership resorted to organised mobs, consisting of available
neighbours and security personnel in civilian clothes, who conducted
'acts of repudiation' against individuals with dubious loyalties ....these
included sieges of their residences to actual invasion of premises,
beatings, and destruction of property." (Baloyra & Morris eds. 1993:
9).
1 Square brackets are used in the text to indicate explanatory additions, or translations by the
I author.
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Part II: Evidence
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Chapter 3
3. 1. Discourse Analysis: 1980 Mariel Episode in Cuban
Newspaper Granma, and Magazines Bohemia and Verde Olivo
The so-called Mariel was a major migratory episode that surprised Cubans
without a warning in the midst of the relatively prosperous early 1980s. It
resulted in the State opening the floodgates of unrestrained emigration, to
relieve the system of its most discontented elements, while claiming strong
legitimacy amongst the loyal parts of the population. The loyal were
encouraged to repudiate those leaving as unpatriotic scum, who were allowed
to legally embark onto ships arriving from the US (Kapcia 2009: 41, 156, Gott
2005: 266-267). The boatlift was mostly organised by Cuban exiles residing in
Florida, and its name derives from the port of Mariel just a few miles West of
Havana. Cuban authorities proclaimed the voluntary character of Cuban
socialism, and aware of the damaging impact of the migratory crisis on US
electoral politics, and released its own prisoners who joined the migrants,
resulting in some 125,000 marielitos (Ibid.).
The Situation before the Crisis
Following the victory of the nationalistic Sierra Maestra freedom fighters
during the Revolution, the nation-building project enjoyed relative stability,
largely due to continuing mass revolutionary enthusiasm. Undoubtedly, this
enthusiasm provided the main legitimating component in support of the post-
revolutionary ideological structure sustaining a system which was perceived as
historically legitimate. The system belonged to those Cubans that stayed on
the island after the Revolution. The system suffered a blow during the failed
ten million ton sugar harvest in 1970, which damaged the rest of the economy
neglected during the campaign, while also representing a de legitimating
failure. Castro addressed the failure of the 1970 zafra [sugar harvest] and
offered his resignation during his July 26 speech (Eckstein 2003: 41). In this
way, he reasserted his legitimacy as a popular leader that was ultimately not
revoked. At the same time, the system retained its strong grip on dissenting
intellectuals, arresting Herberto Padilla in March 1971 and accusing him of
producing counter-revolutionary poems (Gott 2005: 247).
In 1972, Cuba became a member of the COMECON, and the USSR paid
increased prices for Cuban sugar, while providing oil supplies at lower rates
(Eckstein 2003: 47), supporting further growth of the economy. In 1974, the
system experienced an economic boom based largely on the high world sugar
prices (Ibid: 48). In 1973, the Thirteenth Congress of the CTC (Cuban Labour
Confederation) increased legitimacy of the system amongst Cuban workers by
putting forward policies, which were to increase their material benefits in
relation to their productivity and overtime work (Ibid: 43).
"By 1975 over two thirds ofthe labour force received pay for overtime
and double-shift work ...Meanwhile, the government increased the
supply of such consumer goods as refrigerators and television and it
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expanded the housing stock, linking access to them to 'economic
contribution'." (Ibid.).
As a result of these and other factors, between 1971 and 1975, the country
ranked among the highest in Latin America in terms of economic growth,
resulting in an increased per capita consumption (Ibid: 51). Nevertheless,
because of the preceding economic problems, households were not doing as
well as it may seem.
In August 1975 Cuba agreed to send some 480 military instructors and
personnel to Angola (Gott 2005: 252), and in November 'Operation Carlota'
was launched (Ibid: 254). This focused national attention towards the
developments in Africa and the aspirations of other developing nations to a
similar independence that Cuba had won thanks to the Revolution. In March
1976, South African forces withdrew from Angola, a move that represented a
legitimating victory for Cuban involvement, but also the more complicated
return of war veterans who would require state support back home.
The second half of the decade, however, brought a downturn for the economy,
caused by the fall of the price of sugar on world markets between 1974 and
1977 (Eckstein 2003: 51). This negatively influenced Cuban foreign trade and
the growth of the economy. As a result, the government increased its focus on
foreign investment and encouraged joint ventures (Ibid: 46). As a result, the
country's Western debt rose significantly.
"Initially opposed to tourism on moral grounds because of the
gambling, gangsterism, and prostitution with which it had been
associated under the Old Regime, in the late 1970 Castro modified his
stance here too. He argued that tourism could be regulated to avoid the
degenerating effect it had had before the revolution." (Ibid: 47).
The system went through major changes during the institutionalisation
. processes after 1975, which culminated in a new constitution in 1976. The
December 1975 Party Congress represented a renewed direction for the
country, which tried to reverse more pro-market policies of 1966-1970; now
perceived as erroneous, back towards socialism. The economic policy was
revised, the link between the political apparatus and mass organisations was
strengthened, and the perceived overt centralisation of the bureaucracy was
reversed (Silva Le6n 2008: 69):
" ...muchos estudiosos del proceso revolucionario cubano 10
consideramos como el inicio de un nuevo periodo en la construcci6n
del socialismo en Cuba." [...many students of the Cuban revolutionary
process consider it as a beginning of a new period of the construction
of socialism in Cuba] (Ibid.).
The period represented a revision of the Cuban revolution as a process, with
renewed emphasis on industrialisation and exports for 1976 to 1980, based on
the Direcci6n y Planificaci6n de la Economia, in order to contain the growing
foreign debt crisis (Ibid: 72-73). The economic policies of the SDPE proposed
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ways of constructing socialism without capitalist means, while changes were
made to the functioning of the People's Power (Ibid: 74). The provincial
division of the island was reshuffled (now 14 provinces and 169
municipalities) and a new Constitution was approved by a referendum on 15th
February 1976, with the official results showing a 98% participation with
97.7% of the electorate in favour (Ibid: 88). The electorate now had the right
to recall candidates of the Peoples Power, making them more accountable to
their constituencies, thus improving communication from bottom to top. The
socialist character of the country was reaffirmed. The National Assembly was
established as the supreme organ of the state with exclusive constitutional and
legislative powers (Ibid: 91). In the same year, municipal elections provided
further legitimacy with official results reporting a 95.2% participation (Ibid:
95). The new Constitution also codified women's rights as part of the Family
Code. The new changes demonstrated the ability of the system to react to
changing circumstances, always keeping the revolution current, and assuring
the public about constant improvements to the system. It also sent a message
of improved material wellbeing for the rest of the decade despite the adverse
conditions. Overall, the SDPE and the recent membership in COMECON
improved the economic conditions of Cuban households compared to the first
half of the decade, increasing the role of the material source of legitimacy.
The blowing-up of a Cuban airliner on 6th October 1976 that killed all
passengers onboard, including the Cuban national fencing team, reminded
Cubans ofthe constant threat from Cuba's enemies, especially the radical
Miami exiles who had orchestrated the bombing. Together with the allegations
that these exiles had been associated with the CIA (Gott 2005: 261), this
incident provided an example before the 1980 Mariel crisis of the continuing
relevance of the real danger originating from the United States and its regional
allies. It supported the negative image of the United States as a criminal state
because of the CIA link to the terrorists, ready to use any means to destroy
revolutionary Cuba. It also supported the Cuban criminal image of the Miami
exiles, later used during the Mariel crisis to denounce those leaving, as Cubans
of a similar character to those exiles supporting terrorism.
Cuban involvement in the Ethiopian revolution of 1977 and its increased focus
on Africa as a region where the country's socialist revolutionary development
model represented a new alternative for change, enhanced the country's image
at home and within the Non-Aligned Movement. It also increased tensions
with the United States.
Cuba thus contributed to the triumph of the Ethiopian revolutionary
movement, led by Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, a Marxist-Leninist backed
by the Soviet Union, which led to the closure of US military bases in the
country and caused a Cold War strategic confrontation. The conflict later
escalated into a military confrontation between US-backed Somali forces and
a coalition of Ethiopia, Cuba and the Soviet Union. The Somali forces
withdrew in March 1978, leaving Cuba and its allies as the victors, and
negatively influencing US-Cuba relations (Ibid: 257-260). The Ethiopian
confrontation was portrayed in Cuba as a conflict between US neo-colonial
imperialism and Cuba's altruistic righteous revolutionary cause, strengthening
the negative image of the United States.
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In September 1979 delegates from over ninety-four countries from the Non-
Aligned Movement arrived in Havana for the group's sixth conference. This
can be understood as a symbolic increase in legitimacy of the Cuban system
domestically, supporting its representation of the righteous Cuban struggle in
the developing world. It also encouraged comparisons of Cuban socialist
luxuries in contrast with harsh realities in many developing countries battling
with extreme poverty and under-development, which demonstrated the
qualities of the Cuban system despite any economic issues. Cubans and their
leaders stood for Cuba's unique ability to survive in the face of exploitative
interests abroad, always able to resist US hegemonic pressures that had often
disillusioned other countries and stimulating great admiration for Cuba's
ability to maintain its autonomy under all circumstances.
Despite these antagonistic relations with the United States, in the late 1970s
the Cuban leadership entered into negotiations with the Miami exile
community before the crisis, through Bernardo Benes, a Cuban exile himself
(Ibid: 265). The negotiations represented a potential rapprochement with
Miami, with negotiations touching on the release of political prisoners held in
Cuba and on potential permission for Cubans living abroad to visit the island.
The negotiations resulted in more than 100,000 Cuban-American family visits
to the island in 1979, which had a significant de stabilising impact on Cuban
society, by exposing the population to the wealth of the United States and an
inflow of information beyond the hegemonic discourse, possibly putting the
system in doubt by providing a tempting alternative. Hence, while in 1979 the
focus on the Non-Aligned Movement and Africa encouraged Cubans to
perceive themselves as lucky, the arrival of significant numbers of rather
wealthy exiles had the very opposite effect. Especially, as the economic
situation on the island took a tum for the worse during the second half of the
1970s. The inflow of exiles is seen by some Cuba experts as the main trigger
for the break-in at the Peruvian embassy and the ensuing social unrest
culminating in the Mariel exodus. Hence, while post-1975 institutionalisation
settled Cuban society and the legitimacy of the system for a while, the influx
of Cuban-Americans rattled the cage again generating discontent and doubt.
In the United States, following the Nixon presidency which ended in August
197~, and the interim presidency of Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter took over the
White House in January 1977, bringing new hopes of potentially improving
r~lations with Cuba, due to his emphasis on soft power, ethics and human
rights, A Cuban academic, Roberto Gonzalez G6mez from the Cuban Centro
de Estudios Martianos later even described Carter as: "inteligente, muy
ambicioso y dotado de un profundo sentido etico" [intelligent, very ambitious
and gifted with a deep ethical sense] (G6mez 2003: 134). Carter started by
opening interest sections in Havana in September 1977 reciprocally allowing
!he Cubans to do reciprocally open theirs in Washington D.C. But Cuban
mvolvementin Africa sent negative messages to the Carter administration, and
especially its hawkish advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. The administration
remained rather inconsistent, due to disagreements between Brzezinski and
other advisors, or as expressed by G6mez, "...fue una politica zigzagueante"
[.. .it was zigzag politics] (G6mez 2003: 155).
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During this time, Cuba maintained good relations with the Soviet Union as a
cardinal ally that provided significant subsidies to the island thus
disincentivising any improvements in relations with the United States. The
alliance contributed to a negative perception of Carter by the US public, with
his softer approach to Cuba, engaged in military conflicts side by side with the
Soviet Union, such as in Ethiopia and Somalia. Cuba kept building its own
socialist model, believing it was well tailored to the conditions in developing
countries, thus challenging Soviet socialist orthodoxy despite the strategic
alliance. Even so, the Soviet-Cuban alliance remained firm, and possibly
allowed for the radical condemnation and ridiculing of the United States
during the Mariel boatlift. The tensions between Cuba and the United States
provided useful ammunition for the Cuban leadership to claim legitimacy for
its decisions domestically, protecting its citizens from its traditional adversary
and criticising or denouncing those that would consider switching sides. It
provided a new certainty that the economic blockade, so often denounced
within hegemonic Cuban discourse and understood as a central cause of
hardship in the country, would remain in place, legitimating the decisions of
Cuba's leadership.
During the run-up to the 1980 Mariel crisis, Granma reported the country's
rising economic productivity, discussed the values of the revolution, provided
examples of the virtues of Cuban revolutionaries as models for others, and
also covered a selection of events beyond the island from its own pro-
governmental angle. On a national level Cuba seemed to be focusing on its
own national routine. The nation was hit by the death of Celia Sanchez in
January 1980, who was a recognised national figure since the early days of the
revolution (Granma, y. 16, n. 10, 12 January 1980: 1). Hence, the whole issue
of Granma of lih January was printed in black. This was sad news for the
country, already squashed under the hardship of the el bloqueo [blockade], but
on the other hand it served as a useful reminder of the heroic deeds of
revolutionaries, revolutionary values and the need for commitment.
The Mariel crisis started in mid-April and continued until the end of October
1980, with the greatest number of Cubans leaving between 24th and 26th April
when the Mariel boatlift took place, as the Cuban authorities allowed boats
from Florida to pick up anyone wishing to leave Cuba. As in the past, the
event gradually developed into a symbolic confrontation between the United
States and Cuba. In addition, the crisis took place in the crucial month of
April, remembered by all Cubans as the month of the Playa Giron attack,
which started on 1th April 1961. This provided a unique and very symbolic
opportunity to reflect upon US aggression, the Cuban victory and the need for
Cubans to unite in defence of a homeland facing real military threat. The
context of the Bay of Pigs victory anniversary also provided a tool for inciting
patriotism against those leaving.
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Considering the Evidence
Calm Before the Storm: January to March 1980
The print media content in Cuba preceding the crisis was a mixture of rather
ordinary topics. Granma of 2nd January reported about maritime trade,
ongoing construction projects, improvements in social security, and even
details such as the high production of refrigerators. The language used
descriptive terms, statistical data and focused on informing in an encouraging
way. It did not include any insults, as was the case during the peak of the
crisis. An article titled Las moliendas de fin de aho son ejemplos de los niveles
que deben alcanzarse desde ahora [The milling of the end of the year is an
example of the levels that must be achieved from now on] (Granma, y. 16, n.
1,2 January 1980a, Juan Varela Perez: 1) used rather informative language
suggesting improvements, such as desarrollo, accion colectiva, incrementar or
consolidar la eficiencia [development, collective action, increase,
consolidating efficiency]. The language was implicitly sending a message that
the country was doing well. To support the message, the article listed
provinces that had already fulfilled ninety percent or more of their target
production. It emphasised the role of the revolution and the strengths of the
Cuban collective, evoking images of confidence and stability. Other articles
used positive expressions in the same spirit such as la produccion de
refrigeradores mas alta de su historia [the highest production of refrigerators
in history], or horas voluntarias [voluntary hours] demonstrating the voluntary
commitment of citizens, and implying the smooth functioning of the system
based on genuine loyalty of Cubans to their country and its system.
The discourse in general was positive and encouraging. The last page of the
same issue contained a measure of Cuban anti-Americanism and negative
portrayal of capitalist countries in an article titled 1979fue un atio de mas
inflacton, de aumento de la desocupacion y de mayores precios en paises
capitalistas. [1979 was a year with more inflation, an increase in
unemployment and high prices in capitalist countries] (Granma y. 16, n. 1,2
. January 1980b: 6). The article then reported on the situation in Japan, Italy,
Fr~ce and the United Kingdom, using expressions and descriptions such as
mas desempleo, serias dificultades economicas para la poblacion, or los
precios .se elevardn [more unemployment, serious economic difficulties for the
populatton, or prices to rise], implying a worsening situation abroad and
~vokmg Images of problems, such as unemployment, not encountered on the
Is~and. The build up of such images portrayed Cuba as a safe place to live,
WIth the state granting basic existential needs for all, with Cubans not having
to worry in comparison to other nations living in a constant existential gamble.
Inflation and economic recession in capitalist countries were contrasted with
successes and increased production in communist Cuba. The portrayal of the
revolutionary socialist virtue of genuine commitment to hard work in the daily
lives of Cubans, as part of the revolutionary struggle, is evident in an article in
a later issue tiled Ami/car Gonzalez, un mecanico enamorado de su trabajo
[Amilcar Gonzalez, a mechanic in love with his work] (Granma, y. 16, n. 7,9
January 1980, Jose Gabriel Guma: 1). The article asked a rhetorical question:
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"l,Quh!n es ese obrero que merecia el honor de personificar el esfuerzo
de sus 870 compafieros?" [Who is this labourer that deserves the
honour of personifying the effort of his 870 co-workers?] (Ibid: 1).
The discourse elevated the revolutionary emphasis on hard work, as a source
of individual honour within the workers' state. In addition, the word
compaheros can be translated as colleagues, co-workers or comrades,
inspiring a sense of a united community of workers. Amilcar Gonzalez was
also described as a militante del Partido [militant party member] (Ibid: 1),
which merged his working skills and social honour with the commitment to
political affairs within the highly politicised Cuban political culture, where
such commitment was assumed to be highly valued. He was also described as
having visited the USSR in the past, which encouraged him in his
commitment, and which was an implicit statement of what he gained from
Cuba's crucial strategic ally and ideological partner, the USSR.
Celia Sanchez as an Exemplary Loyal Revolutionary
Granma published an entire issue in black on 13th January and dedicated it to
the honour of the death of Celia Sanchez, the nation's female hero and close
aide to Fidel Castro. This event provided an opportunity to remind Cubans
about the origins of their patriotic revolutionary struggle, with Celia portrayed
as a model revolutionary. This is evident in an editorial in the issue titled
Celia, which considered her contribution to the Cuban nation-building project.
She was described almost as an asexual figure and a citizen embodying the
values of the revolution:
"humilde ...una de las figuras mas nobles, mas queridas, y mas
definitivamente grandes, entre tantas que la Revoluci6n cubana hizo
destacar del seno fecundo de la Patria ...uno de sus mas bravos
soldados." [humble ...one of the noblest figures, most loved, and most
certainly great, amongst so many that the Cuban revolution has
elevated from the fertile womb of the homeland ...one of its bravest
soldiers] (Granma, y. 16, n. 10, 12 January 1980: 1).
The article demonstrated her personification of revolutionary values, and her
patriotism that was the source of her qualities. The article specifically
mentioned her commitment to el Partido y el Estado [the Party and the State]
(Ibid: 1), which were constructed as unified concepts in the single-party
system, suggesting that the party was the state. This also represents a
particular presentation of Cuban nationalism within the boundaries of the
discourse, which largely omitted the word nacionalismo, due to its attribution
to the far right in Cuban political culture. The article not only described her as
una trabajadora infatigable [a tireless worker], consistently emphasising the
revolutionary worker ethics, but also described her explicitly as hermana
[sister] (Ibid: 1), a word suggesting a close bond and familial unity of the
Cuban people in general: The article spelled out Cuban national values, and
then described Celia's life story and the process by which she was drawn to the
revolutionary cause from its early days:
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"...el patriotismo, la combatividad, la vida ejemplar, modestia,
sensibilidad humana y entrega leal y desinteresada al servicio de la
causa revolucionaria" [...patriotism, combativeness, exemplary life,
modesty, human sensitivity and loyal and selfless dedication at the
service of the revolutionary cause] (Ibid: 1).
"Fidel y la Revoluci6n se convertiran desde entonces en el
fundamento, la raz6n de ser y la estrella guiadora de su existencia."
[Fidel and the revolution became from then on the base, the reason of
her being and the guiding star of her existence.] (Ibid: 1).
In addition, a link was established between el Maestro [the Teacher] and
Celia, hence between Jose Marti, her and the revolution that had fulfilled their
longings. They all represented exemplary symbols for the people, especially
before the Mariel unrest, which was already developing and might have been
noticed by the leadership, therefore focusing on strengthening the patriotic
message. Celia was symbolised as steadfast even in moments when her life
had been under threat during the revolutionary struggle, a process which
continued. According to the article, she was always ready, awaiting
instructions and orders, demonstrating disciplina revolucionaria
[revolutionary discipline] (Ibid: 1). In the last part of the article, she was
described in a more poetic, sublime, grandiose and transcendental language as
... la sal invisible en el inmenso mar de la Revolucion [the invisible salt in the
immense sea of the revolution] (Ibid: 1), leaving Cubans explicitly with un
ejemplo extraordinario ...a todo nuestro pueblo ... [an extraordinary
example ...for our whole people] (Ibid: 1).
This example from the discourse before the Mariel incident demonstrates how
the rather negative news of Celia's death was combined with an encouraging
and positive tone of her heroic contribution to the revolution and the nation,
within which she was transcendental and immortal, along with other Cuban
national mythological figures, such as Che Guevara. In this sense, the
discourse suggested an inspiring existence with true depth for committed
revolutionaries, even beyond death.
Encouraging Voluntary Loyalty
The issue of the 10th March delivered clear messages. The title page
announced a number of main points in relation to the III Congress of the
Federaci6n de Mujeres Cubanas [Federation of Cuban Women], with one of
the headlines reading: La lucha por el socialismo es una lucha voluntaria: ese
fue, es y sera nuestro principio [The struggle for socialism is a voluntary
struggle: this was, is and will be our basic principle] (Granma, y. 16, n. 60, 10
March 1980: 1). This indirect expression of determination, related the frequent
reference to Cuba as a country of courageous guerilleros, with a resolute
determination to keep alive the mythical status of the revolution and its
triumphalism, was deeply embedded in the discourse. The message was in line
with the more subtle messages inspiring confidence, loyalty and
determination. Interestingly, the direct emphasis on the voluntary character of
the system may suggest the awareness of potential unrest in Cuban society and
preparation of the public for the opening of emigration floodgates that had
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taken place in the past, but in a way that would portray the Cuban leadership
as in control of the process. The tone continued to be encouraging, without
insults or strong condemnations, instead providing information portraying the
system as functioning well.
During the pre-crisis period, Bohemia focused on diverse issues of interest in a
more informal way. The work of health workers in the Sierra Maestra or life in
Hungary were covered in the issue dated 4th April. The issue started with a
brief message from Fidel Castro, condemning the US embargo and discussing
the country's right to independence. In the introduction, Castro constructed the
concept of nosotros [we/us], with an emphasis on people united by their
opposition to the twenty one years of the US embargo, using an issue which
appealed to all Cubans, regardless of their level of loyalty. The revolution was
interpreted in relation to revolutionary projects that continued in other
countries, such as Nicaragua and Granada, giving further weight to the Cuban
model. This implicitly proved that it was continuing to inspire other peoples
abroad. The common features of these revolutionary projects were interpreted
by Castro in the following words:
"Lo que nos caracteriza es precisamente nuestro propio espiritu de
independencia, 10 que nos' caracteriza es la defensa de los principios
soberanos de nuestros paises, el anhelo de luchar por nuestros pueblos,
de acabar con el analfabetismo, de acabar con la miseria, de acabar con
el desempleo, de acabar con la falta de asistencia medica, de acabar
con la pobreza, de acabar con la indignidad, que bastante habia en
nuestro pais, desde la prostitucion, el juego, el trafico de drogas .... Pero
debemos estar preparados para un largo tiempo." [What characterises
us is precisely our own spirit of independence, what characterises us is
the defence of the sovereign principles of our countries, our desire to
fight for our peoples, to end illiteracy, to end misery, to end
unemployment, to end insufficient medical care, to end poverty, to end
disgrace, of which there has been enough in our country, from
prostitution to gambling to drug trafficking .... But we have to be
prepared for a long time.] (Bohemia, y. 72, n. 14,4 April 1980a, Fidel
Castro: 3).
As in Granma, the language was informative, but engaging, pointing to the
alliance of revolutionary countries emerging from social and economic
difficulties and many other problems, but remaining on the right track. It
suggested the need for commitment. Another article in the same issue
presented the harsh reality up in the Cuban mountains, which had, however,
improved since the revolution: Los dias no son iguales [The times have
changed] (Bohemia, y. 72, n. 14,4 April 1980, Magda Martinez: 4-5). It
described in a poetic way the daily life in remote parts of the country, using a
leisurely and relaxed tone and an entertaining narrative. Unlike the more
factual and political language in Granma, it described the life of a campesino
[peasant]. The light narrative tone of Bohemia later became more serious
during the crisis. In a subtle way, the language contrasted the harsh realities in
t Cuba, Nicaragua, Granada
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Cuba with the firm struggle of its people, surrounded by Cuba's inspiring
natural beauty, and having righteous motives, as the story narrated the life of a
rural physician fulfilling his noble role, symbolically taking place in the region
of Granma:
"El cielo luce lechoso de tantisimas nubes, y a ratos, audazmente se
filtra un sorbo de azul." [The sky shines milky white with so many
clouds, and from time to time a drop of blue seeps boldly through.]
(Ibid: 4).
The Uncertainties Abroad in Contrast with the Comforts at Home
The same issue also focused on difficulties and poverty in Latin America, and
the capitalist world, putting Cuba's own problems into perspective. The article
cited sources from the IMF and OECD, thus increasing its credibility.
"En America Latina la desnutrici6n afecta al 45% de la poblaci6n y
cerca de 35 millones de nifios viven en la mas aguda miseria." [In
Latin America malnutrition affects up to 45% of the population and
close to 35 million children live in the most severe poverty.] (Bohemia,
y. 72, n. 14,4 April 1980c, Jose Luis Robaina: 66-67).
Referring to the capitalist countries the article reported:
"Inflaci6n, desempleo, pobre crecimiento econ6mico, endeudamiento,
desnutrici6n, miseria. Esas son alll las palabras de orden." [Inflation,
unemployment, poor economic growth, indebtedness, malnutrition,
misery. These are common parlance over there.] (Ibid: 66-67).
In addition, Robert McNamara, the former president of the World Bank, was
quoted:
"Para fines del siglo 600 millones de personas estaran en la pobreza
absoluta." [At the end of the century 600 million people will be in
absolute poverty.] (Ibid: 66-67).
The description of the difficult world beyond Cuba in both developing and
advanced capitalist countries aimed to increase the attractiveness of the Cuban
alternative, and in a way anticipated and addressed possible intentions of some
Cubans to emigrate. To increase the effectiveness of this argument against
emigration even further, a crucial part of the article informed:
"Segun informe del Departamento de Empleo que revel6 The New
York Times, los negros e inmigrantes hispano-parlantes son los
primeros en ser despedidos en momentos de crisis empresarial, ...son
los menos remunerados." [According to information from the
Department of Employment, revealed by The New York Times, blacks
and Spanish-speaking immigrants are the first to be made redundant in
times of corporate crisis. .vand are the lowest paid.] (Ibid: 66-67),
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The language became more direct and later read: la recesion sera horrible [the
recession will be horrible] (Ibid: 66-67). This report would have made anyone
considering emigration, or doubting the system, to rethink the situation
carefully.
Hence the overall media message can be summarised as focusing on positive
progress in economic development and productivity, supported by Cuba's
socialist work ethic, in contrast with economic problems elsewhere in the
world. The discourse emphasised Cuba's righteous cause in diplomatic
relations with the United States. The revolution was regularly covered in a
triumphant way, as an encouraging example for comparison with the situation
abroad: some having serious problems and others opting for the Cuban model.
The construction was a mixture of Cuban patriotism, anti-Americanism and an
image presenting national firmness and determination despite Cuba's
structural position as a small country. The language used in the pre-crisis
discourse avoided insults, focusing to a large extent on encouragement, and
suggesting some possible awareness of the increasing internal instability.
Unrest Escalates: April to October 1980
On 1st April 19S0, a group of disaffected Cubans crashed a vehicle through the
gates of the Peruvian embassy in Havana, killing one Cuban guard during the
following exchange of fire. The incident sparked off the Peruvian embassy
crisis, which then escalated into the Mariel boatlift. After the incident, the
discourse began to include messages referring to unrest in Cuban society,
attributing the problems to anti-social elements. Increasingly, the language
started to include negative connotations. Verde Olivo reported the event with a
double-page spread filled with images of the bus driven into the premises of
the embassy, describing the moments of the incident in detail, including the
brief shootout, as narrated minute-by-minute from different perspectives. The
magazine listed the names and past convictions of those involved, questioning
their status as political refugees, as they were interpreted in the US discourse.
The article stated clearly that
"...la irresponsibilidad de los que acogen a tales individuos, exentos en
cualquier lugar del mundo de recibir asilo diplomatico, va mas alla de
10 que puede soportar nuestro pueblo: se pierde la vida de unjoven con
hermosas cualidades humanas y revolucionarias." [...the
irresponsibility of those that welcome such individuals, excluded in
any place in the world from receiving diplomatic asylum, goes beyond
what our people can support: the life of a young person with beautiful
human and revolutionary qualities was lost.] (Verde Olivo, 151S0, 13
April 19S0a, Jorge Luis Blanco: 10-11).
The listed convictions of the perpetrators to demonstrate convincingly their
criminal past, and hence immoral nature, included the following:
"indisciplina laboral, trafico de marihuana, robo, falsificaci6n de
documentos, santeria ...aqui los 'problemas politicos' que confrontaban
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los que ahora son acogidos por las autoridades peruanas." [work
indiscipline, trafficking of marijuana, theft, falsification of documents,
Santeria ...Here are the 'political problems' faced by those that are now
welcomed by the Peruvian authorities.] (Ibid: 10-11).
The language suggested a lack of any real political motivations for leaving. It
also assumed, within the officially atheist nature of the Cuban state at the time,
that Santeria was a negative symptom. The article clearly argued for the idea
that the revolutionary project was voluntary, and that criminal acts used as a
means to leave the country were not acceptable, thus establishing the grounds
for the beginning of the crisis.
Confident, Loyal Masses Face the Parasites
In the case of Granma, the langua~e already started to include insults directed
at disloyal Cubans. The issue of 4t April included a government declaration,
coupled with a synthesis of the life of the soldier killed in the premises of the
Peruvian embassy during the incident, portraying him as an exemplary
revolutionary, a heroic victim of the morally twisted attackers. The range of
words used to describe the perpetrators already expanded to include
deliquentes comunes, lumpens, elementos antisociales [common delinquents,
lumpens, anti-social elements] (Granma, y. 16, n. 82,4 April 1980: 1). The
article also confirmed that:
" ...no se les concede autorizaci6n por los gobiemos extranjeros para
viajar legalmente a los paises a los cuales quieren dirigirse ...han
apropriado el procedimiento de introducirse por la fuerza en embajadas
extranjeras." [...they were not given permission by foreign
governments to travel legally to countries they wished to head for ... so
they have proceeded to enter foreign embassies by force] (Ibid: 1).
This explanation demonstrated that the perpetrators had in fact been refused
by foreign governments (not explicitly citing Peru), and it suggested the
. complications of emigration as such for others in Cuba considering leaving.
Such negative news was contrasted with positive news about the popular
response to the official condemnation of the incident. A headline of another
article read: Pleno respaldo popular al editorial de Granma que define la
posic_ion de Cuba ante los hechos registrados en la embajada de Peru [Full
public support for the Granma editorial that defines the position of Cuba with
regard to the events that took place at the embassy of Peru.] (Granma, y. 16, n.
85, 8 April 1980b, Evello Talleria: 1). The discourse increased its putative
tone and used the wordparasitos [parasites], further encouraging loyal
Cubans:
"En esta espontanea reacci6n de nuestro pueblo es unanime el criterio
de defender nuestra soberania y repudiar las acciones de elementos
antisociales, deliquentes y parasites que ponen en peligro la seguridad
y la inmunidad diplomaticas, asi como la vida de valiosos soldados de
nuestro pueblo." [In this spontaneous reaction of our people is the
unanimous decision to defend our sovereignty and repel actions of
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antisocial elements, delinquents and parasites that endanger security
and diplomatic immunity, as well as the lives of valiant soldiers of our
people.] (Ibid: 1).
Later in the text, the perpetrators were also referred to as vagos, escoria and
lumpens [vagrants, scum, lump ens ] (Ibid: 1), contrasting the condemnations
from "trabajadores ...integrantes del Ballet Nacional de Cuba ... miles de
miembros de nuestras organizaciones politicas y de masas"
[workers ...members of the National Ballet ofCuba ...thousands of members of
our political organisations, and the masses] (Ibid: 1). The article ended by
calling out [Que se vaya la escoria! [Let the scum leave!] (Ibid..l ). Pages four
and five of the same issue then carried a message from the mother of the
soldier killed during the incident, quoting her reaction:
'''Diganle a Fidel que aunque mi hijo muri6, aqui me quedan otros que
seguiran defendiendo la revoluci6n', Luisa Cabrera Lien, Madre de
Pedro Ortiz Cabrera." ["Tell Fidel that even though my son died, I
have others that will continue defending the revolution", Luisa Cabrera
Lien, mother of Pedro Ortiz Cabrera.]. She also added: "Como madre
10 he llorado mucho; pero me queda el consuelo de saber que cay6
cumpliendo con su deber para con la Patria." [As a mother I cried a lot
about it; but I have the consolation of knowing that he fell doing his
duty to the Fatherland.] (Granma, 11 April 1980a, Santiago Cardosa
Arias: 4).
This was the strongest demonstration of loyalty to the system, expressing
patriotic sentiment without referring explicitly to nationalism, but instead
using the word fatherland. Support for the position of the leadership was
portrayed not as moderate, but absolute with complete loyalty and readiness to
receive orders from the commander in chief of the nation at war to stop the
nation's external, but also in this instance, internal enemies, represented by
dissenters intending to leave the country by violent means. The statement
echoed Cuban revolutionary values of sacrifice, determination and
perseverance in difficult moments, as exemplified by the leaders of the
revolution during the Sierra Maestra campaign.
The overall message contained elements stressing the unity of the rest of the
population devoted to their country and its historical struggle for
independence. The message was clear, repeating the theme of receiving
orders, in an article entitled: jComandante enjefe, ordene!, corean los
estudiantes en las calles [Commander in chief, command us! Chanted students
in the streets] (Granma, y. 16, n. 88, 11 April 1980b, Roger Ricardo Luis: 6).
The discourse demonstrated wide support:
"Expresiones y cantos de apoyo a Fidel y a nuestro Partido surgen
incesantemente de las masas estudiantiles que en los ultimos dias
recorren las calles." [Expressions and chants of support for Fidel and
our Party arise incessantly from the masses of students that march in
the streets.] (Ibid: 6).
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Cuban public opinion was interpreted very explicitly in an article in the issue
dated 10thApril and entitled Asi piensan los Cubanos [So Cubans think],
accompanied by brief explanations of individual Cubans expressing their
views in line with the leadership. Within the hegemonic discourse, where
workers were given high social value, the opinions given were often from
factory workers, telephone switchboard operators, street sweepers, repair shop
workers etc., but some white collar workers were also included. The tone was
increasingly serious and combative, calling these exemplary Cubans soldados
de la Revolucion (Granma, y. 16, n. 87, 10 April 1980c, Joaquin Oramas et
al.: 2-3), bringing in a stronger militaristic tone. Calls for antisocial elements
to leave were repeated, and the emphasis on national unity in opinion
culminated in the last paragraph:
"Asi piensan, de San Antonio a Maisl, nuestros obreros y campesinos,
nuestros intelectuales y nuestros estudiantes: los revolucionarios
cubanos." [So they think from San Antonio to Maisi, our workers and
peasants, our intellectuals and our students: the Cuban revolutionaries]
(Ibid: 2-3).
The description from San Antonio to Maisi suggested to Cubans the complete
inclusion of the whole of the island from its most western part (San Antonio)
to its most eastern (Maisi), including all generational and social groups,
starting with the workers and only then followed by intellectuals and others.
The perpetrators were also referred to in a specific word as vendepatrias
[treacherous/those that sold their fatherland], which echoed a very strong
sense of Cuban patriotism and belonging. A strong example of this emphasis
appeared on the front page of Granma dated 12thApril: Dispuesto nuestro
pueblo a defender la patria hasta la ultima gota de sangre [Our people is
ready to defend the homeland until the last drop of blood] (Granma, y. 16, n.
89, 12 April 1980a, Ralsa Pages et al.: 1). The article described the Cuban
people as:
"nuestro pueblo ...erguido y valeroso, supo de la amenazante maniobra
militar yanqui alrededor de Cuba ...los hijos de la tierra de Cespedes,
Agramonte, Maceo, G6mez, Marti, Mella, Guiteras, Camilo y
Che ...confirman su fervor revolucionario y su disposici6n al combate
por la defensa de su gloriosa Revoluci6n ..." [our people ...upright and
courageous, learned of the impending Yankee military manoeuvres
around Cuba ...the sons of the land of Cespedes, Agramonte, Maceo,
Gomez, Marti, Mella, Guiteras, Camilo and Che ...confirm their
revolutionary fervour and willingness to combat for the defence of
their glorious revolution] (Ibid: 1).
The language repeated the concept of "our people belonging to Cuba and its
revolutionary system", suggesting the seriousness of the military threat from
alrededor de [around] (Ibid: 1) Cuba, encircled by hostile forces, yet drawing
confidence from the country's historical experience of victorious struggle for
independence and autonomy. It cited particular heroic figures who died in the
independence fighting or for the revolutionary project, thus demonstrating
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absolute courage and commitment to the revolutionary cause. The tone
increasingly stressed the seriousness of the situation, as a fight, also recalling
the
Cuban army and its proven ability to prevail in military conflicts:
"Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias ...Angola, Etiopia, Gir6n, que
participaron en la Lucha Contra Bandidos y contra piratas ...no caben
los serviles ni los cobardes." [Revolutionary Armed Forces ... Angola,
Ethiopia, Giron, who participated in the fight against bandits and
pirates ... fit against the subservient nor cowards] (Ibid: 1).
The article again included strong words such as sangre [blood] and finally
repeated the call [Que se vaya la escoria! [Let the scum leave!] (Ibid: 1). The
tone at this stage was becoming increasingly militant and mobilising.
In most cases, Cubans involved in the initiation and continuation of the crisis,
and implicitly those unsupportive of the rest of the loyal collective, were
referred to with a range of terms including lumpens, elementos antisociales,
vendepatrias, delincuentes, and escoria. The identity of those disloyal Cubans
was constructed repetitively in several negative points, instead of reporting
any substantial diversity of reasons for wanting to leave. Later on however,
Granma included a brief explanation of this classification at a moment when
the number of people intending to leave expanded dramatically. The
newspaper stated explicitly that it portrayed these dissenters as anti-social
elements, due to the violent origin of the crisis, but later on, when the numbers
grew, explained that under the term of anti-social elements were also included
other individuals, such as relatives of Cubans already living in the United
States. (Granma, y. 16, n. 104,27 April 1980: 1). In most other cases
however, this distinction was not made and emigrants were described
consistently in negative terms. The negative portrayal of those who were
constructed as having betrayed the country and the system, was put in contrast
with the rest of the population, urging them to leave if they wished, thus
asserting the strength and self-confidence of the loyal part of the people and
the system. Granma expressed this outright on its last page of the issue of 8th
April: [Puerta abierta a la escoria! [The door is open for the scum.] (Granma,
y. 16, n. 85, 8 April 1980a: 2). Later issues followed by outright shouts on the
front page: [Que se vayan! [Let them leave"/Get out!] (Granma, y. 16, n. 96,
19 April 1980: 1).
The United States as a Criminal State
The image of the United States as an undesirable place to settle was evident on
the front page of the issue of Granma dated 10th April, which reported the
arrival of a African-American US resident after hijacking an American
Airlines plane. On arrival in Cuba, he testified that he had left for religious and
political reasons to escape persecution. The article presented his description of
the difficulties black people were encountering in the United States at that
time. The hijacker also added that in the United States, slavery continued to be
maintained informally and that the racial struggle in the country had moved
from opposing the "Ku-Klux-Klan" (Ibid: 4) to opposing the political
establishment and el partido nazi [the Nazi party] (Ibid: 4), finally concluding:
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"En Estados Unidos .. .los negros vivimos en un circulo vicioso sin
esperanza ...Se habla del mundo libre, pero un mundo libre que en
Estados Unidos no es para los negros." [In the United States ... the
blacks live in a vicious circle without hope ...They speak about a free
world, but a free world in the United States is not for black people.]
(Granma, y. 16, n. 87, 10 April 1980a: 1,4).
The testimony of the hijacker then continued in the article in the
following words: "Nosotros .. .los llamados negros norteamericanos,
hemos sufrido el peor tratamiento que ningun ser humano haya
experimentado jamas." [We ... the so-called North American Negroes,
have suffered the worst treatment ever experienced by human beings.]
(Ibid: 4).
As is evident here, the tone of the discourse in relation to the United States
was increasingly condemnatory of the United States as a symbol, and started
to include very direct, negative interpretations of particular parts of US social
reality. The focus on US social reality was particularly negative in this case,
and indirectly addressed the internal issues of Cuba, where the leadership
might have sensed increasing domestic unrest, possible migratory pressures,
and the impact of the recent influx of Cuban-Americans. The negative content
on the front page can be understood as a counter argument to the Cuban
domestic situation, interpreting the United States in a less than attractive way.
The tone here became much more confrontational in regards to the United
States as a symbolic adversary, countering what others might have perceived
as a tempting world of prosperity and wealth.
While Cubans were affected by the increased visits of Cuban-Americans,
articles such as this one might have been aimed at providing less attractive
descriptions of the world outside, especially the United States. The means by
which the alleged racial problems of the hijacker were solved by criminal
. behaviour, for example, were not addressed or discussed in the newspaper,
even though in a different context it would have been most certainly seen in as
anti-social behaviour of the escoria emigrating from Cuba by criminal-means.
The same issue of Granma included an article criticising declarations of US
Presi~e~t Jimmy Carter in support of the ruling junta of El Salvador,
describing the situation in the Caribbean as if this region belonged to the
United States (Granma, y. 16, n. 87, 10 April 1980b, Hector Hernandez Pardo:
6). This approach was described as imperialist, and Cuba was portrayed as
morally superior by simply demanding national independence that it had right
to as a nation-state. Alleged lies and misinformation campaigns of the White
House were contrasted with Cuba's justified demands for its rights that had
been internationally recognized, thus giving Cuba moral superiority US
geographic greed, suggesting the different characters of the two states as
righteous versus criminal.
Granma of the 11th April 1980 followed up with the announcement of a major
US military exercise called Solid Shield-80 that was to take place the
following month in the Caribbean alrededor de [around/encircling of] Cuba.
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(Granma, y. 16, n. 88, 11 April 1980c: 1). The timing of the article on the
front page suggests the increasing emphasis on maintaining the siege
atmosphere, in anticipation of a coming crisis, building an image of a
complete encirclement by hostile forces. Migrants abandoning the country in
such a situation were perceived as symbolically willing to join the enemy, thus
in a way becoming the enemy within. Social pressure was on the rise. The
article also reported the US military base in Guantanamo to have been
involved in the exercise, suggesting the reality of a potential military threat
with an undertone of real proximity, immediacy and seriousness. The military
threat represented by the United States combined with its denial of Cuban
territorial integrity by the maintenance of its base in Guantanamo, and the
historical evidence of the expansive nature of the United States, were
contrasted with Cuba's righteous defensive position and moral superiority as a
peaceful island state. This was a construction particularly and uniquely
relevant to Cubans, their concerns and national memory.
Granma continued with the issue of the lih April, further extending the
erroneous-position of the US government, by claiming that the aggressive
nature of its current foreign policy was targeted not only against Cuba, but
against all developing countries, as well as against the poor in the United
States itself. Instead of taking care of the poor, the US government was
increasing its already high spending on armaments, while spending on social
programmes was being reduced.
"La politica de Carter, aiiadi6, es una politica de guerra contra los
pobres y desafortunados de Norteamerica, contra los estados en vias de
desarrollo. De ella salen beneficiados s610 los fabricantes de armas, los
mercaderes de la muerte y tambien los regimenes desp6ticos que apoya
Washington." [The politics of Carter, he added, are the politics of war
against the poor and less fortunate in North America, against
developing states. Its beneficiaries are only the arms manufacturers,
merchants of death and also the despotic regimes supported by
Washington.] (Granma, y. 16, n. 89, 12 April 1980b: 7).
The United States was denounced for its unwillingness to accept migrants
from Haiti, while expressing such support for migrants from Cuba. This was
presented as US hypocrisy of its real position on immigration from South
America and the Caribbean. The discourse continued in an increasingly
insulting and accusatory tone, condemning the United States, and those aiming
to emigrate.
The magazine Verde Olivo contained almost identical messages as the main
information outlet Granma, accompanied by extra material not focusing on
current events. At the beginning of the crisis the magazine devoted a double-
page spread to the incident at the Peruvian embassy with photographs from the
scene. The following pages then covered the personal story of the guard killed
during the incident, with a reprint of an editorial from the Granma entitled La
posicion de Cuba [The position of Cuba] (Verde Olivo, 15/80, 13 April 1980b:
10-15). Amongst the points covered was a statement urging anyone wishing to
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leave Cuba to do so, but with the permission of the country of destination, not
through force.
"Como 10 hizo siempre, Cuba les abria gustosamente las puertas [As it
has always done, Cuba will open its doors with pleasure] (Ibid: 10-15).
The article reported that those who entered the embassy peacefully after the
incident had not committed an act of aggression and were free to return home,
with the Cuban authorities not intending to take any action against them. This
information demonstrates the gradual preparation for a possible exodus of
disaffected Cubans in the future, that could have been already under
negotiation amongst the leadership at the same time, portraying it from a
position intended by Cuban authorities as something under their control and
intent, preparing the public for things to come (Ibid: 10-15).
The issue of Verde Olivo of the 20th April reminded on the front page that
since Playa Giron, all peoples of Latin America had become un poco mas
libres [a little bit freer], sending this message as a quote from Fidel Castro
(Verde Olivo, 16/80,20 April 1980a: 1). Later in the issue, an article titled La
respuesta del pueblo uniformado [The reply of the people in uniform] (Verde
Olivo 16/80, 20 April 1980b, Luis Lopez: 4-5) reported the loyalty of the
armed forces. The issue devoted eight pages to CIA aerial operations over
Cuba, reinforcing the underlying message in Granma of the reality of a
possible US military aggression, not only from the sea but also from the air,
supported by strong historical evidence. This increased the range of threats
against the country under permanent siege. The article was titled Playa Giron,
Las operaciones aereas de la CIA [The Bay of Pigs, aerial operations of the
CIA] (Verde Olivo, 20 April 1980c, Jose M. Miyar Barruecos: 26-38),
suggesting the ability of Cubans to prevail by drawing on national memory,
recalling past triumphs in defence of their country. In an encouraging tone,
Verde Olivo contextualised the historical event as parte de una historia de
triunfo y victoria de nuestro pueblo [part of a history of triumph and victory of
our people] (Ibid: 27). The period was described as:
"El pueblo fue alertado, la naci6n se puso en pie de guerra, se hizo mas
firme la conciencia de lucha y la decisi6n de las masas de defender su
Revoluci6n." [The people were alert, the nation went on a war footing,
the fighting consciousness and the decision of the masses to defend
their revolution grew stronger.] (Ibid: 27).
The language contained a rather uncommon use of la nacion [the nation], and
provided an endogenous model of how to behave in unity in times of national
crisis, reminding readers of their historical ability to prevail against all odds to
defend their way of life, and political and social system. It also stressed the
decision of the masses to defend the revolution, implicitly suggesting that this
was due to spontaneous popular support, not involvement by the political
leadership.
In general, the consistent mixture of supporting messages facilitated the
reinforcement of the sense of Cuba as a society under siege, in a situation
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requiring special sacrifices, increased social control and loyalty. At this stage,
the tone was becoming more direct, negative, militaristic, denouncing, and
confrontational. Topics related to US aggression or emigration were addressed
and interpreted within the Cuban historical experience, anticipating further
problems and hence preparing the public to ensure loyalty. The tough
exploitative individualist life in the United States was contrasted with the
relative comforts of life on the island, available to those who would decide to
stay, and who were implicitly encouraged to do so. The loyal were portrayed
as opposed to those considering leaving for a world of racial inequality,
unemployment, worse access to education and public services, leaving behind
state-granted accommodation, public medical care, and a salary granted at the
end of each month. The press warned that for those leaving Cuba El
aprendizaje sera brutal [The apprenticeship will be brutal] (Granma.v, 16, n.
91, 14thApril 1980, Georgina Jimenez: 6).
This construction of US and Cuban realities in comparison can be understood
as a factor that could have contributed to the continuing legitimacy of the
Cuban system with a positive impact on the country's stability in these
challenging times, by ways of persuasion and a specific interpretation of
reality. It reiterated the basic principles of Cuban political culture, thus
echoing some of Ernesto Che Guevara's ideas (fight against oppression, social
provision etc.) at a time when the system was under pressure and required
active defence and loyalty of the public:
"Why does the guerrilla fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable
conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that he takes
up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their
oppressors, and that he fights in order to change the social system that
keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy and misery." (Cuban
Embassy to South Africa 2010, Ernesto Che Guevara,
http://emba.cubaminrex.cu).
The Mariel Boatlift: 22-26 April 1980
The coverage of the main wave of emigrants leaving through the port of
Mariel started in the issue of Granma of 22nd April, with a section on the front
page titled Noticias de Mariel [News from Mariel]. (Granma, y. 16, n. 99, 22
April 1980: 1). It informed the public that, the preceding day, two boats had
left Mariel for the United States with 48 elementos anti-sociales onboard [anti-
social elements] (Ibid: 1). In addition, the article reported the reaction of US
authorities, and reported the difficulties that those leaving were going to face
in the United States:
"".el Departamento de Estado yanqui hacia freneticas declaraciones
contra estos viajes a Cuba, amenazando con arrestar, confiscar,
etcetera." [the Yankee State Department made frantic declarations to
Cuba against these journeys, threatening to arrest, confiscate, etc.]
(Ibid: 1).
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The underlying message was that the emigrants and vendepatrias were not
welcome in Cuba, but neither were they welcome in the United States, thus
communicating the dangers of joining them and dissenters overtly critical of
the system in general, who had no place of their own and were presented as
despised by all. The article, and similar coverage, can be seen as implicit
discouragement of emigration. It also suggested the failure of the United
States in the diplomatic row, as the crisis was getting out of control for the
United States, which had in the past accused Cubans of constraining
emigration, but was now not willing to permit it, thus contradicting itself on
all grounds and building an image of a confused, irrational, lying imperial
aggressor.
Granma of the 24th April repeated the furious reaction of the yanquis against
the maritime bridge between Mariel and Florida. The language continued to
emphasise the embarrassing effect of the event on the Carter Administration,
using stronger accusatory language such as mentira yanqui [Yankee lie]
(Granma, y. 16, n. 101, 24th AprilI980: 1). The United States was accused of
lying about alleged emigration accords between Cuba, Peru and Costa Rica.
The issue of the 25th April continued to accuse the United States again of otra
desvergonzada mentira [another shameless lie] (Granma, y. 16, n. 102,25
April 1980a: 1). A large part of the article was written in a factual style, and
only at the end did it adopt more insulting language. Interestingly, it described
Cuban-Americans in a positive light, a rare occurrence in the discourse at that
time:
"Esto no fue mas que una respuesta inteligente de los residentes
cubanos en Estados Unidos a la politica hip6crita de ese pais." [This
was no more than an intelligent reply by Cuban residents in the United
States to the hypocritical politics of that country.] (Ibid: 1). In addition,
emphasis was given to the correct handling of the situation by the
Cuban side: "Aqui todo se desarrolla ordenadamente." [Here,
everything is developing in an orderly manner] (Ibid: 1).
Granma of 26th April continued with statistics from Mariel. The Port of Mariel
was described as a bosque de mdstiles [a forest of masts] (Granma, y. 16, n.
103,26 AprilI980a: I), with 958 boats requesting permission to pick up
/umpens from Cuba. Further on, Mariel was reported to be currently an
exception to the embargo, with burgeoning commerce between the crews and
locals, with increasing purchases of Havana Club rum, reportedly because
Bacardi rum produced in the United States no sirve absolutamente para nada
[is good for absolutely nothing] (Ibid: 1). Thus, the event was interpreted as
advantageous for Cuba, temporarily annulling the hated bloqueo, again
contradicting US interests. The editorial then concluded:
"Estos hechos demuestran una vez mas la infinita confianza que existe
en las garantias y la seriedad de la Revoluci6n Cubana .... iY
reafirmamos dignamente que la Revolucion y el socialismo es obra de
hombres libres!" [These acts demonstrate one more time the boundless
confidence that exists in the guarantees and seriousness of the Cuban
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revolution .... And we reaffirm with dignity that the revolution and
socialism are the work of free men] (Ibid: 1).
Another article in the issue referred to those leaving as "parasites", and even
encouraged them to leave as they had no place in a society where work was
considered of the highest dignity, where they represented only a minority that
longed for the exploitative and unjust American way of life instead of joining
the voluntary efforts of Cuban patriots and honourable citizens to build up
their own country.
"Los parasites no tienen cabida en una sociedad donde el trabajo
representa la mas alta dignidad moral y social." [The parasites do not
have a place in a society where work represents the highest moral and
social dignity.] (Granma, y. 16, n. 103,26 April 1980b, Hector
Hernandez Pardo: 3).
They were described as misfits in nuestro pueblo trabajador [our working
people] (Ibid p 3), emphasising a strong sense of community. The traitors were
contrasted with the rest of Cuban society that was ready to defend, at any
price, the sovereignty and dignity of their country. The article used references
to Jose Marti and his concept of Nuestra America [Our America] as a strong
source of identity within Spanish-speaking America, opposed to the Anglo-
Saxon imperialist United States. Marti's call to Latin Americans to unite was
reiterated and those that lacked faith in their country were condemned in the
context of a national crisis and reconsideration of values and revolutionary
history. The emigrants were portrayed as converting themselves into
marionetas de la sociedad de consumo ...los que cobardamente no creen en la
victoria y prejieren desertar [puppets of consumer society ...the cowards do
not believe in victory and prefer to desert] (Ibid: 3), suggesting their weak and
vile character. The tone suddenly became abusive:
"Hay que cargar los barcos de esos insectos dafiinos, que le roen el
hueso a la patria que los nutre .... Eso es 10 que piensa el pueblo
entero ... Porque es verdad. El pueblo piensa como Marti." [It is
necessary to fill these boats with these harmful insects that gnaw on the
bone of the homeland that nourishes them ...This is what the entire
people think ... Because it is true. The people think like Marti.] (Ibid:
3).
A qualitative contrast was reported between the just cause of Cuba with its
system based on truth, dignity, humanity, peace, equality, anti-racism and
social mobility, and the values underlying the US system, as for example in
the issue of 25th April stating: Hay valores humanos que no pueden ser
cambiados por cosas materiales. [There are human values that cannot be
swapped for material things.] (Granma, y. 16, n. 102,25 Apri11980b, Jose A.
Benitez: 2).
Granma of 27th April included further news from Mariel, reporting an
additional 903 elementos asociales leaving the country, with a definition of the
use of the term. Interestingly, the individuals were described as vagos,
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parasitos, elementos delicuenciales 0 predeliquentes [vagrants, parasites,
delinquent elements and pre-delinquents] (Granma, y. 16, n. 104,27 April
1980: 1), but the article also pointed out explicitly that amongst these were
relatives of Cuban living in the United States, who were not necessarily
lumpens. Nevertheless, the article stated that it would continue referring to
them as lumpens, due to the fact that most of them fitted this category:
"Granma seguira denominandolos a todos como elementos antisociales"
[Granma will continue to denominate them all as antisocial elements] (Ibid:
1). Later on, US reality was constructed as an illusion, which had been
described by Marti as monstrous (Ibid: 1). The issues of Granma from 26th
and 2ih April contained the most condemning and insulting language, and the
two days can be understood as the peak of the crisis.
An issue of Verde Olivo from 2ih April covered the massive popular
mobilisation in support of the Cuban authorities (Verde Olivo, 17/80,27 April
1980, Eduardo Yassels: 4-5). Interestingly, the issue did not cover the events
of the Mariel boatlift, which were reported on four pages in the subsequent
issue instead. There does not appear to be a special reason for this omission, as
this was at the time reported by Granma. Verde Olivo followed with a
comparison between Cuban youth widely supportive of the system and the
hopeless youth in the United States photographed holding guns in the midst of
poor housing estates in desolation (Verde Olivo, 18/80, 4 May 1980a: 8-11).
The article used strong language such as sangre or combate [blood or combat]
(Verde Olivo, 18/80,4 May 1980b, Coronel Manuel L6pet Diaz: 12-13). It
reminded, that the crisis was a nuevo combate por nuestra dignidad y
soberanfa [new combat for our dignity and sovereignty] (Ibid: 12-13), and
then reinforced the spirit of community in Cuba, based not only on a certain
blood relation but also on a more subliminal and spiritual bond: "No s610 les
une la sangre. Una afinidad espiritual enlaza las generaciones." [Not only
blood unites them. A spiritual affinity binds the generations.] (Ibid: 12-13).
This heightened appeal was aimed at Cubans of all generations, defending the
very basics of their identities and social reality at a decisive moment. The
trans-generational bond of the revolutionary system was further emphasised in
the following words: "Marchaban junto a viejos luchadores contra la
opresi6n ..." [They marched beside old fighters against oppression ...] (Ibid: 12-
13). The article reiterated the decades-old trust in the leaders of the
revolutionary project, and inspired renewed confidence: "para 10 que sea,
como sea y donde sea: Commandante en Jefe [Ordene!" [for whatever may be,
however it may be or wherever it may be: Commander in Chief, command
us!] (Ibid: 12-13). This article was followed by further coverage of Fidel
Castro's speech to the masses, emphasising unity and commitment (Verde
Olivo, 19/80, 11 May 1980, Fidel Castro: 8-15). The following issue reported
on a double page spread the situation in the United States in an article titled
[Paraiso 0 infierno? [Paradise or inferno?] (Verde Olivo, 23/80, 8 June 1980,
Armando Lopez Rivera, 8 June 1980: 16-17), describing police repression and
desolated immigrants in a US refugee camp, once again implicitly
discouraging emigration. The article examined the insecure future of those
who had left the comfortable socialist homeland, finding themselves in an
environment where an airplane was described as having over flown the
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provisional refugee camp with a banner reading: "EL KU KLUX KLAN
ESTA AQUI" [The Ku Klux Klan is here] (Ibid: 16-17). The article continued
that "No todo era color de rosa en la tierra de 'promisi6n' en el idilico 'paraiso'
yanki." [Not all was rosy in the 'promised' land, in the idyllic Yankee
'paradise']. In the United States, immigrants were not welcome and women
would sometimes turn to prostitution (Ibid: 16-17). As other articles from this
period, it aimed at opening the eyes of the Cuban public, focusing on the less
attractive parts of the US social system, after the population of Cuba was
previously tempted by increased visits of Cuban-Americans. Such portrayals
of the situation in the United States not only fitted well in the overall
hegemonic discourse, but also discouraged emigration of moderate dissenters,
increasing their loyalty to the system. It addressed domestic doubts about the
system at a moment of national re-evaluation, and reverted to a militant,
warlike language.
"Arguably, the so-called Mariel boatlift of April-November 1980 was
the most destabilising event confronting the revolution since the Bay of
Pigs invasion ....The government estimated that another 25 percent of
the population were ready to emigrate." (Baloyra in Baloyra & Morris
1993: 50).
After the Storm
Following the disquiet of the Mariel crisis, the printed media discourse
asserted the victory of Cuba and its people and reverted to other issues. It
described the outcome in the following words: El desconcierto yanki no puede
ser mas completo [The Yankee confusion cannot be more complete] (Granma,
y. 16, n. 106, 29 April 1980: 6). This was further followed by coverage of new
popular mobilisations in the next issue: iManana con Fidel todos a la plaza!
[Tomorrow with Fidel, everyone to the square!] (Granma, y. 16, n. 107,30
April 1980: 1). The same spirit of encouragement peaked on the symbolic day
of 1st May, when Granma reported about massive rallies in Havana and
elsewhere on the island to express support for the government and
symbolically demonstrate the lack of fear of the US military exercises taking
place at the same time. The issue focused strongly on nationwide festivities
around the symbolic date of the International Workers' Day, and the
continuing La Marcha del Pueblo Combatiente [March of the fighting people]
(Granma, y. 16, n. 120, 14 May 1980: 1).
As the titles from the front page of Granma illustrate, the discourse quickly
turned positive, celebrating the perceived Cuban victory: Este pueblo merece
un lugar en la historla, Este pueblo merece un lugar en la gloria, Este pueblo
merece la victoria [This people merits a place in history, This people merits a
place in glory, This people merits victory] (Granma, y. 16, n. 109,2 May
1980a: 1). Even though the mockery of the perceived US failure continued, as
did the condemnations of those that had left, the discourse became very
encouraging, containing a high frequency of positive words, such as victoria
and gloria. Other terms used includedJuerza, unidad, Patria 0 muerte
[strength, unity, homeland or death], with Patria 0 muerte deeply embedded in
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the discourse. The collective self-esteem was considered restored, assuming an
almost absolute national unity (Granma, y. 16, n. 109,2 May 1980d: 2-7). The
message was clear: despite all obstacles, revolutionary Cuba would prevail, as
had happened many times before, and it would not let itself be bullied by a
regional hegemon. All of this was possible thanks to the people and their full
support and confidence. The assumption of complete unity was demonstrated
by reports and photographs of deserted streets of Havana during the events
(Granma, y. 16, n. 109,2 May 1980: 7).
Granma of3rd May continued by printing Fidel Castro's speech, which
refocused the readers back on the need to continue increasing productivity and
on other practical issues as before the crisis, based on the common sense that
the problems had been dealt with and Cuban victory delcared (Granma, y. 16,
n. 110, 3 May 1980a, Fidel Castro: 1-3). The counter-revolutionary lumpen
that had left were portrayed as having betrayed the noble national values of
their homeland, una sociedad con mas valores morales [a society with more
moral values] for superficial capitalist materialist values. The front page
reported that more than a million Cubans participated in the rallies, as
confirmed by international news agencies, demonstrating the loyalty, honour
and revolutionary consciousness of the public. At the same time about 700
dissenters were reported to have gathered in front of the US Interests Section
in Havana, in order to show opposition to the rest of the country. These were
again dismissed as mostly anti-social elements, asking for a swifter exit from
the country (Granma, y. 16, n. 110,3 May 1980b: 5).
It is interesting that the newspaper covered the opposition as well, even though
it could have chosen to not report it. It was reported, however, in a context of
overwhelming support for the government, and the disproportion was the
angle of the coverage, which included numerous supportive responses of the
crowd at the rally in almost each paragraph of Castro's speech:
"APLAUSOS: [Que se vayan, que se vayan! ...EI pueblo unido jamas
sera vencido!" [Let them leave, let them leave! ...The united people
will never be vanquished!] (Granma, y. 16, n. 110,3 May 1980a, Fidel
Castro: 1-3).
The people were addressed in the following words:
"El pueblo debe ser disciplinado, acatar las instrucciones de sus
organizaciones y cooperar con las autoridades .... La disciplina es el
factor esencial en las grandes batallas de los pueblos." [The people
must be disciplined and obey instructions from their organisations and
cooperate with the authorities .... discipline is an essential factor in
great popular battles.] (Ibid: 1).
This communicated the contextual justification of the necessity to maintain
social order under the given circumstances, even by applying strict measures,
thus legitimating the policies of the leadership reinforcing the siege
atmosphere. Other passages interpreted the situation as encouraging,
emphasising strength, unity and rejection of those that had left:
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" ...nuestra fuerza ...En estos dias se ha estado librando una batalla de
masas como jamas se habia estado librando en la historia de la
Revolucion, tanto por su volumen como por su profundidad .... Quien
no tenga genes revolucionarios, qui en no tenga sangre revolucionaria,
quien no tenga una mente que se adapte a la idea de una revoluci6n,
qui en no tenga un coraz6n que se adapte al esfurezo y al heroismo de
una revolucion, no les necesitamos en nuestro pais." [...our
strength ...In these days a battle of the masses has been unleashed as
never before in the history of the revolution, as much for its volume as
for its depth .... Whoever does not have the genes of revolutionaries,
whoever does not have revolutionary blood, whoever does not have a
mind that adapts to the idea of a revolution, whoever does not have a
heart that adapts to the effort and heroism of a revolution, we do not
need them in our country.] (Ibid: 2).
The Cuban magazine Bohemia gave a relatively low coverage of the crisis, in
comparison to Granma, as can be expected from its more relaxed and less
political style. One particular issue covered the events that had taken place in
Mariel on a double-page spread, sending identical messages to those sent by
Granma and examined above (Bohemia, y. 72, n. 18,2 May 1980: 54-59). The
article in fact referred to Granma as its source.
Castro Summarises the Situation
The final interpretation of the crisis from within the system was well
summarised in Fidel Castro's speech given on the occasion of a mass rally on
l" May 1980. Amongst many other points made, Castro's speech responded to
the high turnout at the gathering. He interpreted the times as a crucial battle of
the masses, reminding Cubans of their reasons for taking part in military
campaigns, such as in Angola and Ethiopia, as part of a historical mission,
emphasising the humanity of each living being, black or white, rich or poor.
These Cuban values were explained as being opposed to the wrongs of
systems based on market force mechanisms, since within the Marxist spirit,
not all could be bought or sold. The speech reiterated the interpretation of
those who left as escoria [scum], escaping hard work rather than being
dissidents in the true meaning of the word. The voluntary character of the
revolution was again emphasised as suited only for those having revolutionary
genes [genes] and laJuerza moral [moral force], as those representing the core
of the Cuban historical mission against all odds:
"Cretan que era propaganda de nosotros, creian que estabamos
cometiendo una injusticia y estabamos llamando a los 'pobrecitos
disidentes', lumpen ...la construcci6n del socialismo, la obra
revolucionaria, es tarea de hombres y mujeres libres .... este principio
tiene un gigantesco valor moral" [They believed that it was our
propaganda, they believed that we were committing injustice and were
calling the 'poor dissidents', lumpen ...the construction of socialism, the
revolutionary task, is a task of free men and women ...this principle has
a huge moral value] (Granma, 3 May 1980a, Fidel Castro: 2-3).
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Cuba was interpreted as a workers' state with superior moral values above the
market, based on Marxist ideological foundations:
" ...no hay una sociedad con mas valores morales que los que ha
alcanzado esta sociedad nuestra al cabo de 21 afios de revoluci6n"
[...there is no other society with more moral values than those achieved
by this our society at the end of21 years of revolution] (Ibid: 2-3).
Communism and socialism were constructed as key parts of the revolution
within a workers' state, where only selfish and exploitative bourgeois elements
would be ready to join their interests with the US imperial power in the act of
emigration, this being given as Castro's explanation for the Mariel crisis (Ibid:
2-3).
The ideological component was strongly accompanied by elements of Cuban
nationalism. The message was that honest Cubans were loyal to their home
country and were not keen on leaving for the illusions of the United States,
which in the end came as a surprise for the United States. Cuba was described
as driven by an espiritu humano [human spirit], building a world where
medical care was not for sale and where doctors had not been commercialised,
reminding Cubans of their internationalist emancipatory mission going far
beyond the borders of Cuba. For these reasons, Castro said, the popular
mobilisation and protests had to continue as a testimony to the injustices being
perpetrated against the country. He argued that Cubans were representing the
safety valve for the security of the system and its independence, repeatedly
inciting patriotic attitudes:
"(APLAUSOS) ...la sola presencia de ustedes en esta Plaza es una
batalla, y una importante batalla en defensa de la integridad y la
seguridad de Cuba" [(APLAUSE) ...just your presence in this square is
a battle, and an important battle in defence of the integrity and security
of Cuba] (Ibid: 2-3).
The reality of the military threat from the United States was bound to the need
for discipline and alertness, encouraged by the spirit of victory in the symbolic
Mariel skirmish between the two countries. Within the same spirit, Castro
urged Cubans to use the displays of energy and unity to solve internal
deficiencies and debilities, thus shifting the focus on the public back on itself,
once the Mariel crisis appeared to be under control: ...Ia lucha contra nuestras
propias debilidades [...the fight against our own debilities] (Ibid: 2-3). The
speech then linked the whole episode to Cuba's higher historical mission for
the glory of the homeland and humanity. The speech represented a particular
interpretation of the Cuban nosotros [we/us], as constructed by Castro, based
on his ideas and convictions, steering majority public opinion and constructing
Cuban reality. The discourse was based on three main pillars: Cuban
nationalism, Marxist ideology and a particular version of Cuba's historical
experience, all built into a coherent whole of the discourse. The speech
normalised the content of the discourse at the end of the crisis to provide
effective leadership by refocusing the victorious outcome of the crisis on
future improvements of the system internally: Debemos convertir esta energla
77
en unaJuerza productiva. [We must convert this energy into a productive
force.] (Ibid: 2-3).
The discourse was able to interpret the present on the basis of a particular view
of the country's history, appealing to a significant numbers of Cubans. An
interesting example represented a poem published in Granma. Under the title
Marines U.S.A., the poem linked the current events and anti-American
attitudes in a sublime and artistic way, with the much older historical
experience of Cuba. US soldiers taking part in military exercises around the
island were referred to as yankipiratas and bestias [Yankee pirates and bestial
creatures]. They were compared to Drake and Morgan, pictured as
accompanied by grey parrots referring to Cuba's history of outside invasion
and aggression, thus encouraging the siege atmosphere in Cuban society. In
the poem, these outside aggressors van con el hierro de malar ... con la mana
de robar [go with steel to kill ...with a hand to steal] Cuba's tobacco, sugar and
leather, but a storm stops them and the Cuban people prevail (Granma, 13
April 1980, Nicolas Guillen: 1). The message suggested a victory for Cuba
almost granted from above, as a missionary example to the rest of Latin
America and beyond, as desired by Jose Marti.
Concluding Observations
The Mariel crisis changed the hegemonic Cuban discourse by refocusing its
attention on some of the basic values and sources of legitimacy of the system.
Initially, moving from a situation of relative normality, discussing ordinary
everyday topics, such as industrial production or the sugar harvest, it shifted to
remind Cubans of the very basic raisons d'etre of the nation, reminding them
of the meaning and values of the revolution in opposition to the US model. It
contained a strong sense of urgency and seriousness. As the tone gradually
became more serious, it used derogatory terms aimed at emigrants and
ridiculed the United States as a symbol. The interpretation of the issue of
emigration in the country's printed media emphasised the criminality of those
leaving as opposed to the voluntary and heroic character of those who stayed,
to later share Cuba's legitimating symbolic victory. Subsequently, after
asserting complete victory with massive popular support and celebrations, the
discourse returned to its less insulting style.
The themes used during the crisis called for national unity, discipline and
engagement. The discourse assumed that individuals having different opinions
were morally questionable, and that their arguments were illegitimate. The
interpretation of the issue of emigration emphasised the criminality of those
leaving, a theme that started to shift towards a more moderate approach after
the crisis. The discourse argued that unity was necessary due to the
disproportionate position of independent Cuba in a war-like situation, thus
making excessive opposition illegitimate. At the very end of the crisis, the
language shifted from negative condemnation of emigrants, towards a certain
recognition that some may have been relatively normal economic migrants
misled by the temptations of the United States. In this sense, they represented
less political enemies than victims of US lies. This indicates a shift in the way
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the hegemonic discourse explained reality. This initial shift is highly relevant
to the later chapter about the maleconazo. In this way, 1980 was an important
crisis, when the traditional condemnation of political emigres replaced a
certain realisation and public acknowledgement that these migrants were
indeed economic at heart. This of course excluded the specific lumpen, which
included prisoners, gays and those perceived as outrightly anti-social or
criminal.
On the whole, the Mariel discourse can be seen as part of the overall
hegemonic discourse, which contained many of the same topics and themes,
such as the need for national unity, discipline, engagement and criticism of the
United States as a social and political system, on a continuous basis, but with
less emphasis, militancy and urgency. These were brought in at a decisive time
when the stability of the system was challenged, and its future was at stake.
Some historians, such as Richard Gott (Gott 2005: 268), interpreted the impact
of the Mariel crisis in terms negative for the system. The evidence, however,
suggests that internally the events were interpreted not as a crisis or a time of
national questioning, but as en event with a positive outcome, and an
opportunity for a refinement of the loyal population. The crisis was
constructed as an opportunity to flush treacherous anti-social elements out of
the country, and then celebrate the victory with massive popular support,
demonstrating the full strength of the system. The times were interpreted as an
absolutely crucial battle of the masses, reminding Cubans of their reasons for
taking part in military campaigns, such as in Angola and Ethiopia, as part of a
historical mission, emphasising the humanity of each living being, black or
white, rich or poor. Those leaving were interpreted as escaping hard work
rather than being dissidents in the true meaning of the word. The voluntary
character of the revolution was emphasised. Cuba was constructed as a
workers' state with superior moral values above the market, demonstrating
strong Marxist ideological foundations. Emigrants were assumed to be selfish
bourgeois elements ready to leave for the exploitative United States. This was
provided as the explanation of the cause of the Mariel crisis. Large-scale
popular support marches continued after the crisis as a testimony to the
injustices against the country, so that the United States would understand the
loyalty of Cubans to their leadership. The stability of the system was attributed
to popular support, backed up by a patriotic response. The evidence of the
internal mechanics and interpretative strategies of the discourse represent one
possible contributing factor in the ability of the system to survive such crises.
From the outside, such crises may have been interpreted as more serious, but
from the inside they reached Cubans as a construction within a specific
historical-cultural context and political culture in support of the system.
The 1980 Mariel crisis was a sudden event for both Cuba and the United
States. It continues to be interpreted differently by opposed political groups,
who disagree about its meaning. The crisis could have greatly challenged the
system, and some would argue it did. It could have developed as a proof that
discontent on the island was growing, manifesting itself in social unrest and
mass emigration, but in the end the system withstood the crisis and generated
substantial popular marches in its support. As Balfour pointed out:
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"Indeed, Castro was able to tum the potentially damaging incident of
the Mariel boatlift to some advantage .... Castro called the United
States bluff by mobilising on to the streets the sort of mass support for
the regime that appeared to give the lie to claims that there was
widespread disaffection among the Cuban population." (Balfour 2009:
126).
The Mariel crisis represented a major fallout between Cuba and the United
States, where those migrants Carter welcomed as Cuban heroes were labeled
on the Cuban side as anti-social escoria [scum]. The Mariel crisis had a
negative influence on Carter's presidency, as the US public did not necessarily
welcome large numbers of Caribbean refugees who contributed to
unemployment and the number of inmates in US prisons. This confrontation
seemed to fit the previous pattern, as the Cuban leadership in general had dealt
more easily with more heavy-handed US presidents hostile to Cuba, allowing
it to maintain the country's siege culture more easily, generating popular
support, legitimacy, unity and stability. Hence, even relations with softer
democrats in the United States have often led to diplomatic conflicts, and
some Cuba experts (e.g. Kapcia 2005,2007) believe more confrontational US
presidents suited the Cuban leadership better. The Mariel conflict between
Cuba and the United States, and Cuba's continuing alliance with the Soviet
Union, plus its military campaigns abroad, all led towards renewed tensions
between the two countries fuelling the siege atmosphere, which escalated
further with the appearance of Ronald Reagan on the horizon during the last
few months of 1980.
The reality of the military threat from the United States was bound to the need
for discipline and alertness, yet supported by the spirit of victory in the
symbolic Marie1 skirmish between the two countries. An ideological
component was strongly accompanied by elements of Cuban patriotism. The
discourse was based on three main pillars: Cuban nationalism, Marxist
ideology and a particular version of Cuba's historical experience, all built into
a coherent whole of the hegemonic discourse. Legitimacy was based on a
particular view of the country's history, appealing to significant numbers of
Cubans, with implicit and explicit anti-Americanism. The main message
suggested a victory almost granted from above, to fulfil Jose Marti's longings.
The sources of legitimacy were based on the argument that the system was the
guarantor of national independence, as an issue appealing to the popular
sentiment of Cubans as individuals longing for emancipation from a history of
submission.
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Chapter 4
4.1. Cuba Between the Two Episodes: 1980 to 1994
First Half ofthe 1980s: Inequality, Growing Economic Problems and the
US Threat
Despite Mariel, the 1980s can be described as a stable decade, sometimes
referred to by Cubans today, influenced by the subsequent disaster of the
1990s, as La Edad de Oro [The Golden Age]. During the first half of the
1980s, Cuban growth was "remarkable by Latin American standards"
(Zimbalist 1988: 2). Cuba experienced an average 4.1 per cent annual
economic growth between 1970 and 1988, compared to 1.2 per cent in Latin
America (Gott 2005: 244). The stability of the system was supported by the
continuing, but already declining, military and economic backing from the
COMECON. However, the 1980s also brought a number of challenges, not
only during Mariel, but also therafter, as some of the original revolutionary
enthusiasm started ageing in literal terms: the adults of the revolution were
now thirty years older.
The government launched two five-year plans between 1976 and 1980
followed by another between 1981 and 1986. These five-year plans, as well as
the Direccion y Planificacion de la Economia (SDPE) programme, in place
since 1976, encouraged state enterprises to act more independently, allowed
limited self-financing, emphasised profitability, self-efficiency, profit
generation, decentralisation, and material rewards. Many of these economic
policy changes were based on market-oriented and capitalist incentives, which
were perceived by political hardliners as inconsistent with Cuban communism.
In 1980, a new pay scale was introduced, which reduced the earnings of
manual workers, but encouraged technicians, executives and administrative
personnel with the possibility of earning more. These changes and the
introduction of limited private entrepreneurship during the 1980s brought
apparent changes in the egalitarian social structure, contradicting Guevarist
moral principles as one of the original ideological bases of the system, and
thus having a negative impact on legitimacy. Nevertheless, economists such as
Brundenius and Lundahl still perceived the system's failure to meet growth
targets less as a result of incompatibility between growth and equity, and more
as the result of inefficiencies of an overcentralized and bureaucratic planning
system (Brundenius & Lundahl 1982: 143).
Even after the opening of mercados agropecuarios [agricultural markets] in
May 1980, there remained room for speculators and free-market behaviour.
Corruption grew, with only some having access to extra income or foreign
currency, giving them the possibility to buy on the black market, outside the
permitted modes of egalitarian socialist consumption. Increasingly, as in
Orwell's Animal Farm (1945), all were equal, but some were more equal than
others. This contributed to a growing destabilisation of the equilibrium
between original revolutionary ethics and material and social reality.
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"In 1985, an inspection of 600 CPAs (Agricultural Production
Cooperatives) concluded that free trading was rapidly fomenting rural
social differentiation, and more particularly, a nouveau riche peasantry,
to the detriment of CPA growth and performance." (Stubbs 1989: 42).
"As the nouveau riche emerged on the market scene, a typical
comment in city queues was: "so this is the worker-peasant alliance?"
(Stubbs 1989: 45).
Orlando Borrego' commented on these experiments with market-oriented
policies, describing them as un desastre [a disaster], and the enterprises as
empresas egolstas [egoistical companies]. These conditions and systemic
contradictions were likely to have contributed to a relative decline in
legitimacy of the system, which was to face much tougher challenges during
the rest of the decade. For this reason, the country was constantly engaged in
debates about improving the material standards of the population, as the
economic situation was undermined by the declining price of sugar on world
markets so crucial for the economy (Gott 2005: 274) (Brundenious & Lundahl
1982: 143). The leadership undoubtedly sensed that some Cubans were
becoming increasingly discontented, waking up from the revolutionary dream,
yearning for material prosperity. Despite the positive interpretation of Mariel,
with numerous popular marches in defence of the system, the episode had still
demonstrated that some were ready to leave the island and their families,
twenty years after the Revolution, to live within the detested imperio [empire].
Nevertheless, the system was strengthened by the final interpretation of the
event as a total victory, and as an opportunity to flush-out anti-governmental
troublemakers and prisoners.
Symbolic encouragement came in 1981, when the 20th anniversary of the
victory at Playa Giron was used to remind Cubans, as every year, of their
heroic past and willingness to unite in seemingly hopeless situations. This
determination was further strengthened by the announcement in August 1981
of the continuing support for Angola's confrontation with the South African
imperialist forces, refocusing public attention onto Cuba's campaigns abroad,
which always sought to contrast the relative comforts of Cuban daily life with
the conflicts and poverty into which other developing nations were plunged.
The country struggled with foreign loan repayments and "drastically falling
sugar prices from 28 cents per pound in 1980 to 7 cents in 1982" (Brundenius
1984: 65). Therefore the government issued a new Investment Code in 1982
opening the country to tourism, which by the end of the decade became an
important source of hard currency. The code included the opening-up of light
industry, medical equipment manufacturing, pharmaceutical production,
construction and agro-industry to foreign investment. As a result of the
market-oriented reforms, the economic performance of many enterprises
improved. Managers did not own enterprises, as this would have been
ideologically unacceptable, but their performance was tied to their
remuneration. Castro later condemned the system of material rewards in the
following words:
I Che Guevara's close combatant, Nottingham University, February 2008.
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"Although we recognize there is room for bonuses under socialism, if
there is too much talk of bonuses, we will be corrupting workers .... Is
there no appeal to the obligation of the workers? Is there no appeal to
the duty of young people, telling them that this is an underdeveloped
country that needs to develop, that it cannot be on the basis of offering
pie in the sky?" (Dominguez 1986: 124).
Targets for workers to receive bonus pay were raised and, in some cases,
wages were reduced.
"This rationalization drive meant large-scale discharges of workers
from many workplaces. Supposedly, workers could only be laid off if
there was another job awaiting them. Yet, while unemployment was
around 2% in the mid-70s, by 1989 it had grown to 7%." (Detroit
1996).
All these factors contradicted the promises of the communist system, with
social provision, egalitarianism and employment as crucial sources of
legitimacy, resulting in a negative impact on the system's legitimacy.
The conflict in Angola, where Cuba confronted the US-South African alliance,
added to the already hostile relations with the United States. Ronald Reagan's
entry into the White House in 1981 marked a radical change in US power
politics abroad, as his administration adopted a confrontational strategy and
steadfast opposition to communism, from the Iran-Contra affair until the
collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War.
"Reagan made it clear in his 'Caribbean Basin' strategy that the source
of the 'contagion' was Cuba, to be dealth with afresh; while no one
believed that invasion might result, the signs pointed to a new 'siege',
renewed pressure, and 'the revival of vendetta politics'." (Morley
1987: 317).
Hence, after a relative rapprochement during the Carter administration, US-
Cuban relations entered a new phase of open hostilities marked by flaming
rhetoric, (Aguila 1994: 126). In 1981 President Reagan halted all aid to
Nicaragua and launched an ideological war with continuous covert CIA
involvement, in order to bring down the Cuban-backed Sandinista
government. In his April 1983 speech to the Congress, Reagan reasserted the
US commitment to dominate Central America:
"If Central America were to fall [to communism], what would be the
consequence for our position in Asia and Europe and for alliances such
as NATO? If the United States cannot respond to a threat near our own
border, why should Europeans and Asians believe we are seriously
concerned about threats to them? ... Our credibility would collapse,
our alliances would crumble." (McWilliams & Piotrowski 1997: 330).
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Relations were temporarily improved by Havana's decision to accept the
return of 2,700 of the Mariel migrants in 1984, identified as convicted
criminals before they had left Cuba, as part of renewed talks about migration.
Cuba also welcomed the 20,000 visas quota, introduced by the United States
as a way of preventing another Mariel-like mass exodus. With the quota in
place, potential emigrants would from now on need to consider the possibility
of being turned back and having to return to the island, with all the
condemnation they would have been likely to encounter. This was a symbolic
victory for the Cuban side, which strengthened the meaning of Mariel as a
victory, thus possibly improving the system's legitimacy as an able negotiator
with the empire.
The US embargo, as the ultimate representation of North American hostility
towards Cuba, continued to damage the economy, and continued to provide a
key issue for the hegemonic discourse during the decade. The politics
continued to be defined by the under siege atmosphere, strengthened more
than ever by the arrival of Reagan. The confrontation was well documented on
most last pages of Granma from the 1980s, usually including a cartoon
denouncing the United States, its perceived expansionism and capitalist greed
as the alpha and omega of the discourse (eg. y. 16, n. 1, 1 January; n. 85, 12
April; n. 108, 1 May; n. 36, 15 May 1980). This external threat kept providing
an important source of legitimacy based on the need to protect the homeland,
allowing the political elites to justify their decisions, including the repressive
features of the system. It legitimated the leadership as the defender of the
interests of Cubans against the United States and its embargo, and as a
defender of Cuban sovereignty and its egalitarian democracy. A new reminder
of the presence of the United States and its willingness to interfere in internal
affairs of its southern neighbours came when the Caribbean island of Grenada
was invaded on 25th October 1983 (Gott 2005: 271-272). The US threat was
even further supported by the growing number of staff in the US Interests
Section in Havana that was to become the largest foreign embassy by the end
of the decade (Ibid: 262). Halfway through the 1980s, US-Cuban relations
received a major blow following the launch of Radio Marti/Voice of America
on May 20th 1985 (Ibid: 300). This infuriated the Cuban government, and
chilled diplomatic relations. Cuban-American visits to Cuba were suspended.
During the 1980s, the discourse involved frequent references to the unsettling
situation in the rest of the region, and the media reported regularly on violence
elsewhere, implicitly positioning Cuba as stable, safe and somewhat
comfortable platform for such observation. Such interpretations made the
system more appealing, and increased its legitimacy. In April 1984, the
government sought to augment this legitimacy by presenting the results of the
elections to the People's Power in which, according to the data of the Cuban
authorities, 98.6% of registered voters cast their ballots.
Gorbachev Loosens the Screws
The Soviet Union represented a viable alternative for a country that for
historical, cultural and ideological reasons refused the United States as its ally.
Within the bipolar Cold War context, a strong alliance with the Soviet Union
brought Cuba many benefits, but by the mid-1980s these were gradually
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disappearing. When Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Communist
Party in 1985, Cuba faced two politico-ideological possibilities to maintain the
support of its population. It could either follow its major ally towards
significant political change, thus to ensure its future economic and military
support and to offer Cubans something new, or it could reject the liberalisation
of glasnost and perestroika and go its own way. The government decided, as
has been its tradition, to go its own way and return to revolutionary orthodoxy
as a key source of legitimacy, removing parts of the system that were
contradicting past commitments:
"Castro stated that under Rectification the party will increase its
strength, and he has rejected any possibility of political pluralism of
the Eastern European variety in Cuba ..." (Shearman 1990: 101)
Unlike the Soviet Union, Cuba to a large extent relied on the confrontation
with Washington, and hence the improving superpower relations were not
necessarily in the interest of the Cuban leadership, which used the threat as an
important source of legitimacy. Perestroika represented pressure for change,
which Castro and the ageing revolutionary leadership resisted. Gorbachev's
policies of openness were articulated into Cuban discourse uniquely in
negative terms as un final trdgico y poco glorioso [a tragic and inglorious end]
(G6mez 2003: 234). At the same time, Cuba strived to maintain the best
possible relations with Russia, aware of the many past and existing benefits
(Shearman 1990: 64).
The combination of Gorbachev, growing indebtedness to the West, a
worsening economic situation and concerns about youth alienation were
amongst the main worries of the first half of the 1980s, until 1986, when the
system addressed the declining levels of legitimacy and hence launched a new
campaign.
1986 Rectification
During the Third Congress of the Cuban Communist Party in February 1986,
the worsening situation was debated. The congress, which involved feedback
and suggestions from grass-roots organisations, had to meet twice to resolve
the many issues discussed (Kapcia 2000: 206). The discussions were "open,
candid, and critical" (Zimbalist 1988: 10). Many features of the system were
also criticised in Granma. The result was a new direction for the nation in the
form of the 1986 Rectification of Errors and Negative Tendencies programme.
The campaign was launched in the symbolic year of the 30th anniversary of the
landing of the Granma. As a result, mercados agropecuarios were closed in
May 1986. The new campaign reversed some of the delegitimating influences
of the previous years, and by involving large parts of the Cuban public, gained
substantial levels of legitimacy. Some even trace the beginning of rectification
to 1982-84, when the system had to look for solutions to destabilising issues
(Mesa-Lago 1990) (Kapcia 1990: 162). Castro rejected much of the new
market-oriented Soviet model, instead steering the country towards greater
emphasis on the original communist revolutionary values, including
conciencia [revolutionary conscience] and the communist spirit, perceived as
superior to the power of money. Castro abandoned the previous plan
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implemented by Moscow-trained economist Humberto Perez Ilerrero, the
head of Cuba's JUCEPLAN (Junta Central de Planificacion). Antonio Perez
Herrero was dismissed, perceived as negatively influenced by capitalist
practices and possible personal enrichment. Instead, Castro steered the
economy towards lower import dependency, as Soviet-Cuban imports were
decreasingly advantageous for Cuba. The SDPE economic system was
replaced by Sistema de Direccion de la Economfa (SDE).
"Perez Herrero was no democrat, but he sought to apply Marxism-
Leninism systematically to run Cuba. His dismissal in 1985 was the
first since 1968 which publicly linked a party official's departure to a
policy dispute-in this case, the new, short-lived opening toward the
United States, and the new opening toward the Roman Catholic
Church, which is still underway. [Castro] was opposed to both
overtures." (Dominguez 1986: 120).
Castro placed renewed emphasis on moral incentives (Gott 2005: 274),
following the perceived negative impact of previous growth of private
activities of peasants, street vendors, middlemen, truck drivers, small
manufacturers, personal-service workers and house-builders. Castro
interpreted these as leading to "the creation of a wealthy class in Cuba, as
large or larger that the bourgeoisie which the Revolution expropriated"
combined with worker absenteesism and, in some cases, enterprise managers
stealing from their companies (Shearman 1990: 102). Castro rejected market-
oriented policies, which also led to some managers increasing prices of goods
in order to provide employees with bonuses by generating more profit. These
were possibly alienating the population. Therefore, Rectification can be seen
as an effort to re-establish the revolutionary values in order to revive the
original revolutionary energy and address the negative effects of previous
liberalisation (Zimbalist 1988: 11), only to emerge into the 1990s Special
Period of unprecedented economic hardship. Some have interpreted it as a
"reaffirmation of one element of continuity and certainty in a climate of
confusion." (Kapcia 1990: 179).
"As early as 1982, the newspaper Granma published a series of articles
exalting communist conscience, the need to develop a 'new man', and
Guevara's legacy. This campaign increased in 1986-87, with the
publication of many newspaper and journal articles on Guevara, and
reached its climax with the awarding ofa Special Che Guevara Award
to two books on Guevara, one on his economic thought and another on
the transitional period. Thereafter these books were widely
disseminated domestically and abroad 'to avoid a turn to the right'."
(Shearman 1990: 100).
SDE reassessed the situation and looked for solutions to economic problems,
especially the foreign exchange imbalance. The country's need to import
machinery and a number of other products from Western countries demanded
reserves of hard currency that were acquired through the sale of sugar and re-
exportation of Soviet oil, together with tourism and sales of pharmaceuticals.
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"According to Cuba's figures, in constant prices, the average annual
growth rate in 1981-85 was 7.3 per cent, the highest under the
revolution ...the growth rate slowed down in 1985, almost stagnated in
1986, sharply declined in 1987, and increased in 1988." (Shearman
1990: 118).
With the loss of Soviet subsidies and the declining world sugar price, the
situation was unfavourable. A more centralised approach to economic
decision-making, combined with some decentralisation was introduced
(Zimbalist 1988: 12-13) to "mitigate bottlenecks, delays and general
inefficiencies" (Zimbalist 1987: 19). Farmers' markets, handicraft markets,
motivation bonuses, private enterprise, private selling, renting and other
possibilities of individual economic gain were rejected to underscore the
validity of revolutionary ideals as the legitimating base. Self-centered
profiteering was rejected as being in contradiction with the construction of the
revolutionary utopia, and any form of capitalism and its tendency to create
disunity and instability within communist systems was denounced.
The second half of the 1980s, after the launch of 1986 Rectification, can be
seen as a political strategy to contain possible changes undermining the
ideological, and also social, structure of the system. According to Balfour, the
1980s and Rectification signified a return to egalitarian moral values as an
important root of the system (Balfour 1990: 135), with a continuing emphasis
on nationalism and homeland defence against the United States (Ibid: 143).
The leadership hoped to hold firm by reaffirming the original revolutionary
ethics as key sources of historical legitimacy sustaining the whole system, thus
avoiding a possible collapse. Economically, the situation after Rectification
continued to deteriorate, except for an improvement in 1987 in the foreign
trade balance (Shearman 1990: 124). Rectification addressed the inefficiencies
of the preceding decade, but could not avoid growing economic difficulties
"throwing into question the economic successes upon which the new
ordinance had based its political legitimacy." (Kapcia 2000: 203). The
legitimacy of the system was likely to have been negatively influenced by this
decline in material prosperity. Rectification, however, counteracted the
possible decline in legitimacy by shifting public focus onto ethical ideas and
the revolutionary emphasis on conciencia, as the primary raison d'etre of the
system.
Cuba continued to be involved abroad during this decade, consolidating its
role as a leader of the developing world and proving its experience as a
confident, resolute and doughty David standing up to the Goliath of world
politics. This was reported in the media that covered the frequent travels of the
Cuban leader. Rectification affirmed communist and revolutionary orthodoxy
in opposition to the detente and the rapprochement between the Soviet Union
and the West (Dominguez 1990: 45). It kept Cuban troops engaged abroad:
"In 1986-88 the Cuban government adopted a policy of 'rectification'
at home, in part to foster non-material incentives; abroad, in 1987-88,
appealing to patriotism and internationalism, it sent 15,000 troops to
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Angola to reinforce 35,000 already there, to confront South Africa's
military." (Dominguez 1990: 45).
Constant political unrest in other Caribbean and Latin American countries
provided a useful contrast to the safety in Cuba, with social security, free
healthcare, stability and development, all important sources of legitmacy.
From this perspective, the Cuban leadership was successful and legitimate.
The benefits of economic growth enjoyed by Cubans at the beginning of the
decade were cut by Rectification, which significantly limited consumption.
Underneath this rhetoric, the government was motivated by the need to
minimise distribution of profits to ordinary Cubans in order to solve its
worsening debt situation and repayments of foreign loans - the policy was
driven by economic realism as well as the need to reassert the key values
embedded in Cuban political culture to ensure sufficient legitimacy of the
system, which interpreted equality as one of the highest priorities. If this social
value had been eroded, the system could have become unstable. During the
second half of the decade, the exploitative nature of foreign loans was
condemned in many issues of Granma. Continuous promotion of voluntary
labour, brigades and cooperatives, and the restriction of most legal private
economic activity were the reality for most Cubans, helping to redress the
economy with voluntary or unpaid work for the sake of the revolutionary
collective.
If we consider some of the statistical data available from the period, Cuba in
the 1980s ranked amongst the largest exporters in Latin America, despite its
many difficulties and the major political and economic transformation in the
middle of the decade. Cuba's GOP continued to rise during the decade from
14,159 (millions of US D) in 1980 to 17,113 in 1985 (Eckstein 2003:
Appendix'). During the second half of the decade, economic growth slowed
down. The national budget deteriorated, as Rectification changed the country's
economic outlook. In 1983, the balance was -266 millions Cuban Pesos,
improving significantly to a deficit of -76 in 1984, only to plunge again after
the introduction of Rectification to -1,624 in 1989 (Ibid.). The end of the
decade looked grim.
A similar trend was seen in the foreign trade balance, which retained its
crippling grip on the economy for the rest of the decade (Zimbalist 1987: 2).
While in 1982 the trade balance was 802 million Cuban Pesos, the figure
declined consistently during the rest of the decade to 73 million Cuban Pesos
in 1984, going into negative numbers from there on: -6 in 1985 and finally an
estimated -10 in 1989 (Ibid.). Hard currency earnings also declined during the
1980s, as the current account balance went deeper into negative numbers: -212
million Cuban Pesos in 1984; -506 in 1985; and -600 in 1989. Cuba became
heavily indebted, which was partially the cause of the decline of the price of
oil on the world markets (since Cuba was reexporting Soviet supplies), low
price of sugar and high interests on its loans (Ibid.). Sugar exports steadily
declined throughout the period from 866 millions Cuban Pesos in 1981, to 648
2 Statistical data sourced from the Cuban authorities and the Economist Intclligcnce Unit.
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in 1982; 263 in 1983; 250 in 1984; and 171 in 1985 (Ibid.). This worsening
economic situation required a political and economic response, to decrease
domestic consumption (Le. imports) and increase economic performance.
Rectification can be seen as an alternative solution to the foreign debt crisis,
after Cuba's failure at the summer 1986 Paris Club negotiations to secure a
new $300 million loan (Zimbalist 1988: 11). In addition, on the basis of
agreements from 1972, payments on debts contracted by Cuba as a result of
trade deficits with the Soviet Union were postponed until 1st January 1986
(Brundenious 1984: 65). Now was the time to act on these pressing issues.
Hence, after the growth during the 1960s and 70s that brought both growth
and equity, overseen by the state, Cuba remained insulated from the
international debt crisis because of its favourable terms with the Soviets
(Zimbalist& Brundenius 1989: 165, 169, 172).
But as the terms of trade with the Soviet Union deteriorated, petroleum
prices and the dollar dropped, poor weather decimated the harvest, and
Western debt accumulated, Cuba by 1985 was facing the same foreign
exchange crunch as the rest of Latin America. Similar to other
countries in the region, Cuba introduced an austerity package. (Ibid:
1989: 172).
Hence, even though the country still outperformed the rest of Latin America in
both equity and growth, domestically it had to face the negative impacts of
liberalisation and declining growth that were eroding the system's legitimacy
(Ibid: 165).
In December 1986, further austerity measures were announced that would
eliminate imports of domestic appliances, and lower the consumption of milk
and meat to reduce imports and reduce the workforce employed in public
administration, including the Administraci6n Central del Estado and Organos
Locales del Poder Popular [Central State Administration and Local Organs of
the People's Power]. In other words, Cubans had to work harder and longer
for fewer material rewards, while the government tried to increase its revenue
by any means possible, in order to improve the overall economic performance
of the country and payoff some of the foreign debt and accumulated interest.
In order to increase economic growth, the government continued to pursue
economic ties with the West during the 1980s, using Western management
expertise as well as investment, with extended cooperation in electronics,
mechanical engineering, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and
tourism (Eckstein 2003: 68). Western tourism was encouraged, even if this
was somewhat inconsistent with the condemnation of the imperialist West and
its lifestyle; Cuban tourism workers were soon delivering "bourgeois
pleasures" in the island's luxurious Caribbean resorts. This strategy's
fundamental economic objective was the acceleration of the country's
industrialisation, diversification of exports and substitution of imports,
especially from capitalist countries. Rectification thus combined a strong push
towards ideological reinforcement with economic realism to sort out the
country's finances, while keeping the system legitimate. This also had to be
anchored within the hegemonic discourse ofthe revolution in order to secure
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the support of the population; it had to be justified by the right words in order
to fit into Cuban political culture. Rectification was such a response and the
system retained its legitimacy.
In 1987, state-run Cubanacan was created to generate foreign investment for
hotel development. Amonst its activities was constant promotion of tourism
and conferencing. Other organisations focusing on different sectors soon
followed. Contex was in charge of the fashion industry and Artex of musical
and artistic performance. Spain, Venezuela, Mexico and Italy provided most
of the investment. Gaviota was founded at the end of the decade in 1988 to
develop the high-income luxury tourist market. Cooperation with foreign
investors might have been inconsistent with some of the precepts of Cuba's
communist ethics, but it generated income for the defence of the homeland.
The number of tourists rose from 130,000 in 1980 to 326,000 by the end of the
1980s (Eckstein 2003). This was the beginning of the Cuban focus on tourism
as a main source of hard currency, which would be further developed in the
following decade. By the end of the decade, the revenue from tourism had
increased fivefold since 1980 (Eckstein 2003). The only other sources of hard-
currency that generated more income during the second half of the 1980s were
sugar, fish and oil exports, leaving tourism to generate around 12% of hard
currency rising from 3% in 1981 (Ibid.). The service-oriented industry was not
dependent on constantly and painfully unpredictable fluctuations of the world
price of sugar and oil, causing distress to commodity-oriented export
countries, especially in developing countries. In 1988, Cuba planned to
increase the number of tourists visiting the island to 600,000 by 1992 (Ibid.).
"Since 1986, the Cuban economic system has undergone a
fundamental transformation, a real 'revolution', moving with
astonishing rapidity from an inefficient, centrally-planned sugar-
dominated system, largely dependent on barter trade with the Eastern
bloc, to an economy that is increasingly open, and whose external
trading enterprises are increasingly autonomous .... the informal
economy is being rapidly legalised. What we are seeing, in short, is the
conversion of an economy following (for three decades) a supposedly
'socialist' model of development into a a somewhat classical model of
underdevelopment, in which the clear direction is towards some
version of capitalism." (Kapcia 1995: 8)
Rectification represented a multifaceted debate, which addressed corruption,
privilege, bureaucracy of power, lack of accountability, growing national
indebtedness and the divergent paths of Cuba and the Soviet Union. Internally,
the debate continued for the rest of the decade, underlined by the leadership's
worries about the legitimacy of the system. Dominguez, however, has argued
that this return to moral incentives at home, was only partial and rather short
lived, as the country had to cope with far worse problems at the end of the
decade (Dominguez 1990: 46). This unavoidable transition to Cuban
capitalism under the guise of socialism encouraged the leadership to
restructure the main sources of legitimacy in the country's discourse during
the 1990s.
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"Although the leadership's response was visibly dramatic - declaring a
'Special Period' ('in Times of Peace') in September 1990 and talking
defiantly of Socialismo 0 Muerte instead of the familiar cubanista
slogan of Patria 0 Muerte, in essence the initial responses were simply
continuations of 'Rectification', which, as has been seen, had always
had an economic motive, a political purpose, and an underlying
ideological inspiration and direction." (Kapcia 2000: 207).
In addition to the systemic problems, the new generations born shortly before
and after the Revolution were now approaching their thirties, reaching
maturity without personal memories of the times before 1959. They had only
heard or read about the initial revolutionary impulse and were more likely to
take the benefits brought by the revolution for granted.
"With over half the population now under thirty that is, born within the
revolution, there is a very definite generational gap. The young see
their society and its problems in a very different light, questioning old
symbols and cliches .... these young people were challenging even
Fidel Castro, in person, on a number of very concrete issues." (Stubbs
1989: 23).
"By the 1980s, however, the relative security of the political system
had been undermined by three developments. First, it was undermined
by the growing disjuncture between the social and political aspirations
of younger generations and the economy's limited capacity to satisfy
these demands, especially after 1984. Secondly, it was weakened by
the discernible rise of an unprecedented, increasingly entrenched,
power elite, in the form of the Party, leading indeed to the growth of
privilege and even corruption ..." (Kapcia 1995: 9).
The Rectification returned to the original plan of the 1960s in order to create
the socialist hombre nuevo [new man] after Che Guevara's maxims. Detroit
interpreted the Rectification campaign in the following words:
"The Western loans dried up in the late 1980s. But that was not due to
Castro's choosing, but because Cuba was defaulting on its debts.
During 'rectification' the Cuban leadership bled the masses in part to
pay off these debts. And the pursuit of foreign capital continued in
another form." (Detroit 1996).
The younger generations might not have necessarily perceived the system as
legitimate, in view of the prosperity reported through unofficial channels from
abroad. Rectification, therefore, also targeted specifically the younger people
to support their sense of moral incentives (Zimbalist 1988: 15).
"Rectification could be seen as a government manoeuvre to pre-empt
criticism concerning corruption and inefficiency and neutralize the
potential for large-scale discontent rather than as a conscious attempt to
return to the roots of the revolution. It is more likely that the
government's motives were a mixture of both." (Lievesley 2003: 120).
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For these reasons, the 1980s saw a shift of sources of legitimacy from
economic factors, as at the beginning, and the accompanying delegitimating
impact of growing inequality, corruption and the black market. As the
economy started to decline, Castro combated the negative effects by launching
Rectification, which symbolically re-purified the revolution, and refocused the
public on the moral content. In this way, Castro refreshed the legitimating
force of the revolution, and refocused on Che Guevara and the original
revolutionary ideals. As ever, patriotism served as the main source of
legitimacy, as a source with little controversy or negative side effects.
Patriotism received a boost by the arrival of the threat posed by Reagan, and
possibly encouraged even the least patriotic Cubans to remain loyal to the
system. In addition, the system relied on its tradition of participatory politics,
and by involving the population in the processes of Rectification, as well as
during 1989 and 1990, it gained further legitimacy as a system reflecting
popular concerns (Kapcia 1995: 9). Cuba survived the difficult period of the
1980s, only to prove that it could cope with far worse situations, such as the
subsequent Special Period of the 1990s.
Cuba after 1989
Another endorsement of revolutionary orthodoxy came in 1989 in the form of
a serious political affair within the Cuban ruling elite. The affair involved not
only senior figures of the government, but most of all several members of the
Sierra Maestra generation, who were accused of having betrayed the ideals of
the revolution. This provided an example that ignorance and criminal
behaviour would not be tolerated, thus strengthening the legitimacy of the
system as a moral project. The trials examined the alleged involvement of
Arnaldo Ochoa, Tony and Patricio de la Guardia and others in drug trafficking
and illegal affairs around the Moneda Convertible mission during the 1980s,
which was part of the Cuban Ministry of Interior (MININT) (Gott 2005 :281).
Based in Panama, the mission was to acquire hard currency by circumventing
the US embargo. When the first secret cocaine shipment was made in April
1987, a cargo of 300 kilos was aboard a plane from Colombia to Varadero, to
be delivered subsequently to the United States. The US coastguard intercepted
the traffickers before their contraband reached its final destination (Ibid: 282).
As a result, several senior figures including Ochoa, a legendary Cuban general
who led the Cuban forces to victory in Angola, were arrested in June 1989.
Most of those involved were condemned to long prison sentences and Ochoa,
de la Guardia and two others were executed on 13th July 1989 (Ibid: 284).
Whether the affair involved an internal political elite struggle would be a
speculation, but the trial and executions certainly sent a clear message of 'zero
tolerance' towards behaviour seen to be against revolutionary morals at any
level of the state, even if this behaviour was allegedly in the national interest.
From this example, Cubans were sure that corruption and illegal dealings
would not be tolerated, with a possibly threatening impact on the black
market. The moral ideals and purity of the revolution were renewed, as the
master signifier and source of legitimacy.
Cuba confronted the worst crisis in the years 1989-91, with the crisis
persisting until 1994. During these years, the system was destabilised by major
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economic and security problems related to events following the fall of the
Berlin Wall in November 1989. The leadership had to witness worrying
radical political changes abroad, such as the execution ofNicolae Caucescu in
Romania in December 1989, the total disintegration of COMECON and the
internal reform of the Soviet Union followed by a coup in August 1991. The
legitimacy of communism declined significantly, and many Cubans might
have been asking questions too. Despite the fact that the leadership somewhat
anticipated this period, and was preparing Cuban society for it with its 1986
Rectification offering a new direction within the scope of Cuban communist
orthodoxy, the country was undoubtedly shaken. First the financial and then
the security backing from the Soviet Union disappeared, and then the 1991
collapse wiped out this valuable ally in real terms:
" ...hasta 1991 el azucar cubano era pagado por la URSS con precios
nominal mente superiores a los del mercado mundial, mientras que el
petroleo se compraba a precios inferiores a los del mismo mercado. Esa
relaci6n de precios se modific6 en 1992, ya que todo 10 comerciado
entre ambos partes se hizo a partir de los precios del mercado
mundial." [...untiI1991, Cuban sugar was paid by the USSR with
prices nominally higher to the world market, while oil was bought at
prices below those of the same market. This price relation changed in
1992, since when all trade between the two parties was made according
to world market prices.] (Suarez Salazar 1997: 103).
Rafael Hernandez analysed coverage from Granma in regards to the impact of
the post-Cold War context and the 1989 transitions, and concluded that despite
the economic hardship, the reference to pre-revolutionary Cuba continued to
provide a major legitimating force:
" ...it must not be forgotten that, from the beginning, revolutionary
policies and politics were supported because they signified a
fundamental change in direction for the conditions of existence of the
people, and a net improvement in their standard of living. During the
'70s and '80s the revolutionary process achieved substantial gains in
the conditions of material and cultural life of Cubans, including their
social and national consciousness. This development has constituted a
fundamental pillar of the revolution all these years." (Hernandez 2003:
14).
The new Cuba of the 1990s developed its focus on external markets such as
tourism and mining (Monreal 2002: 76). The transfer of responsibilities to the
Cuban army as a reliable operator continued, and its responsibilities were
further increased:
"Soon the armed forces were running hotels, doing language training,
spiriting tourists around the island on tours ...Aircraft normally used for
parachute training were converted to carry tourists." (Klepak 2005:
49).
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The collapse of the Soviet Union was however something that the Cubans
were already prepared for since Castro's speech on the 26th July 1989, the 36th
Anniversary of the Moncada assault:
" ...tenemos que advertir al imperialismo que no se haga tantas ilusiones
con relaci6n a nuestra Revoluci6n y con relaci6n a la idea de que
nuestra Revoluci6n no pudiera resistir si hay una debacle en la
comunidad socialista; porque si manana 0 cualquier dla nos
despertaramos con la noticia de que se ha creado una gran conticnda
civil en la URSS, 0, incluso, que nos despertaramos con la noticia de
que la URSS se desintegro, cosa que esperamos que no ocurra jamas,
[aun en esas circunstancias Cuba y la Revoluci6n Cubana seguirian
luchando y seguirian resistiendo!" [...we must warn imperialism not to
make any illusions in relation to our revolution and in relation to the
idea that our revolution will not be able to resist if there is a debacle in
the socialist community; because if tomorrow or any other day we
wake to the news that there there is a civil war in the USSR, or even
that we wake to the news that the USSR has disintegrated, which we
hope will never happen, in such circumstances Cuba and the Cuban
revolution will continue fighting and will continue resisting!] (Castro
1989a).
Hence the legitimacy of the system was not necessarily damaged by the
transition in post-Soviet Russia; Cuba was to continue with its own
nationalistic project under any circumstances, following its endogenous
political orthodoxy under the insignia of the bandera cubana [Cuban flag] as
the most important source of legitimacy.
Opposing such an argument, Juan J. L6pez addressed the question of the
stability of the system in the 1990s, and concluded that the non-transition in
the 1990s could not be explained by the legitimacy of the regime among the
population (Ibid: 165). Instead, L6pez argued that the lack of mass unrest
implicitly legitimated the system (Ibid: 57). This makes the impact of the 1994
maleconazo disturbances even more relevant, as this would contradict L6pez's
argument. L6pez identified economic underperformance as a main source of
regime instability, but did not answer the puzzle why Cuba has been able to
survive several decades of the embargo and the vertiginous destitution of the
first half of the 1990s. Referring to Cuba, he argued that:
"Major theoretical works on transitions to democracy concur that
dictatorships tend to fall when faced with crises." (Ibid: 1).
However, Cuba survived several crises, and would thus contradict this theory.
Kapcia, on the other hand, identified the difference in the origin of the
communist systems in Cuba and Eastern Europe, as well as their difference in
constraining emigration:
"Why then has a political revolution not taken place? The main
explanation has to be that, until recently, there has not been a
commensurate political crisis. In 1989, such crisis as there was could
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be seen as purely economic in character. However, the potential always
existed for this to be translated into a parallel political crisis, if
economic solutions were not found readily, and especially at the grass-
roots level. Here, the key questions were not whether a 'translation'
could take place but when it might, and how long could the crisis go on
until the cracks began to show in the edifice, how long before the
underlying tensions and problems came closer to the surface. Could
economic adjustment and progress come fast enough and be
convincing enough? In the light of this, one should logically ask how
the system has been able to survive so far, when far less afflicted
systems collapsed throughout Eastern Europe and Latin America."
(Kapcia 1995: 8) .
.....the need for political change in Cuba is simply not as urgent as it
has been in Eastern European systems that lacked legitimacy as far as
the majority of their citizens were concerned and which lacked the
'safety valves' available to the Cuban population ..." (Kapcia 1995: 27).
The loyalty of the population became ever more important after the
withdrawal of7,000 Soviet troops from the island by Gorbachev. From 1991
to 1994, therefore, Cuba found itself isolated and the population bore the
consequences. This led to increased nervousness amongst the leadership
during the first half of the 1990s, which again focused on maintaining the
mobilisation of the population as the backbone of the system, driven by
nationalism as the main source of legitimacy:
"Now lacking the Soviet guarantee, Raul began organising Cuban
defence in terms of a 'people's war' to resist a possible American
attack. The mobilization of the entire population was to substitute for
the revolution's earlier reliance on Soviet assistance." (Gott 2005:
274).
The sense of a threat from abroad was even more relevant since the American
invasion of Panama in December 1989 (Operation Just Cause), when President
Bush Sr. sent 20,000 US troops to depose Noriega and bring him to be tried
for charges of drug trafficking issued by a Miami court. The invasion served
as yet another example increasing the anxiousness of the Cubans, and making
them more likely to listen to the increasing emphasis of the discourse on
[I'atria 0 Muerte! [Homeland or death!].
"Castro continued to assert the regime's orthodoxy in the midst of a
worldwide collapse of Soviet-style socialism. The slogan 'Socialism or
Death!', first coined at the beginning of 1989 on the thirtieth
anniversary of the Revolution, became the rallying cry of all his
speeches." (Balfour 1990: 154).
In the meantime the political leadership had to find solutions quickly not only
to security issues, but above all to the fact that Cubans in the early 1990s were
hungry and the country had to cope with a growing foreign exchange deficit.
An important aspect of the "Great Adjustment" of the decade was the
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adaptation of the economy to a new international context. In this sense, the
reinsertion of the island into the world capitalist economy was a key
component of survival (Monreal 2002: 75), ensuring Cubans would not starve
to death. The food supply situation was so serious that dogs, cats and rats were
disappearing from the streets of Havana (Hernandez Otero, Havana, May
2010). Nevertheless, hard currency earned at already operating tourist resorts
was not sufficient to supply the island with all the required imports. Cuban
bureaucrats were making difficult choices on a daily basis whether to purchase
a tanker with petrol or food stuffs waiting outside the Ilavana bay for a call to
come in and unload (Garcia Brigos, Havana, May 2010). The leadership was
aware of the tension amongst the population, as the population went quiet and
the atmosphere was turgid (Ibid.). The population was desperate, the
leadership worried, and both of them despised even more the US-imposed
embargo as the continuing source of legitimacy inflicting pain on them all.
The discourse reflected the crisis by largely dropping the reference to the
construction of communism and instead spoke more about preserving the
achievements of the revolution, such as social benefits. At the same time, the
system was making concessions to private capital in the form of foreign
investment, tourism and some limited private enterprise as a reaction to
combat the embargo and "save" the revolution, as the patriotic representation
of the homeland. The period was termed the "Special Period in time of Peace"
as the economic situation deteriorated with a 2.9 per cent decline in the
country's GDP in 1990, 10 per cent in 1991, 11.6 per cent in 1992 and 14.9
per cent in 1993 (Gott 2005: 288).
"Our opening is not an opening toward capitalism, but rather a socialist
opening toward a capitalist world. It is based on certain principles that
guarantee the preservation of socialist order over our economy and our
ability to meet our economic and social objectives" (Carlos Lage in
Cole 2002: 47).
Discontent in Cuba was real, with Abajo Fidel [Down with Fidel] painted
onto walls, clashes between youths and the police, disobedience of the Film
Institute, intellectuals signing an open letter demanding reform, all
accompanied by purges in academia (Perez-Stable 1993: 213). The crisis
management of the Cuban political apparatus included a codification of the
new pro-business, pro-foreign currency reforms into an updated Constitution
approved in July 1992, as a result of issues raised by the L1amamiento al IV
Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba in October [Call for the IV
Congress of the Cuban Communist Party] (Silva Le6n 2008: 140), again
involving large sections of the general public through various mass
organisations.
"On the eve of the Fourth Party Congress in 1991 there was a call for
public debate to establish a 'consensus based on a recognition of the
diversity of views that exists within the population and strengthened by
democratic discussions within the Party and the Revolution'."
(Cuadernos de Nuestra America, 1991).
96
For several months Cuba experienced an unusually free public debate, when
millions of people criticised, proposed or simply offered opinions on questions
ranging from daily life to public policy (Cole 2002: 51). The reforms
maintained the party as the ultimate guiding power of Cuban society, but
removed the exclusion of religious candidates. The nature of the state was
renamed from atheistic to lay, to represent a higher number of Cuban citizens.
The same year, the government decriminalised the holding of US dollars
(Kapcia 1995: 10). In 1993, General Elections were held, with Cuban
government figures showing a participation of99.57% of registered voters
(Le6n Silva 2008: 143-145):
"El alto nivel de participaci6n ciudadana en estos procesos demostro la
legitimidad quo tiene el actual sistema politico unipartidista existente
en Cuba." [The high level of participation in these processes
demonstrated the legitimacy of the present single-party political system
existing in Cuba.] (Silva Leon 2008: 102).
Despite the contradictions, joint ventures with the despised capitalists had
increased rapidly since 1990; but the economy remained in recession.
"Early in 1993 ... The economic system was on the verge of collapse
and two officials from the International Monetary Fund visiting
Havana declared that the Cuban decline since 1989 was far worse than
the deterioration suffered by the former socialist countries of Eastern
Europe in the same period." (Gott 2005: 291).
During a speech at the annual anniversary of the Moncada barracks on 26th
July 1993, Castro spoke about current events and concerns. He described the
difficulties as doble bloqueo [double blockade] (Castro 1993) and argued for
the use of any means to gain access to hard currency including foreign
investment, to thus improve the living standard of the population and save the
revolution by making unavoidable concessions. In the context of such a
construction, the new direction was legitimate. As part of the achievements of
the revolution, Castro pointed out the luxury of any Cuban to receive a
minimum of food supplies from the state with the popular Libreta de
Abastecimiento [Supply BooklRation Book], which, he said, would be retained
(Ibid.). Castro assured that the luxuries of the socialist revolution would be
saved unlike in other socialist countries, which collapsed into chaos:
" ...en periodo especialla Revoluci6n no estuvo dispuesta, ni esta
dispuesta ni estara dispuesta, a sacrificar al pueblo. En otros paises
habrian adoptado las famosas medidas de choque: liberaci6n de
precios, con efectos real mente terribles para jubilados, para todos los
que reciben menores ingresos ... Pero nuestra Revoluci6n ni siquiera en
periodo especial dej6 a un solo trabajador en la calle, ni dej6
desamparado a un solo ciudadano, ni a un solo jubilado, ni a un solo
nino, ni a una sola madre, ni a un solo nucleo familiar de bajos
ingresos." [...during the special period the revolution was not willing,
is not willing and will not be willing to sacrifice the people. In other
countries the famous shock measures have been adopted: price
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liberalisation, with really terrible results for the retired, for all those of
low income ... But our revolution even in the Special Period has not left
a single worker in the street, has not left a single citizen homeless, not
abandoned a single retired person, nor child, nor mother, nor a single
low-income family.] (Ibid.).
Castro interpreted the continuing unbreakable interconnection between Cuban
nationalism and socialism to reassert the country's ideological fabric, despite
the changes in the rest of the world:
"Ahora nuestro pais tiene una tarea prioritaria, como la hemos
definido: salvar la patria, la Revoluci6n y las conquistas del socialismo
(APLAUSOS). Digo las conquistas del socialismo porque es por 10 que
podemos luchar hoy, pero sin renunciar jarnas al socialismo .... No nos
resignarlamos jamas a renunciar a eso. Esto es 10 que queremos
expresar cuando decimos Socialismo 0 Muerte." [Now our country has
a priority, as we have defined: to save the homeland, the revolution and
socialist conquests (applause). I say the conquests of socialism because
this is what we can fight for today, but without ever renouncing
socialism .... We will never resign to renounce it. This is what we mean
to express when we say socialism or death.] (Ibid.).
To maintain at least minimum levels of loyalty, the government had to
communicate carefuly with increasingly disgruntled Cubans, possibly
doubting their own system and aspiring to the luxuries available in Havana's
dollar shops. Some observed growing cynicism and disenchantment with the
privileges of leaders in the decline of those involved in mass organisations
(Kapcia 1995: 10).
"The most important aspect of all these changes during the Special
Period and the economic hardship suffered was that the bedrock of the
Revolution, free education and health care for all-was maintained if not
increased. Moreover this was achieved in the midst of increased
confrontation with the United States as the economic blockade was
tightened first by the so-called Cuba Democracy (Torricelli) Act of
1992, which extended the trade ban to overseas subsidiaries of U.S.
companies ..." (Hamilton 2002: 24-25).
Therefore, the Special Period did not end the radical nationalistic project. The
inefficient communist economic system, and external factors including the
tightening of the embargo, declining world prices of sugar and oil, and
collapse of COMECON, posed a lethal threat. In addition, in 1993,
particularly destructive weather conditions resulted in a poor production of
sugar, cutting futher Cuba's cash to pay for imports of food and fueland
plunging the island into the full depths of the crisis (Cole 2002: 41-42). A
number of pro-market and pro-investor policies would not destabilise the
system nor the loyalty of the people, as these were only necessary concessions
to keep the nation-building project on course. Mercados agropecuarlos were
allowed again in 1993 after having been abolished in 1986, and the leadership
organised major CTC [Cuban Workers' Union] discussions in May 1994 to
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listen attentively to people's concerns. These changes, particularly the newly
introduced free circulation of the US dollar, did represent, however, a
digression from Rectification, while Cubans were increasingly exposed to the
living standards of foreign tourists (some of whom rushed in to witness a
possible Cuban transition to Western-style democracy). The black market
grew again, resulting in increasing social inequality. The system was
interpreting the situation as a way of developing Cuba, but it could not
completely ignore some of the related contradictions and negative effects. It
did, however, prevent a sudden collapse, by interpreting the meaning of these
changes as necessary and legitimate. The government provided a particular
interpretation of the country's problems and gave the public a direction for the
future within the existing structures of the historically legitimate communist
system, which supported loyalty and stability. Economic changes and
especially the opening to foreign investment provided the resources necessary
to improve economic performance, and thus were interpreted as necessary,
that is, legitimate. During this time, Cuba managed to remain engaged in
international politics as a leader of the developing world, thriving on the
legitimating support of other developing countries.
Cuba and the United States in the 1990s
In the United States, George Bush Sr assumed the presidency in January 1989
and despite his preoccupation with internal developments in the Soviet Union,
as the former Vice-President of President Reagan, he represented a strongly
anti-Cuban Republican administration. Hence, in the context of a Republican
administration in Washington and the US invasion of Panama in December
1989, Cuba had cause for concern about its national security. Bush also
provided 36.9 million dollars to fund Radio and TV Marti between 1991-1992
(Suarez Salazar 1997: 105). The US involvement in the Persian Gulf against
Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 1991 was yet another opportunity for Cuba to
criticise the empire's involvement abroad, despite the multinational nature of
the coalition forces, which it ignored. Cubans were also reporting renewed
hostile under-cover operations during this time (Suarez Salazar 1997: 77-78).
After the arrival of President Clinton in the White House in January 1993, the
most important Cuban foreign strategy became the establishment of a dialogue
with Washington, with expectations of a friendlier leadership amongst the
American Democrats - the embargo and its Torricelli Act tightening however
remained in full force.
"Cuba maintained rather good relations with the Clinton
Administration and Castro offered publicly to stand down in exchange
for the lifting of the embargo." (Kapcia 1995: 3).
The same year, the United States was reevaluating its post-Cold War national
security concerns with START II signed by President Bush shortly before the
end of his term. But friendlier ties with post-Cold War Russia did not extend
to US-Cuba relations. Cuban discourse continued reporting the external
pressure on the country's political system. The discourse interpreted the
situation as the war of the people to keep their socialist privileges, thus
anxiously promoting internal mobilization and loyalty: la guerra de todo el
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pueblo [war of all the people] (Suarez Salazar 1997: 79). In adition, the
political leadership of the island sought extended inter-state cooperation
within the Caribbean and Latin American region, looking for new trade
opportunities. In January 1994, the system was affected by another crisis in
Mexico. The Zapatista National Liberation Army in Chiapas, composed
mostly of impoverished native Indians and peasants, rebelled on the same day
NAFTA went into effect (McWilliams & Piotrowski: 343). This provided a
timely echo of what Cuba had achieved in 1959 and henceforth in terms of
national independence and benefits for the poorest. Implicitly, it argued why
the system should be valued and defended by Cubans despite the difficult
times.
Legitimacy and Interpretations of Early 1990s
Cuba observers have interpreted the island during the 1990s in different ways.
Based on evidence from Bohemia and orther sources, Susan Eva Eckstein
argued that during the Special Period the system based its claims to legitimacy
on Marxist-Leninist moral principles (Eckstein 2003: 12). Legitimacy also .
continued to be based on pre-1959 sources, such as the use of Cuban law and
constitution, which was not respected by the Batista government (Ibid: 15).
Eckstein continued to support the concept of Castro's charismatic leadership
as a source of legitimacy, calling it "a mystical and magical influence, a
commanding spell.;." (Ibid: 19). This notion was supported by Baloyra, who
termed the system a "charismatic hegemony" (Baloyra 1993: 39). Ilowever,
Eckstein argued that, the system increasingly relied on rational-legal
bureaucratic forms of legitimacy (Ibid: 20). Eckstein found that during the
1990s, the system increasingly relied on nationalism as the prominent source
and unifying force:
"Castro found ideological and moral justification for the diversity of
strategies pursued, partly in reinterpreting Marxism-Leninism but also
in nationalism and contemporary au courant global discourse. The
ruling ideology was flexibly reinterpreted." (Ibid: 127).
Enrique A. Baloyra and James A. Morris, on the other hand (and in agreement
with Kapcia), identified key differences between Eastern Europe and Cuba,
thus explaining the survival of the system:
"...the former socialist regimes of Central Europe were imposed by
Moscow after the turmoil of World War II. The Cuban Revolution, on
the other hand, evolved from a distinct set of indigenous factors.
Instead of being imposed by foreign invaders, Cuban leaders asked to
join the socialist bloc." (Baloyra & Morris eds. 1993: 4).
They perceived a crisis of legitimacy in view of the collapse of the socialist
bloc, which forced the system into re-examining its foundations (Baloyra &
Morris eds. 1993: 5), calling the period a "crisis of ideological legitimation"
(Baloyra 1993: 38). Baloyra also concluded that the system relied primarily on
its internal Gramscian hegemony based on consent, implying that violence or
wide-scale repression were not necessary to maintain stability (Baloyra 1993:
42). Marifeli Perez-Stable supported the possibility of eroding legitimacy
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brought by the end of the Cold Word and the Ochoa-de la Guardia affair
(perez-Stable 1993b: 77). She concluded that the system responded with a call
for perfecting the system, increasing the emphasis on the national origins of
the revolution and socialism in Cuba, using the national sovereignty and social
justice that the past three decades had brought as enduring sources of
legitimacy (Marifeli Perez-Stable 1993b: 77).
Raymond Duncan, on the other hand, argued that the system experienced a
substantial loss of legitimacy and thus responded with various forms of
repression, together with an image of the United States as an enemy state,
legitimating the system (Duncan 1993: 232). Duncan argued that the system
had to enforce loyalty, coercing those that would resist publicly, and
promoting adherence to a militarized political culture (Ibid.). Zimbalist
supported the role of the under-siege mentality based on a real and growing
threat of Reagan's United States, which resulted in a growing repression
including incarceration of political dissidents, operation of brigadas de
respuesta rapida [quick response brigades] and enhanced control of the media
(Zimbalist 1992: 11-12). These seem to have, to some extent, complemented
the liberalisation reforms of the Fourth Party Congress. An additional source
of anxiety of many Cubans, which was likely to make them loyal, was the
Cuban American National Foundation and its visions of a post-revolutionary
Cuba. For this and other reasons, Zimbalist estimated that 40-50% of Cubans
might have remained loyal (Ibid.). Zimbalist concluded:
"The regime sees the repression as requisite for its survival.. ..Castro is
still viewed as the legitimate defender of Cuban sovereignty by large
numbers of Cubans." (Ibid.).
Duncan's, Zimbalist's and Mesa-Lago's arguments about repression contradict
Perez-Stable's and Hernandez's emphasis on popular support:
"The revolution had mustered extraordinary popular support and
offered Cuban socialism a long-standing source oflegitimacy."
(Marifeli Perez-Stable 1993b: 83).
"Popular support for the system is what gives it stability. Continued
identification of the system with the interests of the population
guarantees it support." (Hernandez: 20).
Fernandez also attributed the survival to popular support:
"The discourse is better understood as the language of passion that
gave form to a political religion, not an ideology narrowly defined .
...The revolution evoked feelings and also relied on those feelings to
muster support and, in no small measure, to survive in power. The
strong affective reactions stemmed from a moral sense of justice
expressed as radical nationalism, based on judgments about Cuba's
past and future." (Ibid: 65).
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Conclusions based on repression contradicted Geraldine Lievesley's analysis
of the period, as she argued that the destabilising "climate of insecurity and
dissatisfaction" of the 1990s resulted in the system loosening up social
controls such as press censorship and critical public debate (Lievcsley: 123).
These contradicting interpretations, however, may represent a range of
combining factors that in fact reinforced stability. Encouragement of the loyal
part of the system, with repression of the dissenters, close control of the media
(perhaps liberalised during short periods such as during the call for the IV
Congress in the summer of 1992), and a limited libcralisation of some parts of
the system might have produced the right mix that allowed the system to retain
its legitimacy and withstand the worst challenges. The next chapter therefore
looks at the discourse, its interpretations and sources of legitimacy during a
major crisis, to understand how the system coped, when collapse could have
been imminent.
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Chapter 5
5. 1. Discourse Analysis: 1994 Malecon Episode in Granma, and
Bohemia
This chapter examines the content and mechanics of the discourse during
1994, before and after the hijackings, Malecon public disturbances, and
subsequent migratory and diplomatic crisis. The chapter provides a second
example of a destabilising moment. It examines how the media interpreted the
crisis for the general public and how they interpreted emigration, while
striving to encourage loyalty and stability. As demonstrated in the preceding
chapter, the Special Period was a time when Cubans experienced extreme
poverty, unheard of since 1959, and when they seem to have doubted the
system the most. One of the symptoms demonstrating the possibility of
growing instability was the Malecon riots that erupted in Havana on 5th
August 1994. This was also preceded by numerous hijackings earlier that year.
In the afternoon of 5thAugust, Fidel Castro himself approached the
discontented crowd and steered public opinion in his favour, generating
renewed support. The riots were a rare public protest in Cuban history since
the 1959 Revolution, which triumphed on the basis of wide public support and
then thrived on its residue. The daily hardships of the early 1990s tested the
allegiance of loyal Cubans to the limit. Similar to Mariel in 1980, migration
was again a major issue, both domestically, and between Cuba and the United
States.
Summary of Key Events
The changes following the end ofthe Cold War plunged Cuba deeper into its
domestic tensions and economic crisis in 1994, but at the same time provoked
a turning point after which the economy started a slow recovery later that year.
A chronology of the most important events during the several months of
domestic instability was given by Fidel Castro during a televised interview
and it is useful to present the most important events here in an abbreviated
form (Granma, y. 30, n. 175,26 August 1994, Fidel Castro Ruz: 1-7). On 13th
July 1994 a tugboat 13 de Marzo was hijacked and sank during a subsequent
chase, in which boats of the Cuban coastguard were involved. Thirty-one
individuals were saved by the coastguard and thirty-two died during the
incident. Granma reported President Clinton on 18thJuly to have described the
situation as "otro ejemplo de la naturaleza brutal del regimen cubano" [another
example of the brutal nature of the Cuban regime] (Ibid: 1). On 26th July
another hijacking took place, in which hijackers using a pistol and knives took
control of a boat called Baragud with thirty people on board, threatening to
kill a seventeen year-old female passenger and later throwing two passengers
overboard. On 3rd August another boat called La Coubre was hijacked. The
boat was intercepted by US coastguards out at deep sea, with over one
hundred people onboard (Ibid: 1). On 4th August the already mentioned boat
Baragua was hijacked again, and officer Gabriel Lamoth Caballero was killed
during the incident. The boat ran out of fuel on the way, was captured the
following day and returned to Cuba (Ibid.).
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On 5th August, riots broke out on the streets of Central I Iavana, with some
rioters shouting [Abajo Fidel! [Down with Fidel!]. Fidel Castro confronted the
crowd in person later that day, which reportedly resulted in the crowd chanting
i Viva Fidel!. On 8thAugust another hijacking of a military boat 5034 took
place in the port of Mariel, with Captain Roberto Aguilar Reyes killed during
the incident. The boat was intercepted by US coastguards with twenty-six
people on board, who were all transferred to Key West in Florida (Ibid.). The
number of balseros [rafters] crossing the straights to Florida was increasing
during these days; the US coastguards reported assisting 116 on 9th August
bringing the total number of rafters intercepted in 1994 to 5,270. On 11th
August an additional116 balseros were intercepted (Ibid.). On 14thAugust
about seven hundred Cubans, with the assistance of the captain, boarded the
tanker Jussara in the port of Mariel. On the is" August the Cuban Ministry of
Interior MININT announced that anyone disembarking from the Jussara would
be allowed to do so with no subsequent punishment (Ibid.). On 19thAugust,
President Clinton declared that illegal immigrants from Cuba would not be
allowed to stay in the United States and would be transferred to the US
military base at Guantamo (Ibid.). From the end of August, large-scale
marches in support of the Cuban government took place and continued during
the following months.
Considering the Evidence
January to July 1994: Tensions under the Extreme Poverty of the Special
Period
The style of messages did not involve insulting language, and the discourse
suggested the need to save the revolution or face total destruction with no
future. Emphasis was given to national pride, duty and patriotism above all. A
frequent juxtaposition of three main signifiers, homeland, revolution,
socialism, and the order in which they were used implied the precedence of the
homeland above all as the driving force. Socialism was interpreted as
representing independence, while communism stood for patriotism,
neoliberalism for imperialism, and the US threat was as serious as ever.
The press before the crisis contained messages assuring Cubans that the
country was on its way to economic recovery and that the government was
planning to rationalise expenditure without altering the social achievements of
the revolution. The press argued that one of the main causes of the economic
problems was the disintegration of the Socialist bloc after the Soviet Union
had followed an erroneous direction. The discourse repeatedly confirmed the
continuing validity of communism and socialism, and the need for Cuba to
avoid a similar mistake. This interpretation made it possible to report the
transitions in the Socialist bloc, without having concerns about their potential
destabilising impact on Cuba. The discourse of the pre-crisis period used
statistical data and government-produced reports, focusing the public away
from the declining legitimacy of communism abroad. The press during this
period contained an ever higher frequency of the word Patria, demonstrating
the ever increasing appeal to Cuban patriotism in the new unipolar context
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after the collapse of Cuba's communist allies and its potential delegitimating
impact on the persuasiveness of communist ideology.
The underlying message was encouraging Cubans to remain loyal, confident
and patient, assuring them that revolutionary ideals would be upheld despite
the challenging national and international contexts. The print media reported
new economic developments and reorientation to tourism, suggesting brighter
days to come to improve morale which was at an all-time low since 1959
(Bohemia, y. 86, n. 8, 15 April 1994, Ariel Terrero: 40). It suggested that
increasing numbers of foreign tourists were assumed to bring hard-currency
cash to be spent, and subsequently used by the authorities to finance medicine
for the population, reassuring Cubans, that the cash would be used for public
benefit. The language was positive, using expressions such as buenos
resultados [good results], eficiencia [efficiency] or mejorar [to improve]
(Granma, y. 30, n. 28,9 February 1994: 1), (Granma, y. 30, n. 80,22 April
1994: 3).
Beyond tourism, the coverage also reported that new markets in Latin America
and Europe were receiving exports from Cuba as a reorientation away from
the former Socialist trading partners, suggesting the effective responsiveness
of the system to current problems. Other articles reported on the success of
exports of medical products as another growing export industry. In sum, the
discourse admitted that the times were hard, but that there were no doubts that
the situation was about to improve. A significant number of articles supported
this message. This was, however, accompanied by reassurances that these
changes would not infringe on revolutionary ethics, public decency, and the
ideological base of the country:
" ...los objetivos de Cuba sin abandonar sus principios ...No queremos la
imagen de un pais de juego, de drogas, de prostituci6n. Queremos la
imagen de un pais de elevada cultura y capacidad para acoger al
visitante que el mundo tenga la imagen de un pais honrado, moral y
eso 10 apreciamos mucho porque sabemos que en el mundo tales
cualidades no abundan." [...the objectives of Cuba without abandoning
its principles ...We do not want the image of a country of gambling,
drugs, prostitution. We want the image ofa country that is highly
cultured, with a capacity to welcome the visitor, we want the world to
have the image of a country that is honourable, moral and this we
appreciate very much because we know that in the world such qualities
do not abound.] (Granma, y. 30, n. 102, 21 May 1994, Iralda
Calzadilla: 1).
This article referred to sus prtncipios [its principles], presupposing in the
reader the knowledge of these referring mostly to Cuba as an independent
country, with an emphasis on good socialist morals and dignity above the
market. The future was painted in very positive language, and the discourse
did not contain any insulting language aimed at opponents (Granma, y. 30, n.
7, 11 January 1994: 5). Despite a parallel with the pre-crisis coverage of 1980
Marie1, which also focused on good economic performance, the coverage from
the 1994 period was clearly addressing the desperation of the population by
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more strongly presenting evidence of developments that would positively
affect the near future, because in 1994 Cuba was already in trouble.
Elsewhere, the language used expressions such as ereee confianza [confidence
grows],javorables condiciones [favourable conditions], or more bluntly
optimismo [optimism]. The discourse could not have been more morale-
boosting using both explicit and implicit messages.
The encouraging reports were contrasted with the negative impact of the US
embargo. The embargo was routinely denounced and presented as the most
important factor contributing to the economic collapse of the early 1990s, after
Cuba lost its allies and had to face the United States on its own, without Soviet
sponsorship based on trade transactions below world market prices with the
difference financed by the Russian people. The unjust nature of the embargo
was demonstrated by evidence of international support, presumably to increase
the credibility and impact of the information, indirectly implying that these
groups and individuals represented the majority opinion in their countries.
Solidarity abroad strengthened the legitimacy of the system, and pictured
Cuba leading a global alliance against imperialism (Granma, y. 30, n. 34, 17
March 1994: 1), (Granma, y. 30, n. 7,11 January 1994: 5).
An important article reporting a Fidel Castro speech was printed on 5th
January, linking the country's revolution to socialism as the only possible
socio-political model guaranteeing the country's independence. This was one
of the most important messages during the whole episode. This interpretation
in the spirit of iPatria, Socialismo 0 Muerte! [Homeland, socialism or death!]
was not unique to this period, but was greatly emphasised in the press during
these difficult times, when the system was being questioned by many, and it
would have been inconcievable to dismantle communist ideology without
bringing down the whole system. In the slogan, the order was reversed, to
emphasise the role of patriotism in close connection with socialism,
suggesting they were one. This interpretation of the pillars of the country's
own model left no other possibilities beyond itself and argued for continuity.
The headline Sin el socialismo y sin la Revolucion no serlamos un pais
independiente [Without socialism and without the revolution, we would not be
an independent country] explicitly made the direct connection between
socialism and independence, sending a message that socialism had to be
maintained under all circumstances despite the transitions elsewhere, in order
to safeguard priceless national independence as the crucial driving force of the
political identities of Cubans. In the speech, Castro stated the only acceptable
option:
"Cualesquiera que sean las cosas que hoy hagarnos y tengarnos que
hacer para salvar la Patria, la Revoluci6n y las conquistas del
socialismo, jamas renunciaremos al socialismo .... Ser revolucionario
ahora es cuando vale verdaderamente ser revolucionario. Cualquiera
puede ser revolucionario en tiempos faciles, pero no todos son capaccs
de ser revolucionarios en tiempos dificiles ... " [Whatever we do and
have to do today to save the homeland, the revolution and the
achievements of socialism, we will never renounce socialism .... To be
a revolutionary now is when it is truly worth being a revolutionary.
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Anyone can be a revolutionary in easy times, but not all are capable of
being revolutionaries in difficult times ...] (Granma Internacional, y.
29, n. 1,5 January 1994, Fidel Castro Ruz: 13).
Again, the juxtaposition of the three signifiers (homeland, revolution,
socialism) and their order implied the precedence of the homeland above all,
closely knit together with Cuban socialism, emphasising the need to persevere
under any circumstances. It conveyed meaning to reality from within the
Sierra Maestra experience well know to all Cubans, where the revolutionary
rebels had encountered many utterly desperate moments, but never gave up,
expecting the same from all Cubans. Hence the hard times were a good
opportunity to test everyone's true revolutionary capacities. The times were
interpreted as another challenge, rather than a final collapse. Castro was
perhaps anticipating the worst and was gathering support, interpreting those
that would choose otherwise as weak, cowardly and unpatriotic. He indirectly
suggested that courage and honour equalled ser revolucionarios en tiempos
dificiles.
Again, Castro insisted that Cuba's hard-won achievements would be
preserved, indirectly presenting the success of the system based on public
support:
"Todas esas circunstancias adversas se juntaron en muchos campos, sin
embargo, ninguna escuela se cerro, ningun hospital se cerro, la
mortalidad infantil no crecio ... l,Como es posible ese milagro sin el
pueblo que tenemos, cualesquiera que sean los debiles, cualesquiera
que sean las dificultades materiales tremendas que tenemos hoy?
...tenemos que luchar, pero no renunciaremos a nada" [All these
adverse circumstances came together in many fields, however, no
school was closed, no hospital was closed, the infant mortality rate did
not grow ... How would this miracle be possible without the people we
have, regardless of the weak ones, whatever the tremendous material
difficulties we have today? ...we have to fight, but will not renounce
anything] (Ibid: 13).
With the use of tenemos que [we have to] Castro referred to loyal supporters,
as well as everyone else on the island, leaving them little choice and assuming
a union of most Cubans. The nationalistic rhetoric was presupposed in the
reference to the Cuban public as nosotros [we/us], and was transmitted by a
frequent reference to homeland, the revolution and the people as well as
frequent use of the first person plural tense of verbs and nouns. Such language
presupposed a nation-wide community, stressed in repetitive expressions such
as nuestro camino ...nuestros esJuerzos, nuestras negociaciones y nuestras
iniciativas [our path ...our efforts, our negotiations and our initiatives] (Ibid.).
The language emphasised a scenario in which, if the model were changed, the
country's independence would be lost, channelling the widespread appeal of
nationalism towards systemic stability:
"Este pais nunca sera entregado, este pais nunca sera vendido, y la
estructura, 10 fundamental, 10 esencial de la Revolucion y el
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socialismo, se mantendra: porque sin el socialismo y sin la Revoluci6n
no seriamos nada, tendriamos que regresar al horroroso pasado que ya
conocimos ...Sin el socialismo y sin la Revoluci6n no scrlamos siquiera
un pais independiente." [This country will never be surrendered, this
country will never be sold, and the fundamental structure, the essence
of the revolution and socialism, will be maintained: because without
socialism and without the revolution we would be nothing, we would
have to return to the horrific past that we already know ... Without
socialism and without the revolution we would not even be an
independent country.] (Ibid: 13).
By the proximity and repetition of the terms isle pais, la Revolucion y el
socialismo, Castro implied the unity of these terms, unable to exist separately,
again reversing the order with the patriotic signifier first. The repetition of
these terms in their proximity appealed to the attitudes of Cubans. Therefore,
within the national context of the day, it was not important what was
happening elsewhere after the end of the Cold War, whether the Cuban
economy would get worse, or anything else. Cuba would not, and most
importantly could not change direction or compromise on any of the main
pillars interpreted as inseparable. The interpretations assumed that by
transforming one pillar, the whole system would collapse. Such a message
incited patriotic sentiment in the audience and linked it to socialism. By
relating the end of socialism to a return al horroroso pasado que ya
conocimos, Castro implicitly referred to the Batista era to extrapolate his
argument evoking images relevant to Cuban national memory. The language
implied that a systemic change would ultimately mean a regression to pre-
revolutionary Cuba, perhaps representing US-style democracy as something
that had already been tried with the disastrous result that the island was
controlled by foreign interests. Castro frequently encouraged the people:
" ...los tiempos dificiles pasaran, tendran que pasar .... manana
construiremos mucho mejor y mucho mas en condiciones
favorables ....Estoy convencido de que las generacioncs venideras sc
sentiran orgullosas de esta generaci6n, la generaci6n que no se dej6
veneer por ningun obstaculo, la generacion que no c1audic6, la
generaci6n que no se rindi6." [...difficult times will pass, they have to
pass .... tomorrow we will build much better and in much more
favourable conditions ...1 am convinced that the generations to come
will feel proud of this generation, the generation who was not
overcome by any obstacle, the generation which did not give in, the
generation that has not surrendered.] (Ibid: 13).
In this paragraph, by the frequent repetition of generation, Castro implied the
continuity of the system as part of a long history of struggle for independence,
longed for by the country's forefathers. In this sense, Castro reflected patriotic
sentiment, and stressed the importance of the common historical heritage and
continuity in favour of systemic stability. He promised that the current
economic problems would be temporary, by the emphasis and repetition of
expressions such as pasardn, tendrdn que pasar. By repeatedly referring to
generacion, Castro indirectly related the current situation with Cuba's
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independence struggles and the fulfilment of Marti's nationalist ideas in the
revolutionary victory of 1959, normally referred to in full as la generacion del
centenario [the centennial generation]. By linking socialism with Cuban
nationalist martyrs and memory, he legitimised the system as a singular unit
that had to be retained. The speech stressed that the hard times were a passing
period, which had to be lived through in order to preserve the basics of the
self-worth of Cubans as members of an independent nation, to sustain their
honour and dignity. The speech constructed a sense of nosotros, as surviving
only if the revolution were preserved in its purity and entirety.
Retaining Revolutionary Communist Orthodoxy Backed by Patriotic
Sentiment
The discourse repeated that the bright times were to come in order to raise the
morale of the population. The encounter solidified the press relations at times
when dissent would have been the most destabilising.
"La prensa tiene la misi6n primordial de defender la Revoluci6n.
Defender la Revoluci6n es defender el socialismo .... Cuando hablamos
de esta Revoluci6n, no la puedo concebir separada del socialismo, son
inseparables .... Yeo la prensa como una fuerza, un instrumento
formidable de la Revoluci6n. La veo como Radio Rebelde, en la Sierra
Maestra, porque estamos viviendo tiempos que no son mas faciles que
los de la Sierra Maestra ... " [The press has the primary mission of
defending the revolution. To defend the revolution is to defend
socialism. When we talk about this revolution, I cannot conceive it
separated from socialism, they are inseparable ...1 see the press as a
force, a formidable instrument of the revolution. I see it as Radio
Rebelde in the Sierra Maestra, because we are living in times that are
not easier than those of the Sierra Maestra ...] (Granma Internacional,
y. 30, n. 2, 12 January 1995: 3-5, speech transcript).
By repeating the word deJender, Castro presupposed a war-like situation,
requiring a special effort from all, recalling the Sierra Maestra as a victorious
national experience. By juxtaposing signifiers such as socialismo with
Revolucion, and building up the image with the historical references, Castro
conveyed an image driven by implicit patriotism, where Cuban socialism and
nationalism were one and inseparables, thus sustaining the legitimacy of the
system with a single solution. The linking of the hardship of the Special Period
with the struggles in the Sierra Maestra gave contemporary times a lot more
meaning to any patriotic Cuban, inciting a culturally relevant sentiment within
the context of a nation-building project.
" La indisciplina, el desaliento, la duda, son tendencias peligrosas que
deben empezar a revetirse ... Sin el bloqueo econ6mico, sin el sabotaje,
sin el hostigamiento de que nos hacen victimas constantemente,
nosotros podrfamos, en un tiempo mas corto ... ir saliendo del periodo
especial. ..Debemos decir que este pais en el capitalismo, jamas
consigui6 10 que ha conseguido en el socialismo. Estariamos como
Haiti.,;" [Indiscipline, discouragement, doubt, are dangerous
tendencies that should be reversed ...Without the economic blockade,
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without sabotage, without the harrassment of which we are constantly
victims, we could, in a shorter time ...exit the special period .... We must
say that this country under capitalism, never achieved what it achieved
under socialism. We would be like Haiti.i.] (Ibid: 5).
By juxtapositing terms referring to a lack of commitment such as doubt and
tendencias peligrosas with the embargo and sabotage, Castro suggested the
danger represented by a lack of commitment thus increasing the social
pressure on dissenters. In addition by using the image of Haiti in comparison,
Castro warned what would happen to the country if it abandoned socialism,
using an image well embedded in Cuban national memory, suggesting the
chaos Haiti had experienced since 1791. The speech referred negatively to the
concept of political opening as tested in the Soviet Union:
" .. .la perestroika tuvo una notable influencia en nuestro pais, ya
medida que se desarrollaba todo el mundo fue observando la tragica y
dramatica consecuencia de todo eso." [...perestroika had a marked
influence on our country, and as it developed everyone observed the
tragic and dramatic consequences of it all.] (Ibid: 5).
The article reasserted Cuba's tradition of leadership rather then discipleship,
by offering its particular nationalist-socialist model intact. Castro anticipated
people's concerns about transition-related economic problems in former
Socialist countries, and incited them with negative language about adopting
similar perestroika-like policies. Similar language was used consistently
several weeks later: monedas devaluadas, poblaciones desilusionadas,
desesperadas [...devalued currencies ...disillusioned and desperate populations]
(Granma, y. 30, n. 37,16 February 1994: 5, speech transcript). The language
presupposed that Cuba, if following a similar direction, would ultimately
experience similar economic chaos.
Saving the Revolution from Neoliberalism
An important transcript of Castro's public speech delivered on 28th January
1994 in which he encouraged Cuban patriotism and and interpreted it as in
conflict with neoliberalism was published in Granma on the 16th February. lIe
used specific endogenous signifiers such as ba/alia [battle] to suggest the
connection between the current hardships with the times of the nationalist
struggles of the rebels in the Sierra Maestra.He juxtaposcd neoliberalism with
the signifier of genocidio [genocide], an important reference evoking images
of past threats of biological warfare against Cuba, and possibly even
suggesting the image of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. In this way, he
reconstructed the meaning of neoliberalism for Cubans: neoliberalismo era un
suicidio ...era un genocidio [...neoliberalism was a suicide ...it was a genocide]
(Granma, y. 30, n. 37, 16 February 1994: 4, speech transcript).
By using these images, Castro painted a culturally specific image of
neoliberalism as a real threat, conveying a message relevant to the nation's
memory with a potentially strong impact. This was the intentional ideological
projection of an image of the new global context and the construction of its
meaning for Cubans, inciting particular attitudes. The language also
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reinterpreted the concept as another label for imperialism and the immediate
negative meaning it thus carried. The identity of Cubans as "we" was
simplified in relation to its Other in the following words:
.....no podriamos decir que somos, pero sf podrlamos afirmar
categ6ricamente que no somos, y no somos, por supuesto, nada en
absoluto neoliberales .... no s610 Cuba esta viviendo un periodo
especial. America Latina esta viviendo un periodo especial. .. el Tercer
Mundo 10 esta viviendo .... en el mundo crece el hambre, hay mas
hambre y mas pobreza que nunca ... " [...we could not say what we
were, but we could say categorically that we are not, we are absolutely
not, of course, neoliberals ... not only Cuba is living a special period.
Latin America is living a special period ...the Third World is living it.
...hunger grows in the world, there is more hunger and poverty than
ever ...] (Ibid: 5).
The island was portrayed as maintaining the safe direction, interpreting current
problems as temporary: estdmos travesando [we are passing through] (Ibid: 5),
contextualising problems in Cuba with the developing world. These ideas
were repeated in other articles, reporting that imperialism was impoverishing
an increasing number of countries besides Cuba. Neoliberalism taking hold in
Latin America was later labelled in another article as el pe/igroso veneno
[dangerous poison], reaching a conclusion that it was una aventura
norteamericana [a North American adventure] (Bohemia, y. 86, n. 8, 15 April
1994j, G. Sojo, Maggie Marin: 10-13). By linking neoliberalism to North
America, the negative meaning implied that it was an alien, non-hispanic,
oppressive phenomenon, ill-suited to Cuba.
The discourse called on Cubans to protect their homeland, as the last standing
defender of rights of the developing world, painting images of larger
processes, with Cuba in the front line. The language assumed moral
superiority, which implied that revolutionary sacrificial commitment for
reasons beyond individual self-interest were the right subject position. The
link between familiar anti-imperialism and new neoliberalism provided the
meaning of the new concept: Ser antineoliberal es ser antimpertaltsta [To be
anti-neoliberal is to be anti-imperialist...] (Granma, y. 30, n. 37, 16 February
1994: 5, speech transcript). Negative images such as loss of independence,
subjugation or global inequality, which was reflected in the UN veto system,
were linked to the concept of neoliberalism, which was in this way
reconstructed with a modified meaning within the discourse. The revolution
was the central pillar in the discourse, as the key signifier interpreting all other
concepts that could be related to it at any time.
The frequent use of the word desaparecer [to disappear] in relation to the
collapse of the Soviet Union is particularly revealing (Ibid: 5); the Socialist
Bloc was not described as having disintegrated or being dismantled by its
oppressed people to join the free world, as it was interpreted in some
discourses outside Cuba, but simply as having disappeared. Thus an
explanation of a possible cause was omitted. Cubans were instead warned that
adopting the new neoliberal trends would mean a return to colonial
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dependency and loss of national autonomy. The underlying message was that
Cubans were surrounded by hostile forces, and hence had to hold fast, unite
and carry on: nos convert irian todavia en mas colonias de 10 que somos
hoy ... liquidarlan nuestra independencia .. .liquldada progresivamente [they
would convert us into still more of a colony than we are today ...thcy would
liquidate our independence ... independence ...liquidated progressively] (Ibid:
5). By repeating the words liquidarlan and independencla, the impact of this
scare was made more prominent.
Adopting anything different than the existing system was interpreted as a road
towards destruction, calling capitalism a suicide (Ibid: 5). If adopted. it would
lead to the loss of its most valued independence by sooner or later seeing
militares yankis en nuestros palses [Yankee soldiers in our countries] (Ibid: 5),
an interpretation that again linked Cuban nationalism to the survival of
communism. Neoliberalism was linked to a regreso to a presupposed past
negative experience with a similar system under Fulgencio Batista, evoking
images of social and racial segregation, landless labour and colonial
subjugation. In addition, by using plurals (nuestros poises). Castro
presupposed similar processes in all developing countries. As an implicit
metaphor, the expression also evoked the 1898 arrival of the US battleship
Maine, later bombed in Havana harbour, and the 190 I Platt Amendment.
inciting Cuban nationalism by implicit historical examples.
Criticism of the Cuban system was addressed indirectly, by arguing that the
United States was a single party political system since Democrats and
Republicans were a similar group of the imperialist bourgeois class: El
imperio es monopartidista [The imperium is single party ...] (Ibid: 5). The
message suggested that Cuba was fighting for more than just its independence:
it was fighting for its just socio-economic programme, for itself and other
developing countries that were being exploited by lawless ncolibcrals. This
interpretation suggested that economic and other difficulties on the island were
caused by external factors, and thus did not require fundamental internal
adjustments in terms of Cuba'scommunist model. The communist model was
portrayed as granting Cuba's independence, in view of the US embargo and
the collapse of the Socialist bloc, thus increasing in importance. In the last part
of the speech, Castro assumed a general attitude of public opinion and
interpreted it in the following words:
" ...nosotros tenemos un pueblo que sabe 10 que es el capitalismo, y les
puedo asegurar que nuestro pueblo no quiere el regreso al
capitalismo." [...we have a nation that knows what capitalism is, and I
can assure you that our people do not want a return to capitalism.]
(Ibid: 7).
Subsequently, Castro encouraged the people with images of victory ahead: la
Revolucion sobrevivira [the revolution will survive] (Ibid: 6), Nuestra
Revolucion saldrd mas Juerte de este perlodo especial. [Our revolution will
come out stronger from this special period.] (Ibid: 5). This time, Castro finally
closed with a strong emphasis on socialism, modifying the usual call i Patrla 0
Muertel to [Socialismo 0 Muertel [Socialism or Death!] (Ibid: 7), thus
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enmeshing further Cuban nationalism with socialist ideology by using a
common sense slogan with a different signifier. The discourse confirmed its
high interaction with concepts, or signifiers, originating from its Other,
adopting them with a modified meaning by contextualising them within the
national historical experience, political culture and endogenous master
signifiers. The link between Cuban socialism and nationalism was now
interpreted anew by inserting explicit and implicit messages of the possible
collapse of independent Cuba, if socialism as the revolution's key component
was dropped. It implied it would lead to the collapse of the whole, including
what most Cubans were potentially keen to keep.
An issue of Bohemia from the 15th April 1994, reminded Cubans about the
anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion with the following title on the inside
front cover: Giron, La Victoria engrandece la patria, somos de patria 0
muerte [Bay of Pigs, Victory exalted the nation, we are of homeland or death]
sending a strong patriotic message by the repetition of patria. Implicitly, it
reminded the public of the Cuban tradition to prevail in seemingly hopeless
situations.
Changing the Intepretation of Emigration
Another article reported in depth about a conference called La nacion y la
emigracion [The nation and emigration], in which members of the Cuban
emigre community living abroad participated. It promised acercamiento
[rapprochement] and used expressions such as normalizar and dialogar [to
normalise, dialogue]. It mentioned both political and economic reasons for
emigration in general, then looking at the different waves of emigration from
Cuba. It mentioned the 1959 Batista allies, family reunions, economic and
other reasons for emigration. It reported that many Cubans living abroad were
also supporting revolutionary Cuba (Bohemia, y. 86, n. 8, 15 April 1994i: 24-
27). Most of all, the article explained the changing attitudes towards
emigration in relation to ideological continuity:
"Nuestra actitud de hoy, de ir hacia el acercamiento necesario con la
ernigracion cubana, no constituye una concesion en el terreno
ideologico, ni tampoco la forma de subsanar un error cometido antes
como algunos piensan. La postura mantenida por nuestro pueblo y
gobierno en otros momentos estuvo plenamente justificada por las
circumstancias historicas, tanto externas como internas, entonces
existentes. Ahora las condiciones internacionales han cambiado, asi
como como la situacion interna." [Our attitude today, must go forward
toward a necessary rapprochement with the Cuban diaspora; it does not
constitute a concession in the ideological field, nor a way of correcting
a mistake committed before, as some think. The position taken by our
people and Government in other times was fully justified by both
external and internal historical circumstances of those times. Now the
international conditions have changed, as has the internal situation.]
(Ibid: 27).
The text assumed the unity of opinion of the people and the government,
making it clear that the new attitude towards emigration reflected of the new
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reality. It suggested the need to defend the revolution by various means,
including acercamiento with those formerly signified as enemies. The article
also assumed an unsaid right to correct different interpretations of the issue
como algunos piensan, providing the acceptable subject position. The article
well reflected the changing attitude toward emigration in Cuba since 1980,
shifting towards a more complex understanding of the phenomenon, and
reinterpreting it as economic rather than political.
Achievements of the Revolution, Nelson Mandela and Continuity Based
on National Heritage
A key article brought an interview with Roberto Robaina, Cuban Minister for
Foreign Relations at the time, who spoke about una tremenda batalla
diplomdtica [a tremendous diplomatic battle] and warned that it was
" ... un momento crucial en la historia de la Revoluci6n, cuando esta en
juego no s610 la soberania de la Patria sino la existencia misma de la
Revolucion." [... a crucial moment in the history of the revolution,
when not only the sovereignty of the homeland is at stake, but also the
very existence of the revolution.] (Bohemia, y. 86, n. 8, 15 April
1994e, Pedro Vinas Alfonso: 34-39).
By the use of the word batalla, Robaina linked the current difficulties to the
revolution's historical legacy. By the juxtaposition of la soberanla, /a Patria
and la Revolucion, the text suggested a call for engagement to defend over
thirty years of national autonomy and shared history, in the midst of internal
and external pressures. (Bohemia, y. 86, n. 8, 15 April 1994c, Mirta Rodriguez
Calderon: 28-29), (Granma, y. 30, n. 80,22 Apri11994a: I). Over all, the
articles stayed away from strong condemnations or insults and, similar to
Granma, Bohemia carried a message of encouragement.
A part of the pre-crisis coverage, especially in May, focused on Nelson
Mandela and festivities in South Africa attended by Fidel Castro (Granma, 10-
14 May 1994). This was positive coverage, reminding Cubans of their
respected achievements abroad at a time when the country's ideals were under
pressure, indirectly evoking images of Cuba as a heroic international freedom
fighter (Granma, y. 30, n. 94, 11 May 1994a: 1). The text recalled Cuba's
contribution, as an implicit encouragement sending an unsaid message that
other countries have only recently emerged to enjoy what the Revolution had
brought to Cubans in 1959. This helped the leadership to solidify Cuba's
image of righteousness, leading the way with its own legitimate model:
"Esta tarde, en toda isla, se rendira homenaje a los combatientcs
internacionalistas cubanos que con su participaci6n en las luchas de
independencia y por soberania en Africa contribuyeron tambicn al
triunfo sobre el apartheid." [This evening, in the whole island, a tribute
will be paid to Cuban internationalist combatants who through their
participation in the fights for independence and sovereignty in Africa
also contributed to the victory over apartheid.] (Granma, y. 30, n. 94,
10May 1994: 1).
t t 4
The 41 st anniversary of Moncada filled the pages of several issues in July. The
articles pointed out the significant involvement of youth as a response to the
anniversary, demonstrating the continuity ofthe revolution. It emphasised the
patriotic aspect as the inheritance of the country's forefathers:
"Esa misma Juventud que jamas ha c1audicado, ni jamas sabra dejarse
veneer, porque esta consciente que defendiendo esta Revoluci6n se
defiende a si misma, defiende la existencia de su Patria ...hacer de este
pais una naci6n libre y soberana" [The same youth that has never
faltered, nor will ever let itself be defeated, because it is conscious that
by defending the revolution, it also defends the existence of its
homeland ...to make this country a free and sovereign nation] (Granma,
y. 30, n. 137, 12 July 1994: 1).
The article from the 12thJuly mentioned specifically that revolutionary youth
was defendiendo nuestra cultura [defending our culture] (Ibid.), demonstrating
renewed focus on the cultural meaning of the revolution, used during the
sixties, but brought into renewed attention. This component of the discourse
was once again placing greater emphasis on Marti's concept of Nuestra
America, as a valid source of legitimacy for most Cubans. This suggested the
need to defend Cuba not only as a nation, but also as a cultural community,
with different values from the regionally-dominant Anglo-Saxon United
States, interpreted as alien and incompatible with post-1959 Cuba built on its
endogenous ideology. Cultural and national independence were again
emphasised in a later issue from 2ih July, which celebrated the symbolic
Moncada assault over five pages and warned Cubans about las enemigos de la
Patria [enemies of the homeland]. The extent of the coverage demonstrates
the emphasis on rallying support by evoking images of patriotic Cubans not
giving up, even in the most hopeless circumstances:
" ...el hombre es capaz de sobreponerse a las mas duras condiciones si
no desfallece su voluntad de veneer, hace una evaluaci6n correcta de
cada situaci6n y no renuncia a sus justos y nobles principios" [...man is
capable of overcoming the toughest conditions ifhis will to win does
not weaken, he makes a correct evaluation of every situation and does
not renounce his just and noble principles] (Granma, year 30, n. 148,
27 July 1994: 1).
The word principios presupposed the principles of the revolution known to all
Cubans. In addition, the article insisted Cumpliremos el mandata martiano
[We will fulfil Marti's mandate] (Ibid: 1), using a metaphor from national
mythology to suggest the need to fulfil the historical mission of Cuban
forefathers.
The US Threat and International Solidarity
A number of issues of Granma, including that of the 220d July, brought news
about the United States expecting to receive the go-ahead from the United
Nations to intervene in Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy launched in
September). The texts were written in a rather factual style using expressions
such as indica, declare [indicated, declared], devoid oflanguage insulting the
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United States. This suggests a more cautious approach towards the only
remaining superpower (Granma, y. 30, n. 145,22 July 1994: 1). The discourse
painted images of a potential US military deployment in the very proximity of
Cuba, perhaps suggesting a similar threat for Cuba as it was becoming
encircled by the US army in real terms - the threat evident and very close.
Issues closer to August brought reports of expanding international support for
the Cuban cause against the US embargo, which included, for example, reports
not only from the rest of Latin America, but also from Canada: Congreso
colombiano demanda cese del bloqueo contra Cuba [Colombian Congress
demands cessation of the embargo against Cuba] (Granma, y. 30, n. 117, 11
June 1994: 1), Se opone Canada a aislar a Cuba [Canada is opposed to the
isolation of Cuba] (Granma, y. 30, n. 124,22 June 1994, Orlando Oramas
Leon: 1). The discourse reported the diversity of positions in capitalist
countries and implied opposition to the United States even within the capitalist
camp, thus discrediting this unilateral US policy.
The press also brought encouraging assurances that the economy had already
started improving, and further partnerships and contracts with foreign
investors were being signed. In this way, the discourse was countering the
increasingly tense atmosphere, which former government employees
described, during interviews conducted on the island, as tense, unusually silent
and charged with anger (Pastor Brigos, Havana May 2010). The positive
messages focused not only on the growth of the tourist sector, maintenance of
healthcare and social provision, but even on reports about growing extractions
of petrol on Cuban soil (Granma, y. 30, n. 131,2 July 1994, Ortelio Gonzalez
Martinez: 1). Such messages had a significant role in improving the chances
for loyalty of the population, based on their expectations about the near future
(Granma, y. 30, n. 144,21 July 1994, Silvia Martinez: 1). The theme of
improving economic outlooks was strongly present during the pre-crisis
period, implicitly asking the Cuban public to further stretch its patience:
Debemos convertir el patriotismo en respuestas mas eficaces [We have to
convert patriotism into more effective responses] (Granma, year 30, n. 154,4
August 1994b, Fidel Castro: 4-5).
Slh August Disturbances
In sum, during the disturbances in Havana and the subsequent migratory crisis,
the discourse increased the emphasis on a number of themes, with an
underlying patriotic message. Those involved were interpreted as anti-patriotic
anti-social elements allied with the United States and trying to destabilise the
island internally. It interpreted the US threat as aimed against all Cubans,
rather than the political system, hence requiring a patriotic response from all
the people to defend their national independence, one of the most valued
master signifiers of Cuban political culture. Since the disturbances were
organised from abroad, the implication was that there were no worries
whatsoever about the system itself. The perpetrators were interpreted as
weakening Cuba internally at a difficult time, which was not patriotic and thus
condemned by everyone. They were pictured as a small minority, facing an
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overwhelmingly loyal sweeping majority. Emigration received a new
meaning, as a common phenomenon, driven by economic motivations and
thus common in the developing world, to which Cuba belonged. Castro
demonstrated his charismatic leadership skills, as a legitimate leader by the
side of the Cuban people, boldly facing yet another incident in the long history
of imperial aggression. The criminal United States was in a weaker position,
fearing another Mariel that righteous Cuba could unleash any time. Many
condemnations were aimed at the United States, for its encouragement of
illegal emigration, inciting violence and highjackings, which were
endangering Cuban civilians. The details of US immigration policies were
examined in detail to demonstrate the internal contradictions and nonsensical
rules. The outcome was interpreted as a euphoric, nation-wide revival of
revolutionary energy and commitment. Patria was again something to actually
die for. The discourse used more neutral language compared to 1980 Marie!'
On 3rd August, a ferry La Coubre was hijacked and piloted towards the United
States with several passengers thrown overboard. Cuban patrol boats were
reported to have been ordered to avoid further incidents after the sinking of the
}30 Marzo tugboat on 13th July. On the 5th August, civil disturbances erupted
in Central Havana in the areas ofNeptuno and San Rafael, spreading towards
El PradolPaseo de Marti and the Malec6n, with some Cubans also mentioning
Obispo, as the area where some of the best dollar shops in Havana were
located, with stones having been thrown at displays and the police. Castro was
later reported to have confronted the angry crowd in person, turning the mood
in his favour (although surprisingly no photographic evidence is available).
During a live broadcast on the evening of 5th August, Castro gave his account
of the events to the nation and Granma published the transcript the following
day. To send the main message, Castro argued the meaning of these events to
represent another manifestation of popular support and renewed confidence in
the revolution. The title of the article presupposed widespread support, based,
above all, on patriotism: No ha sido en vano la cantidad de semillas de
patriotismo que se ha sembrado en estos mas de 35 aiios [The amount of seeds
of patriotism sown during the past 35 years has not been in vain] (Ibid: 4).
With this metaphor, the title referred to shared revolutionary history, with
patriotism as the uniting component. By using the word semillas, the title
implied growth of popular support, with a tone suggesting confidence in the
country's direction dating all back to 1959, linking the present day to symbolic
historical events. Castro was praised by one of the presenters for his
charismatic presence facing the rioters in person, renewing his profile as an
effective leader and hero:
"...el Comandante venia a pie, bajando por todo Prado, que lleg6 hasta
la esquina del Malec6n ...Su presencia en la calles ...algo extraordinario"
[...the commander came by foot, down along Prado, all the way to the
corner of Malec6n ...His presence in the streets ... something
extraordinary] (Granma, y. 30, n. 157,6 August 1994a: 4).
The usc of words such as extraordinario and references to the positive
outcome of the incident contained an underlying message, that the events did
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not represent a crisis, but instead a renewed faith in the leader, and implicitly,
in the system. Castro described how, after receiving news about attempts to
hijack another boat in Havana harbour with apparently no engine fitted, further
information arrived about algunos disturbios ...desordenes [some
disturbances ...disorder] (Ibid: 4). Castro suggested the inadequacy of those
involved, Le. disloyal Cubans, in contrast with the organised and strengthening
revolution, backed by its supporters, painting a picture of overwhelming
support. Castro's use of terms painted a picture of a small-scale event for
viewers in the rest of the country, contradicting any images of mass riots that
would have suggested widespread discontent. On the contrary, the language
implied that the event was insignificant by juxtaposing it with the
overwhelming support that ensued. Therefore, the legitimacy of the system
was not harmed.
Castro, as the leader and physical representation of the revolution,
demonstrated confidence and renewed its essence. Castro referred to the
events specifically as provocaciones [provocations] and termed those involved
as perturbadores [rioters] (Ibid: 4), suggesting that confident, loyal Cubans
would not have been challenged nor threatened. Castro also appealed to the
audience by humorously describing his motivation for attending the
disturbances in person, suggesting his unquestionable confidence:
" ...yo queria tambien recibir mi cuota de piedras y de disparos. [No es
nada extraordinario!" [...1 also wanted to recei ve my share of stones
and gunfire. It is nothing extraordinary!] (Ibid: 4).
He spoke as a seasoned and confident revolutionary fighter, always in the
front line, without any doubts. The text exemplified his genuine commitment
to the revolutionary project, as its legitimate leader able to intervene in
difficult times. It revived the legendary Sierra Maestra history, relating it to
the events of the day, as the crucial source of popular support and legitimacy.
Castro's account demonstrated commitment and closeness to the people,
including those who might have lost faith in the system, thus exemplifying
leadership skills and trust:
" ... tenia el interes especial de conversar con nuestra gcnte, para
exhortarla a tener calma, paciencia, sangre fria, no dejarse provocar,
puesto que yo me se de memoria todo el plan del encmigo y toda la
concepci6n imperialista acerca de los medios para liquidar la
Revoluci6n, su actual estrategia" [...Ihad a special interest to converse
with our people, to encourage them to be calm, patient, cold blooded,
not to let themselves be provoked, because I know by heart the whole
plan of the enemy and the whole imperialist conception about the
means to liquidate the revolution, its current strategy] (Ibid: 4).
Here, Castro referred to nuestra gente, presupposing the large numbers still
committed to the revolution that, instead of giving in to small-scale
provocations encouraging violence to destabilise the system, would inevitably
follow his example of treating the events as an essential moment of revival,
reasserting the historic duty to stop the enemy. With the expressions la
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concepcion imperialista and todo el plan del enemigo, he evoked images of
past US actions against Cuban independence, such as the 1901 Platt
Amendment and the official US occupation from 1906, appealing to popular
sentiment that would incite support for the revolution. In addition, the multi-
signifier la concepcion imperialista, might have also referred to Marti's
warnings about the United States' threat to destroy Cuban independence. The
language linked Cuban historical experience to the events of the day, re-
labeling history as actual.
Rioters and Hijackers as an Instrument of Imperialist Aggression
The rioters were interpreted as an instrument of the enemies of the revolution
abroad, placing them beyond the protective boundaries of Cuban nationalism,
and making them de facto enemies of the patriots who were united to preserve
their independence. The rioters would have to face anyone with patriotic
attitudes, regardless of their ideology, defending the revolution as a
representation of justice, patriotism and commitment to social equality. They
were interpreted as the enemies of all, linked to the imperialists, and hindering
the country's economic recovery. Such an interpretation would have most
probably evoked anger from most Cubans looking for an improvement as soon
as possible:
"como instrumento de subversion, y, finalmente, como instrumento de
intervencion en nuestro pais .... La estrategia imperialista ... de dividir a
la poblacion conducir nuestro pais a un conflicto, a un bafio de sangre
... presiones para tratar de dificultar nuestro esfuerzo con vistas a
salir del periodo especial" [as an instrument of subversion and finally
as an instrument of intervention in our country ... The imperialist
strategy ...to divide the people ...conduct our country into a conflict, into
a bloodbath ...pressures ...to try to hinder our efforts to get out of the
special period] (Ibid: 4).
By using the word intervencion, Castro built up the message of an immediate
real threat taken literally and very seriously in Cuba. At the same time, the
word was often used to refer to past US involvement, and therefore carried
even stronger meaning for Cubans. The nation was threatened by the
imperialists, a term which presupposed the automatic identification of this
term with the United States and anyone else opposed to revolutionary Cuba.
The issue of emigration from the Cuban side was used as a weapon to threaten
the United States, recalling from national memory the image of the victorious
example of 1980 Mariel: ...ellos tomardn todas las medidas para prevenir otro
Mariel [...they \\111 take all measures to prevent another Mariel] (Ibid: 6). The
hijackings that took place earlier that year were interpreted not as a sign of
discontent, but instead as part of a universal phenomenon, stimulated by the
embargo:
"El fen6meno migratorio es universal y, sobre todo, se produce desde
los palses que tienen desarrollo hacla los paises que tienen mas
desarrollo econornico; pero en el caso nuestro no era Cuba la que
limitaba la salida ....el bloqueo es un instrumento que compulsiona las
119
salidas ilegales ..." [The migratory phenomenon is universal and, above
all, is from developing countries towards more developed countries,
that have more economic development; but in our case it was not Cuba
who limited the departure ...the blockade is an instrument of
compulsion of illegal departures] (Ibid: 4).
Elsewhere in the text, the term el pueblo luchando [fighting people] was
juxtaposed to disturbios [disturbances], suggesting the divide between the
rioters and the rest of Cuba. The interview contained a frequent use of
provocar, provocaciones, suggesting external factors aimed at destroying the
nation. Castro continued building up and reinforcing the image of a plan of
aggression, linked to the rioters, indirectly discouraging the undecided to rebel
and further encouraging the loyal, again repeating the image of a master plan,
omitting any internal problems or discontent:
" ...la causa? Estos incidentes de ahora son parte de todo un plan y de
toda una estrategia de Estados Unidos .... su plan integral para destruir a
la Revolucion" [...the cause? These incidents are now part of a whole
plan and the entire US strategy ...its complete plan to destroy the
revolution] (Ibid: 4).
The text presupposed the validity of the argument, by placing it into a
commonsense context (todo el mundo sabe), based on the shared knowledge
of past skirmishes with the United States. The text explicitly defined the
peaceful position of Cuba based on superior moral qualities:
"To do el mundo sabe que la Revolucion Cubana tiene una tradicion de
decir la verdad en todas las circunstancias Y que la Revolucion Cubana
nunc a ha mentido ....este problema se podria resolver mediante una
sincera colaboracion entre Estados Unidos y Cuba, que no la han
querido hacer, porque son demasiado demagogos, son demasiado
hipocritas, son demasiado cobardes ... " [Everybody knows that the
Cuban revolution has a tradition of saying the truth in all
circumstances and that the Cuban revolution never lied ....this problem
could be solved by sincere collaboration between the United States and
Cuba, which they do not want, because they are too demagogic, too
hypocritical, too cowardly ...] (Ibid: 4-5).
The use of the word sincera highlighted the ongoing dishonest behaviour of
the United States, implying that the difficulties to which Cubans were exposed
were unnecessary, as a boatlift could have been arranged at any time. This
demonstrated the non-problematic interpretation of emigration, interpreting it
as an ordinary flow of economic migrants towards developed countries.
Hence, emigration did not represent a delegitimising issue for the leadership.
This interpretation reminded that Cuba was part of the developing world, and
the main cause of its economic hardship was linked to the US embargo. Castro
contextualised illegal migration, arguing that Cubans were interpreted in the
United States as escaping from a ruthless communist regime, but were in fact
not different from Mexicans dying at the fenced US-Mexican border, built to
keep them out. Nor were they different from Haitian rafters. This was
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presented as proof of US hyprocrisy in using a migratory issue in a defamation
campaign, ignoring the support the revolution enjoyed from the Cuban people.
The compassionate nature of Cuban authorities implicitly denying images of
an oppressive regime, was suggested in its orders:
"Saben que los guardafronteras cubanos no les van a disparar, aunque
les disparen no van a disparar a la lancha de pasajeros porque hay
ancianos, hay mujeres, hay nifios, hay personas que no tienen nada que
ver con el secuestro, que son inocentes." [They know that the Cuban
coastguard will not shoot at them, if they shoot they will not shoot at a
passenger boat because there are elderly, women, children, people that
have nothing to do with with the hijacking, who are innocent.] (Ibid:
5).
The language emphasised the criminal character of the rioters, as well as of the
United States as their benefactor, with the two juxtaposed closely next to each
other, indirectly associating the two. The language also included frequent use
of words such as nosotros [us], nuestro pais [our country], lucha [fight],
batalla [battle] and guerra [war], while many verbs were in the first person
plural tense, all implying the situation of the unified Cuban people facing
another fight in a series of battles of its war of independence. The repetitive
use of nosotros, referring to Cuba as a whole, also assumed a majority support,
omitting any possibility ofintemal disunity. The language referred to the
definition of the 1990s as a Special Period in Times of Peace, when the
leadership called on to the people to defend Cuba in a war-like situation, in
times when all depended on their loyalty, instead of on the Soviet Union. The
seriousness of the situation was communicated by the juxtaposition of terms
such as Guerra biologica [biological war] and nuestro pais [our country],
suggesting a possible annihilation of the independent Cuban nation, reviving
similar accusations from the 1980s (Ibid: 4). The image was built up to convey
the seriousness and the life-or-death situation. To stress the message explicitly,
the text frequently used destruir la Revolucion [destroy the revolution] or
planes genocidas, sus planes criminales, sus planes tntervencionistas contra
Cuba [genocidal plans, its criminal plans, its interventionist plans against
Cuba] juxtaposed to nosotros, thus assuming the United States (often referred
to as "they") to be against all Cubans and not just the revolution, its leadership
or ideology. The repetitive use of nuestro pais [our country] reinforced the
patriotic message in the midst of the build-up of images of a total annihilation,
to encourage Cubans through their shared memory to mobilise in support of
the system.
"No sera la primera vez, ya hubo una vez que hasta tuvimos amenaza
nuclear ... Y de los revolucionarios es la Patria y de los revolucionarios
es la independencia, y los que estan encargados de defenderla. Y todos
saben con que paciencia hemos nosotros tolerado todas estas cosas ...
Las provocaciones de hoy llamaron al combate a la gente, porque yo
hacla mucho tiempo que no veia a la gente con el espiritu con que la
vela hoy en la calle." [It will not be the first time, we already were
once under a nuclear threat ...The homeland is of the revolutionaries,
and independence is of the revolutionaries, and of those that are called
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to defend it. And all know with what patience we have tolerated all
these things. Today's provocations called the people to fight, because I
have not seen for a long time the people with the spirit with thich I saw
them in the streets today] (Ibid: 6-7).
Finally, Castro explicitly reaffirmed the evidence of fresh confidence, and
implicitly the stability of the system. The language appealed to individual and
group self-esteem of the public, and blamed the United States for the crisis.
Within the context of this intepretation, the legitimacy of the system was not
challenged and loyalty was not questioned. This was confirmed by one of the
presenters in the programme, describing the crowd's reaction to the arrival of
Castro as euphoric. The country was assumed to be in a war-like situation
under attack, evoking symbolic moments from revolutionary history as well as
the Bay of Pigs invasion, building an image of a symbolic revival of the
revolution:
" ...una euforia tal que creo que eso es 10 que habran sentido los
milicianos en Giron ...fue 10 que sentimos nosotros hoy, porque Ibamos
por todas las esquinas gritando Viva Fidel!".cantando el Himno
Nacional, cantando el 26 de Julio, y que, de repente, Fidel aparcciera
entre nosotros, creo que eso no hay palabras con que describirlo, y
volvemos a vivir 10 que nuestros padres vivieron en Giron" [...such
euphoria that I think that is what the militia of the Bay of Pigs must
have felt...it was what we felt today, because we went through all the
streets shouting Viva Fidel]. ..singing the national anthem, singing the
26th July song, and suddenly, Fidel appeared among us, I believe there
are no words to describe it, and we return to live like our parents lived
during Bay of Pigs] (Ibid: 6).
By referring to Giron and the national anthem, the message incited feelings of
revolutionary victory and triumph countering any sense of doubt or lack of
commitment, by activating the culturally-bound content of Cuban national
consciousness. The juxtaposition of current events with historical references
gave them meaning beyond the events of the day. Cubans were called to unite
and hold fast to their ideals in the new post-Cold War neoliberal context, as
the last remaining heroic fighters for justice, independence and revolutionary
values:
"Como nos hemos quedado casi el unico adversario del imperio, toda
su mali cia, toda su perfidia y todo su poder se concentra contra
nosotros, asi que es dura y dificil esta batalla, pero no Ie tenemos
miedo a esta lucha." [.... As we are now almost the only adversary of
the empire, all its malice, all its perfidy and all its power concentrates
against us, as hard and difficult as is this battle, but we do not fear
them in this fight.] (Ibid: 6).
Despite some derogatory images, the overall content of the hegemonic
discourse was less confrontational and insulting than in 1980, possibly due to
the recent imbalance in international relations. The event was later described
in an article on 13th August, which praised Castro's direct participation despite
122
any risks, always close to the people (Granma, y. 30, n. 164, 13 August
1994b, Susana Lee: 8). Discontent or declining support for the system was not
considered while support was emphasised, thus leaving no doubts about the
system's future, based on the residual support for 1959 revolutionary
nationalism. Castro's appearance in person during the disturbances affirmed
his image as an effective leader enjoying widespread support, ready for bold
action when necessary, true to his words and ideals at the forefront of the
confident revolution.
Victory, Large Scale Support Rallies and Heroic Patriots
The victorious and positive interpretation of the outcome of the incident
continued in the weeks to come as support marches were organised, similar to
after 1980 Mariel (Granma, y. 30, n. 158,7 August 1994: 1). The participation
was described as including a multitud [multitude] implying widespread
support, and the victims of the incidents as exemplary heroic patriots: muerto
en el heroico acto de defender la dignidad de su Patria [killed in the heroic
act of defending the dignity of his country] (Granma, y. 30, n. 159, 8 August
1994a, Oria de la Cruz: 1). The rioters and hijackers continued to be referred
to mostly as antisociales, contrarrevolucionarios [counter-revolutionaries] or
simply as elementos inescrupulosos [unscrupulous elements] (Ibid: 1). The
nationalistic expression vendepatrias [those who sold their country] was used,
but infrequently (Granma, y. 30, n. 159, 8 August 1994, Orfillo Pelaey e
Isabel Moralea: 3). In some rare cases, they were also referred to as rats:
"Los antisociales, como ratas que son, se combaten a pufio
limpio ...Como las cosas en el pais estan dificiles, los enemigos piensan
que por fin van a ganar. Creo que olvidan: cuando los revolucionarios
salimos, las ratas que tiran piedra se esconden." [The antisocial
elements, like the rats they are, are fought with a bare fist...As things in
the country are difficult, the enemies think that they will finally win. I
believe they forget: when we the revolutionaries go out, the rats that
throw stones hide.] (Granma, y. 30, n. 159,8 August 1994b: 2).
Similar to 1980, the difficult times for the revolutionary project were
interpreted as an opportunity to cleanse society of weaker, disloyal elements.
The popular marches were described as un acto de reafirmacion
revolucionaria [...an act of revolutionary reaffirmation] (Ibid: 2), and other
encouraging language included expressions such as defenderan siempre [will
always defend] or una alta moral combativa [high fighting morale] (Ibid: 2),
again building up images of popular support. The expression su decision
assumed spontaneous participation. The text juxtaposed nationalist signifiers
such as independencia and Patria with the threat from enemigos infernos y
externos, again interpreting the rioters as an instrument of the United States:
"los revolucionarios salieron ...para manifestar en actos publicos su
decision de defensa de la libertad e independencia de la Patria y su
conviccion de que los enemigos internos y externos no tienen futuro ni
ahora ni nunea." [revolutionaries went out...to express in public their
decision to defend freedom and independence of the countrylhomeland
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and their conviction that internal and external enemies do not have a
future, not now or ever.] (Ibid: 2).
An article about Alfredo Rodriguez, who was in charge of one of the hijacked
boats, appeared in the issue of 8th August. Rodriguez was presented as an
exemplary patriot, loyal even when offered the possibility of emigrating. The
language suggested a link between the family, the Communist Party and the
homeland, constructing them as one and interdependent:
"Soy comunista, militante del Partido, tengo familia, un nicto que
quiero y no traiciono ami Patria" [I am a communist, a Party militant,
I have a family, a grandson whom I love and do not betray my country]
(Granma, y. 30, n. 159,8 August 1994e, Sara Mas: 2).
The unity of the islanders was expressed explicitly in another article titled
Morir por la Patria es vivir [To die for the homeland is to live]. The article
evoked strong patriotic images, stressed by the fact that the title of the article
quoted a passage from the Cuban National Anthem, which most Cubans would
have knows as common sense. More accusatory language against the United
States was used by Raul Castro during his speech printed in the same issue.
Raul stepped up the emphasis on the seriousness of the enemy's intentions, by
using words such as derrocar [subvert], produzca un baho de sangre
[produces a blood bath], or reimplantar su dominio neocolonial [reinstate its
neo-colonial domination] (Granma, y. 30, n. 159, 8 August 1994g, Raul
Castro Ruz: 4-5). He too linked the disturbances as part of the hostile US
strategy aimed against Cuba's nation-building project:
" ...hostilidad norteamericana contra nuestro pais y forma parte del plan
estrategico del imperialismo para liquidar a la Revoluci6n Cubana"
[...US hostility against our country and is part of the strategic plan of
imperialism to liquidate the Cuban revolution] (Ibid: 4).
As was the case in the discourse in general, Raul interpreted the whole
nationalist project into one coherent and consistent package of several
concepts presented as indivisible:
" ...muerto defendiendo la libertad, la dignidad y la independencia de su
pais, ha muerto defendiendo la Patria revolucionaria y el Socialismo."
[...killed defending liberty, dignity and the independence of his
country, he died defending the revolutionary fatherland and socialism.]
(Ibid: 5).
In another speech, Raul Castro referred to the rioters as gusanos [worms],
vendepatrias, traidorzuelos [those-who-sold-their-country, traitors], and los
anexionistas de este siglo [the annexationists of this century], strengthening
the condemnations (Granma, y. 30, n. 160, 9 August 1994a, Raul Castro Ruz:
3). Raul recalled the concept of the annexationists from national memory, who
had been willing to give up their absolute national independence, thus
betraying the aspirations of the recognised Cuban national heroes and martyrs.
This link was aimed at mobilising hatred against the rioters. More importantly,
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Raul suggested that patriotism was not a choice, but a duty: los deberes para
con la Patria [duties to the fatherland] (Ibid: 3), thus constructing a singular
subject position for the public presented as the only socially acceptable. He
followed with a warning to dissenters, by quoting Marti:
"Todo 10 que se oponga a la Revoluci6n sera destruido por ello." [All
that is opposed to the revolution will be destroyed by it.] (Ibid: 3).
By recalling Cuban heroes including Cespedes, Marti, G6mez and Maceo,
followed by Fidel, he reiterated the connection between Fidel as the leader of
the revolution and its historical origin, thus indirectly arguing for the historical
legitimacy of the system as fulfilling the nation's aspirations to sovereignty.
Subsequently, Raul used another expression stressing the authentic-
endogenous character of the revolution, as another source of legitimacy, based
onpilares de la cubanidad [pillars ofCubanness] (Ibid: 3).
On 8th August, another hijacking took place, which resulted in the death of
Roberto Aguilar Reyes. The following day, Granma published the reaction of
Aguilar Reyes's mother, who confirmed her support for her son's fulfilled
duty for the nation in the extreme spirit of Patria 0 Muerte. The language
suggested the main message demonstrating a lack of options, forcing the
audience into a simplified position, leaving support for the system as the only
alternative, from all the moral, historical and patriotic perspectives:
". ..el fue valiente, y se muri6 defendiendo la Revoluci6n, no tengo
derecho a acobardarme, aunque llore inconsolablemente, porque es un
combatiente, un revolucionario que salio de mi vientre .... El hizo 10
que tiene que hacer un cubano digno." [...he was brave, he died
defending the revolution, I have no right to cowardice, while crying
inconsolably, because he is a fighter, a revolutionary I gave birth to .
...He did what every decent Cuban has to do.] (Granma, y. 30, n. 160,
9 August 1994d, Haydee Leon Moya: 8).
By juxtaposing the words combatiente with revolucionario, the language of
the interview suggested a link with the concept of the Sierra Maestra fighter,
having the duty to make the utmost sacrifice for his or her country. As in
1980, the mother of Aguilar Reyes confirmed her support for the sacrifice, and
encouraged others to follow with total commitment. Compared to 1980, the
language of the article largely avoided insults. In the same issue, Aguilar
Reyes was described in a biographical summary as having demonstrated
incondicional apoyo a la Revolucion. [unconditional support for the
revolution] (Granma, y. 30, n. 163, 12 August 1994b: 2), as an exemplary role
model of a patriotic Cuban.
In an article three days later, the language was somewhat sharper in a
transcript of Rear Admiral Pedro Perez Betancourt's speech, which referred
again to the reaction of the nieta de mambi [granddaughter of a mambi], the
mother of Aguilar Reyes evoking the image of Mariana Grajales, the mother
of Antonio Maceo, making Cuban mythology current:
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"[Me han matado un hijo, pero aun me quedan dos para seguir
defendiendo la Revolucion, y si cayeran tambien elIos, tendran que
matarme a mi entonces, porque voy a ocupar su puesto!" [They have
killed my son, but Istill have two to continue defending the revolution,
and if they also fall, they will have to kill me then, because I will take
their place!] (Granma, y. 30, n. 166, 15 August 1994a, speech
transcript, Pedro Perez Betancourt: 2-3).
Perez Betancourt evoked the legacy of the mambl independence fighters, and
described the rioters and hijackers as gusanos, delicuentes y antisociales
[worms, delinquents and antisocial elements] and mercenarios y anexionistas
[mercenaries and annexationists], who encountered la mano dura del pueblo
[the hard hand of the people] (Ibid: 2). The language suggested widespread
support and resistance from the unified Cuban people that would counter the
mercenarios, who had betrayed the homeland. The message indirectly warned
of the dangers of being identified as such a person and then confronting the
rest of the loyal people, thus encouraging conformity. Betancourt's speech was
one of the few instances when the word gusanos [worms] was used. This was
more of an exception in 1994, when compared to the frequent use of this term
in 1980.
Granma of 13th August continued with a five-page transcript of the appearance
of Fidel Castro on national television two days earlier. The key message
confirmed that the disturbances and hijackings were provoked by the the
United States to destroy the revolution, a guarantor of the country's
independence. Hence they did not represent reasons for any doubts about the
system internally. Charismatically, Castro tuned in the audience by starting
with a humble apology for the late hour of the transmission. The transmission
represented one of the key moments of interpretation, concluding and
demonstrating how to make sense of the situation. Initially, Castro used
neutral expressions such as analizar, rejlexionar [analyse, reflect], and
factually described the events of the most recent hijacking of the vessel
Unidad Militar 4349. Castro stressed the peaceful approach of the Cuban
authorities, but lamented the friendly treatement of the hijackers in the United
States as impunidad absoluta [absolute impunity], despite them using violent
means to leave (Granma, y. 30, n. 164, 13 August 1994a: 2-6). This suggested
the immoral behaviour of biased US authorities. He put a construction on the
United States as against nuestro pueblo [our people] (Ibid: 2), rather than
against the Cuban political leadership or the system, directing the threat
directly at the people, with the embargo aimed at all Cubans as a sovereign
community.
Castro implied the inferior position of the United States, referring to
emigration as a Cuban weapon, and indicated he was losing patience and
might soon permit otro Mariel [another Mariel]. The language also evoked the
meaning of Mariel, retained in Cuban national memory as a victory. Castro
referred to emigration as ...fenomenos migratorios norma/es de esta epoca.
[...normal migratory phenomenon of this period.], supporting the transformed
meaning of migration (Ibid: 3). Later in the programme, Castro mentioned
rumors about the Miami-based Cuban-American community planning to allow
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unrestrained killing in Cuba for three days, if they returned to the island. Thus
he was feeding fears of possible consequences resulting from a political
change, presented as a direct threat to all Cubans rather than the political class.
Castro used repeatedly the word guerra [war] and warned of the Miami
opposition:
" ...un infierno de terror. Satanas podria contratar alIi un buen numero
de gente para los peores salones del infierno ... " [...a hell of terror.
Satan could contract a good number of people there for the worst parts
of helL.] (Ibid: 5).
Castro called the United States idiotas [idiots], and followed with a description
of the US military base in Guantanamo as un campo de concentracion de 20
000 haitianos. [a concentration camp of 20 000 Haitians] (Ibid: 5), ridiculing
the United States and evoking an image of Nazi Germany and Spain to
condemn the immoral enemy in the midst of issues appealing to popular
sentiment (Le. embargo, Guantanamo), He again conveyed clearly the
underlying main message that the situation was the result of US migratory
policies, instead of Cuba's internal problems.
The discourse during the rest of August 1994 continued within the same spirit
of a victorious interpretation of the outcome of the crisis. The perpetrators
were mostly referred to as elementos contrarrevolucionarios [counter-
revolutionary elements] (Granma, y. 30, n. 165, 14 August 1994a, Sara Mas:
1). Report of widespread popular support marches continued, providing
evidence of the final victory: Impresionante reafirmacion del apoyo de
nuestro pueblo a su Revolucion [Impressive reaffirmation of support of our
people for their revolution] (Granma, y. 30, n. 166, 15 August 1994c, Enrique
Atienzar Rivero e Isabel Moralea: 1). The word reaffirmation suggested the
link with past support and its renewal, while the revolution termed as su was a
representation of the people. As in 1980, Cuba and its people were understood
as the winners: Salgamos al combate con la certeza inconmovible de la
victoria [We go into battle with unwavering certainty of victory] (Granma
Internacional, year 29, n. 33, 17 August 1994, speech transcript, Raul Castro
Ruz: 12-13).
Castro Reiterates Key Messages
Perhaps the next most important article summing up all the major events of
August was published in Granma on 26th August 1994. It was a transcript of a
televised interview with Fidel Castro (Granma, y. 30, n. 175,26 August 1994,
Fidel Castro Ruz: 1-7). Castro summarised the past three months and
constructed their meaning, repeating and justifying most of the key messages
examined so far. He reiterated the moral superiority of the Cuban position:
.... .la unica razon que puede tener la administraci6n norteamericana
para hacer estas cosas es la raz6n de la fuerza, mientras que nuestras
razones son los principios, la moral, la dignidad, el honor y la verdad"
[...the sole reason that the US administration can have to do these
things is the reason of force, while our reasons are the principles,
morality, dignity, honour and truth] (Ibid: 4).
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To support his argument, Castro condemned anti-Cuban interpretations of the
crisis by US officials, presenting Cuba as a brutal regime, referring to it as El
regimen de Castro [the Castro regime] (Ibid: 2), a label out of context on the
island with the public constantly reminded of the real benefits the revolution
had brought them. Castro reiterated the violence used by the hijackers and
their disregard for ordinary passengers, suggesting they were the ones to be
condemned, contrary to their glorification by US authorities as heroes. In this
way, Castro discredited the arguments of the United States. lie referred to the
disturbances of 5th August as:
"Acciones vandalicas de elementos contrarrevolucionarios y
antisociales en la Ciudad de La Habana, asociadas al sccucstro de
embarcaciones para emigrar, provocan la respucsta del pueblo
revolucionario de la capital" [Acts of vandalism by counter-
revolutionary and antisocial delements in the City of I Iavana,
associated with hijackings of boats to emigrate, provoke the response
of the revolutionary people of the capital] (Ibid: 4).
By referring to the riots, he was clearly suggesting that there was no need to
ignoring them as they did not represent a threat to the legitimacy of the
system. The language confirmed that the rioters were most of all against other
Cubans supporting the revolution. He condemned the decision to
accommodate the migrants in Guantanamo, thus violating Cuban sovereignty,
and drawing attention to an issue that received automatic support from all
patriots. He once again pointed out that ...el bloqueo economico es el elemento
compulsor esencial y fundamental en estas salidas ilegales masivas [...the
economic embargo is the essential and fundamental compelling element for
these massive illegal departures] (Ibid: 6). To support this point, he argued that
Cuba would not persecute those departing, since no other country such as
Mexico did so, as there were tanta gente queriendo emigrar [so many people
wishing to emigrate] for economic reasons (Ibid: 6). By contextualising Cuban
illegal emigration, Castro reiterated the message that migration was a common
phenomenon, especially in the region, implying there was no need to worry
about it in relation to internal instability.
During interviews conducted by the author in Cuba, it was also confirmed that
the permitted migration was approached by the authorities as unproblematic
for the revolution, and there were even cases where Cuban police assisted
rafters with transporting their rafts to the sea (May 2010, Dr. Jesus Pastor
Garcia Brigos, Institute of Philosophy, Havana).
After the Storm: September to December 1994
From September onwards, the discourse continued in an increasingly factual
style. It continued covering the issue of emigration as further negotiations with
the United States were taking place, repeatedly affirming the future of the
achievements of the revolution despite the economic difficulties (Fidel Castro,
Speech at the closing of the World Meeting of Solidarity with Cuba, 25
128
November 1994). Cuban classrooms may have been full of students unable to
concentrate due to empty stomachs, but the country was bound to continue,
and changing course was interpreted as cowardly weakness. This encouraging
message was contradicting the situation on the ground, where, according to
testimonies, some were eating soups from banana peelings. (Havana, May
2010).
Organised marches to express popular support continued filling the pages and
social pressure on participation was increased, as the language included
expressions such as convocar [to summon], reajirmar voluntad, pasion,
unidad y jirmeza revolucionarias [to reaffirm revolutionary will, passion,
unity and firmness] (Granma, y. 30, n. 181,3 September 1994a: 1). Rather
than the ideological base of the system, the emphasis on patriotic attitudes
kept increasing, reflected in expressions such as: marcha patriotica [patriotic
march], or defensa moral de nuestro pais [moral defence of our country]
(Granma, year 30, n. 184,8 September 1994, Octavio Lavastida: 1). The
underlying message was that comitted loyalists, with their apoyo
incondicional [unconditional support] in the end defeated the weak anti-social
elements (Ibid: 1).
An article on 14thSeptember entitled Poner en orden las ideas [Putting ideas
in order] is an example of the final interpretation of the events, allowing
Cubans to make sense of the situation. The article negated any images ofa
crisis and instead communicated a meaning: Vivimos un gran instante de la
Revoluclon [We are living a great moment of the revolution] (Granma, y. 30,
n. 188, 14 September 1994b, Armando Hart Davalos: 4). The article
distinguished the system from its former allies in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, distancing it from their collapse. The discourse continued
emphasising the cultural aspects of the system as a Hispanic construct:
"Como muestra la tragica experiencia de 10 que se llam6 'socialismo
real' ... la defensa a ultranza de nuestra identidad, pertenencia a
America Latina y el Caribe." [As demonstrates the tragic experience of
what was called 'real socialism' ...the uncompromising defence of our
identity, belonging to Latin America and the Caribbean.] (Ibid: 4).
The text interpreted the post-Cold War reality as part of a disorderly
'postmodernidad' a la que se ha caracterizado como 'explosion del desorden'
[... 'postmodemity' that is characterised as 'an explosion of disorder'] (Ibid:
4). The message was that Cubans were to value the stability of their own
endogenous system in the new disorderly global context. Unity was assigned
the highest priority, while diversity represented anarqufa en el pensamiento
[anarchy in thought] (Ibid: 4). In such times of unpredictable change, only the
orthodox revolutionary nationalistic path was desirable. To achieve unity and
stability, revolutionaries had to act: no de manera discordante ni hipercritica
[not in a divisive or hypercritical way], but rather in loyal support of nuestra
obra [our work/project] (Ibid: 4). The article provided an interpretation,
explaining what was happening abroad, and the meaning of these events for
the revolutionary future of Cuba.
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Another article examined the causes of the migratory crisis, with migration
still at the centre of the national debate. It argued that the event was
internationally called the crisis of balseros cubanos [Cuban rafters], but this
was actually not so, since it was strategically generated from abroad. The
article made clear that emigration arose from: motivaciones estrictamente
economicas 0 de reunificacion familiar [...strictly economic motivations or for
family reunification] (Granma, y. 30, n. 181,3 September 1994b, Susana Lee:
4). The period of permitted illegal emigration was even described as [xodo
masivo de emigrantes cubanos ilegales [massive exodus of illegal Cuban
migrants] (Ibid: 4). The article reported about the contradictory fact that the
United States was trading with Vietnam, North Korea and China, but not
righteous Cuba.
The discourse followed the reconciliatory approach towards the United States
at a time when Cuba was struggling economically and its political leadership
was worried about the loyalty of the population. The issue of migration
continued to fill the pages for the rest of the year. An article from 10,h
September brought news about agreements regarding 20,000 visas annually
for Cubans. The negotiations were described as reaching compromisos
[commitments] (Granma, y. 30, n. 186, 10 September 1994a: 1), suggesting
improving relations. The article also reported that
"Ya no se estimularan salidas ilegales, ni se recibira automaticamcnte a
los que lleguen a sus costas de esa forma, ni qucdaran impunes cl uso
de la violencia ni los secuestros de barcos y avioncs para obtencr estos
fines. Problemas absurdos ...no se habian solucionado en mas de 35
anos, se abordan ahora con racionalidad y espiritu de respeto a las
leyes de cada pais." [Illegal departures will no longer be encouraged,
nor will those that arrive at its coast be automatically received in this
way, nor will people using violence or hijackings of boats and
airplanes for these purposes be unpunished. Absurd problems
that...have not been solved in more than 35 years are addressed now
with rationality and a spirit of respect for the laws of each country.]
(Ibid: 1).
The use of words such as encourage suggested the intentional misuse of
emigration as a political weapon by the United States. The underlying message
was of Cuba's victory with regard to the migration issue. Emigration was not
negative publicity, and migrants were no longer enemies:
"Conocemos cuales son las causas fundamentales que en este momento
compulsan la emigraci6n masiva, que son de orden econ6mico, y por
ello nos proponemos seguir luchando incansablemente contra el cruel
bloqueo ... " [We know what are the fundamental causes that in this
moment cause massive emigration, which are economic, and therefore
we intend to continue fighting tirelessly against the cruel blockade ...]
(Ibid: 1).
The language focused on factual information and to some extent
reconciliation. It mentioned soluciones sought by the Cubans in the absurda
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politica de agresiones [absurd politics of agression] of the United States.
(Granma, y. 3D, n. 188, 14 September 1994a: 1). This emphasis on
cooperation and reconciliation was rather new to the hegemonic discourse as it
emerged after the crisis. An interview with Ricardo Alarc6n again attributed
migration to the embargo: bloqueo ...elfactor principal que compulsiona a
algunas personas a emigrar [embargo ...the principal factor that forces some
people to emigrate ...] (Granma, y. 30, n. 18, 16 September 1994a, Susana Lee:
2). Alarc6n used the word persona [person] to describe the migrants unlike
terms such as "scum" used in 1980, implicitly confirming their new status. In
the interview, Alarc6n used very diplomatic language such as: dialogo,
discusiones, or negociaciones [dialogue ...discussions ...negotiations], while
negative expressions were targeted specifically at the Cuban opposition based
in the United States, described as mafia contrarrevoluctonaria [counter-
revolutionary mafia] (Ibid: 2). The opposition was presented as separate from
the US government, suggesting improving relations with US authorities. The
language suggests that in the new unipolar global context, the Cuban
leadership, aware of its diminishing defence, was rather careful. In addition,
Alarc6n also warned that some illegal migrants would be repatriated, which
supported the change in the perception of emigration, as Cubans were now to
be treated as other migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean.
Cuba's position in the new global context increasingly dominated by liberal
democratic rhetoric as a set of guidelines for building functioning, just and
pluralist political systems was examined in an article printed on 18th October.
The article analysed the liberal democratic model and interpreted its meaning
in the Cuban context as democracia liberal burguesa [bourgeois liberal
democracy] (Granma, y. 3D, n. 212, 18 October 1994, Roberto Regalado: 4). It
then presented the problems of such systems, which implicitly Cuba did not
have, such as clientelism, fraud and effective exclusion of some parts of
society:
"El neoliberalismo excluye a grandes sectores poblacionales de
participar en la vida nacional... Lo cierto es que quienes propugnan un
cambio del sistema politico en Cuba no estan interesados en la
dernocracia, sino en que nuestro pais tambien se 'acople' al llamado
nuevo orden mundial." [Neoliberalism excludes large sectors of the
population from participation in national life ... It is certain that those
who are advocating a change of political system in Cuba are not
interested in democracy, but that our country also 'attaches' itself to
the so-called New World Order.] (Ibid: 4).
The text reconstructed the meaning of neoliberalism as anti-democratic and
argued in favour of Cuba's democracia real [real democracy] emphasising
participation and social inclusion. Hence, the new neoliberal global agenda
was not a programme to bring real freedom, development and accountability,
but instead represented los nuevos mecanismos de dominacion global [new
mechanisms of global domination] (Ibid: 4). This implied that maintaining the
orthodoxy of the Cuban model was right. The discourse assumed that the
system remained beyond questioning and doubt, while the meaning of the new
global context was clear.
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Interestingly, the discourse referred to the complex issues of liberal democracy
and the concept of political change, and instead of omitting these issues,
reinterpreted them with an altered meaning in order to integrate it into the
Cuban field of meaning. The uncertain times were linked to the whole of the
South American region. Stability was interpreted as the safest choice, while
other developing nations were slipping into ever worse exploitation driven by
the imperialists (Granma, y. 30, n. 207, 11 October 1994, Jorge Luis Batista:
1). The language suggested that independence of the homeland was at stake,
instead of communist ideology. In this way, the language appealed to Cuban
nationalism to generate support. No matter how influential the Washington
Consensus was to become in the former Soviet Union or in South America, it
was going to fail and Cuba, which had to fulfil its historical duty to defend the
right to its own, legitimate, home-grown model against any US led orthodoxy:
"...un destino ajustado a sus necesidades y a su proceso hist6rico,
equivale a defender el derecho a la pluralidad de caminos frente a los
dogmas politicos y econ6micos que se pretcnde universalizar." [...a
destiny adjusted to its needs and its historical process, is equivalent to
the right to plurality of paths against political and economic dogmas
that they pretend to universalise.] (Granma, y. 30, n. 241, 26
November 1994b: 1).
In December, Bohemia brought news about changes in world politics. focusing
especially on South Africa, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, sending an
underlying message that the world was in constant flux as ever, including the
recent changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Bohemia, y. 86, n. 25,
9 December 1994c, Alexis Schlachter: 4-9). This confirmed the overall
message of the uncertainty of the changing times of the day. The issue
confirmed that Cuba was not isolated and continued to enjoy wide
international support (Bohemia, y. 86, n. 25, 9 December 1994f, Susana
Tesoro, Alberto Salazar, Luis Sexto: 32-34). Throughout the end of the year,
the converage continued focusing on economic improvements iGranma, y. 30,
n. 253, 14 December 1994: 1).
After the main disturbances and migratory crisis, the discourse remained
focused on the topic of emigration until the end of the year, covering
continuing negotiations with the United States. The United States were
interpreted as having lost and retreated before a confident and victorious Cuba.
At the same time, the language avoided using overtly insulting expressions
addressed to the United States, instead emphasising conciliatory discussions.
Overwhelming, unconditional support of the patriotic loyalists was reported,
implicitly demonstrating the support for the legitimate revolution as an
expression of Cuban patriotism, with socialism guaranteeing independence
and the achievements of the revolution. The underlying message was that the
system was finally rejuvenated, and its fortunes would soon change after the
doubts of the early 1990s - the revolution was still alive and well. The system
represented a predictable and safe option in the midst of uncertain times of
flux, where neoliberalism as yet another form of imperialism was gaining
ground. The revolution offering real democracy thus had to fulfil its role of
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protecting the interests of Cubans against the threat of the Cuban-Americans
and foreign exploitative interests.
Concluding Observations
Over all, the press coverage contained less insulting language compared to
1980 Mariel. Expressions such as escoria or gusanos [scum, worms] almost
disappeared from the discourse in comparison to 1980, when such expressions
were used frequently. Instead the rioters were labelled mostly as counter-
revolutionaries, traitors and vendepatrias [those who sold their country], and
the migrants were interpreted as economic. The United States was constructed
as a self-contradicing loser. The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act, granting Cuban
illegal immigrants arriving in US waters automatic right to asylum (Gott 2005:
213-214, 299), was denounced as hypocrisy and a political weapon. The crisis
was interpreted more as a problem for the United States, with Cuba more
concerned with theft and violence caused by US policies, rather than the
specific individuals involved in hijackings and disturbances. The crisis was
interpreted as the result of incompetent US policies aimed at destabilising
Cuba, instead of the island's internal problems. This implied that the system
retained all its legitimacy. In 1994, Cuban hegemonic discourse shifted to
more diplomatic language compared to 1980, possibly due to the new
unfavourable position in global politics in which the island lacked the
military-strategic backing of the USSR.
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Part III: Findings
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Chapter 6
6. 1. Analysis of Evidence
The evidence provides a detailed insight into the mechanics of the hegemonic
discourse, allowing us to understand better how Cuban authorities sought to
communicate with the public and how they interpreted current issues. It
demonstrates what sources of legitimacy were called upon to maintain loyalty,
and how the discourse reflected popular concerns to offer appropriate
responses as a capable system in control of the situation. It allows us to
identify the sources of legitimacy, and their change over time. The two
episodes tell us how the discourse functioned in difficult times, to understand
Cuba better. Further insights can be derived from a comparison of the two, to
observe changes and shifts in the discourse, in relation to internal challenges
and the new post-Cold War global context. These observations allow for a
better understanding of the ways in which the system argued in favour of
stability, shedding further light on how the country remained stable after 1989.
Comparing the Mariel and Maleconazo Episodes
The hegemonic discourse from the pre-crisis period focused similarly in 1980
and 1994 on encouraging economic prospects, and presented supporting
evidence in confident language. 1994 however was set in the extremities of the
unprecedented hardship of the Special Period, unlike the relative prosperity of
the 1980s. The Cuban leadership reported the seriousness of the situation, and
placed it in relation to the uncertainties of post-Cold War international politics.
The 1994 discourse urged Cubans to remain loyal to their patriotic cause and
called for patience, endurance and commitment, assuming this was the way to
test real revolutionary qualities. This evoked the revolutionary heroes, who
had continued their campaign under incredibly adverse circumstances and
eventually prevailed. From this experience well embedded in Cuban national
memory, Cubans were expected to follow suit. The future was painted in
positive language, assuming another victory soon to come, as in 1959 (Cuban
revolution), 1961 (Playa Giron), 1962 (Cuban Missile Crisis), or 1980
(Mariel). In 1994, the discourse was more factual and used fewer insults,
denunciations and anti-American terms, compared to the language used in
1980, which used derrogatory terms against the United States at a higher
frequency. Despite some parallels with the pre-crisis coverage of 1980 Mariel,
which also focused on good economic performance, the coverage from 1994
was clearly addressing the desperation of the population by more strongly
presenting evidence of developments that would positively affect the near
future. The headlines talked about growing confidence, favourable conditions
or optimism, and the discourse was as encouraging and morale-raising as
possible.
As a key source of legitimacy, the US embargo against Cuba was denounced
even more than in 1980 as the main cause of material destitution, following
the collapse of the Soviet Union and tightening of the embargo in 1992. It was
assumed that difficulties were the result of external factors, rather than any
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internal causes such as widespread theft or possible inefficiencies of the
centrally managed economy. Some internal problems, such as private
profiteering and the black market were also covered, but only in a way
conceivable within the context of Cuban communism. In 1994 especially,
Cuban communism was left beyond questioning and doubt, despite the post-
communist transitions in other parts of the world. Instead, commitment and
the individual behaviour of Cubans as revolutionaries, not sufficiently
following the communist revolutionary principles, were examined together
with external causes. The discourse rejected a radical change in socio-political
terms, and instead, Cubans were to renew their commitment, in order to
maintain the social achievements of the revolution that they valued. Similar to
1980, in 1994 Cuba was portrayed in the media as not isolated, but instead
enjoying worldwide support. During both years, statements from communist
and socialist groups from around the world were presented in a way that
indirectly suggested that they represented their respective countries, and
critical groups were not reported. This was likely to have increased the
approval for the positions taken by the Cuban leadership.
The main message in 1980 was that Cuba was being attacked by the United
States, who was receiving Cuban criminals as heroes. The 1980 discourse used
migration for concrete political purposes, stressing the war-like relationship
with the United States, describing those involved as an unpatriotic scum of
Cuban society. Hence in 1980, Cubans shouted in the streets [Que se vaya la
escorial, while in 1994, popular marches focused more on demonstrating
support for the government and denouncing the politics of the United States.
By not reporting Cuban success stories abroad, the discourse increased the
impact of its messages and provided a particular interpretation of given issues
consistent with the positions of Cuban communism.
Compared to 1980, in 1994 the topic of emigration and those involved was
interpreted in a different light. In 1994, those involved were described with
less insulting or even somewhat neutral language, while in 1980 the discourse
contained a high frequency of insults and derogatory language. In 1980, the
discontents and migrants were constructed to a much larger extent as anti-
social criminal elements, rats, worms and scum, opposed by loyal and
righteous revolutionaries. This transition to a non-problematic and non-
poltical meaning of emigration was already evident at the end of the 1980
crisis, signifying an earlier recognition that emigrants were no longer
necessarily enemies. This shift since 1980 is confirmed by the evidence from
1994 when migrants were clearly interpreted primarily as economic and the
rioters as desperate Cubans, suffering the consequences of the US embargo. In
this sense, they were presented more as victims than as criminal elements, as
had occurred at the beginning of 1980 Mariel. In 1994, they were set in the
context of the embargo aimed at a developing country, and the collapse of
Cuba's socialist allies, caused by the imperialist United States and its allies-
emigration in such a situation was implicitly somewhat understandable.
Therefore, the migrants and rioters, except for hijackers, were not attacked
individually, since the causes were perceived as external. The 1966 Cuba
Adjustment Act was denounced, and the discourse interpreted the United
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States as the aggressor, positioning Cuba as open to talks. In 1994, Cuba
criticised US hypocrisy in not issuing legal visas but still accepting illegal
migrants, thus encouraging more hijackings and crimes connected with illegal
emigration (Granma, y. 30, n. 181,3 Sepcmbcr 1994b, Susana Lee: 4). In
1994, migrants were occasionally called vendepatrias, due to the patriotic
emphasis of the discourse looking to unite the people. But in general, they
were no longer depicted as traitors. The discourse seemed to imply that not all
Cubans living abroad were opposed to the revolution, allowing for a
perception of diversity in the diaspora. In addition, it explicitly presented
evidence of friendly relations with Cubans living abroad (eg. work camps,
conferences).
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The La nacion y La emigracion conference for example, was held in Havana
from 22 until 24 April 1994, to demonstrate the initiative from the Cuban side
to normalise relations with Cubans living abroad (www.nacionyemigracion.cu.
2011). The event was organised for Cubans not committed to hostile acts
against the island (Rodriguez Chavez 1997: 96). The conference was another
real example of a shifting interpretation of emigration, announced publ icly.
The conference welcomed 221 emigrants from thirty countries, and was
followed by the opening ofan office at the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs
responsible for relations with non-radical emigrants (Antonio Aja Dlaz 2000:
11-12). The topics discussed included ways of facilitating visits to Cuba,
student exchanges, permission to use private accommodation with relatives,
and the new status of Cubans residing abroad: Permiso de residcncia en el
exterior (Ibid.). As a result of the new meaning of migration and relations with
migrants abroad, the system started to distinguish between batistianos or
mafia contrarrevolucionaria and Cubanos resldentes al extranjero, who were
not necessarily radically opposed to the system.
The issue of emigration was not addressed in any way as an attack at the
legitimacy of the system, and neither as an internal problem. By presenting the
context of common migration from developing countries in the rest of the
world, and the high level of migration from Latin America and the Caribbean
in particular, the discourse portrayed the issue as a common phenomenon. In
addition, the discourse acknowledged that many emigrants were leaving to
unite with relatives already living abroad. Hence, migration was
understandable, representing a threat for the United States rather than Cuba.
The discourse included concrete references to the 1980 Mariel boatlift as a
weapon against the United States. In 1994, the subject of emigration took
longer to dissipate, as the United States was negotiating a change of policy.
This change signified the truth in the shifting perception of Cuban migration,
not only in Cuba, but also abroad - Cubans were now common economic
migrants suffering the wrath of the embargo. This new meaning had a rather
legitimating impact on the Cuban system.
In both 1980 and 1994, the system provided arguments related to current
issues, which were developed in-depth, even if from a pro-governmental
angle, provided by highly trained and experienced intellectuals, political
leaders, journalists, academics and other opinion leaders. The underlying
common sense was that Cuba had no need to deny facts or hide information,
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as the accusations from its oponents were false. Re-examination of such
claims was sufficient to prove the superiority of the Cuban position.
Credibility was implicitly based on historical legitimacy, with the revolution
as the heir to the mass revolutionary movement. Issues and concepts used to
denounce Cuba were given alternative meanings, and were then presented as
the only possibility based on truth. This was done at times directly and bluntly
by the use of insults and condemnations, but often also subtly by presupposing
the general knowledge of Cuban history and past events. Alternative
interpretations were implicitly discredited, where Cuba was true and righteous,
while the United States as the main symbol of opposition was criminal and
evil. In such an extreme and disproportionate confrontation of a small
Caribbean country with the mightiest world superpower, the discourse
assumed that diversity outside the official political structures in such a war-
like situation was dangerous. For this reason, those ready to venture beyond
this boundary were automatically perceived as enemies.
"[The Cuban leaders] have claimed the legacy of Cuban history as their
mantle of legitimacy, and they deny the possibility that there might be
alternate ways of defending the homeland and promoting justice."
(Marifeli Perez-Stable in Baloyra & Morris 1993: 79).
During both years, the discourse showed a high level of interactivity with
other discourses, by taking in the adversary's ideas, concepts and arguments,
instead of omitting or denying them, and reinterpreted them within its own
context of Cuban national history and ideological make-up. Hence, rather than
fearing negative claims aimed at the system, it modified and extended their
meaning in order to reveal a hidden truth in them and provide Cubans with the
whole truth, which it perceived as reduced by its enemies for political
purposes. Even if not included in mainstream publications, the liberal concept
of civil society, for example, was modified in the context of the Cuban
discourse, to represent mass political organisations in Cuba. Such re-
interpretations channelled the meaning to have a legitimating impact, as
instead of simply rejecting claims against the system, they were reinserted into
the discourse with altered meaning reinforcing the existing field of meaning
available to Cubans. This was a strategy for the long-term survival and
stability of the system, as omitting facts and accusations would have only
postponed their arrival and might have threatened the system by allowing
these facts to retain the meaning intended by Cuba's critics. Instead, by
interacting with them and modifying their meaning, they no longer represented
a threat, as their meaning had been made favourable. This generalisation of the
discursive strategy provides an insight into the system and its ability to
maintain long-term stability before and after the end of the Cold War, despite
unfavourable circumstances such as the post-1989 liberal democratic
hegemony on a global scale.
This interactive character of the discourse can be perceived as stronger in
1994, since in 1980 the country had less to worry about with the backing of a
powerful strategic ally. The empathetic nature of the discourse could be
attributed to various explanations, one of which is the unequal structural
relationship between Cuba and its economically and militarily stronger
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adversaries. Cuba, unlike the Soviet Union for example, could not rely on its
military force, and historically had to confront other cultures and discourses
from a minority position. Hence rather than military strength, the country had
to develop a discourse encouraging loyalty. In addition, the personal
leadership of Castro, and his tactic of reinterpreting claims against him and the
country in front of his audience in Cuba, is another possible explanation of the
empathetic nature of the discourse, following his example.
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In 1994, the discourse had to deal with a number of other issues, which were
not present in 1980, as global politics were vastly different after the end of the
Cold War. For this reason, the discourse in 1994 had to address the post-1989
transitions, with the emergence of the United States as the victor of the Cold
War, and the resulting prestige and symbolic legitimacy. Elsewhere, this
increased US influence in other countries as a political and economic model.
This was however filtered into the discourse through the ideological lenses of
the centrally controlled media, and the coverage was simplified to fit Cuba's
national politics and continuing focus on internal stability. Therefore, the
collapse of the Soviet Union and transitions in Eastern Europe were examined
without a specific reason for this to have happened, other than US aggression.
The events were given meaning only in relation to the disappearance of
valuable economic support, and Cuba's perseverance in response. In Granma
and Bohemia, the events were simplified into factual information about the
disappearance, without considering the arguments used by other groups
abroad, who interpreted the collapse as caused by economic inefficiency,
internal divisions, inherent contradictions and lack of popular support,
amongst other reasons that would have potentially had a negative impact on
related models such as Cuba. Within the discourse, the Socialist camp simply
plunged into chaos that Cuba had to avoid. The Soviet Union was understood
as taken over by the imperialist enemy, i.e. the United States. Pre-1989 crimes
committed in Eastern Europe, such as labour camps and persecution of
dissident groups, coupled with poor economic performance were not
considered. It was not covered, as it could have opened the door to a
questioning of possible parallels with the Cuban model, built on a somewhat
similar ideological model, with many Soviet and Eastern European consultants
advising on the island during the 1960s. In this way, the system avoided a
potentially delegitimating issue.
The harsh changes in other former communist countries emphasised the
negative effects of a transition. In this way, the political changes were
interpreted into the discourse in a way to support the stability of the system,
without causing harm to its legitimacy. Sudden collapse, transitional chaos and
economic recession in previously allied countries were not an attractive
picture for Cubans, who were thus more likely to value the guaranteed social
provision, stability and predictability of their own system. Since the revolution
was originally based on mass popular support, Cubans, unlike many Eastern
Europeans under the occupation of Soviet tanks, had a system genuinely of
their own. With such a meaning of the transitions, communism and socialism
were not discredited and continued to represent legitimating ideological parts
of Cuban society. Within this interpretation, the underlying message was that
economic and other difficulties on the island, or persecution of critics outside
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the revolution, were required as a protection because of external factors. The
communist system was interpreted as guaranteeing Cuba's independence in
view of the collapse of the Socialist bloc, so the system gainied even more
importance in a world where Cuba had to face the United States without
external help.
Similarities (and Some Differences)
Similarities between the two crises include most of all the constant and
consistent references to patriotism as a consensual source of legitimacy in the
discourse, which may have also contained implicit anti-US references. In
1980, however, patriotism was not as prominent as at the end of the crisis and
even less so when compared to 1994. Cuban officials killed during violent
incidents received substantial coverage, as patriotic heroes. During both crises,
mothers of the killed followed a similar pattern of exemplary mothers, ready
to sacrifice everything for the revolution and the independence of the nation.
They both fitted the model of Bertolt Brecht's Mother Courage, evoking
images of Mariana Grajales, the mother of Antonio Maceo. Anti-US attitudes
were incited as an important drive to overcome challenges to ensure Cuban
independence, resisting, overcoming and defending national independence,
dignity, homeland, and socialism. These were all integrated into the singular
master signifier of the revolution, worthy of the highest sacrifice.
The evidence from both periods demonstrates a strong focus on improving
economic outlooks for the near future, as an important source of legitimacy
and an element of encouragement for the public. This was more important in
1994, when the discourse focused on increasing tourism and new joint
ventures. The discourse in both cases included strong messages for Cubans to
follow the symbolic examples of persevering revolutionaries drawing from the
historical legitimacy of the Revolution, surrounded by difficult times and
hostile forces. Perseverance was required to keep the Revolution alive. This
was most important in 1994, after the collapse of communist allies, with a
possible negative impact on the stability during the 1990s. The discourse did
not question the communist model even in 1994, but looked for solutions to
ensure continuity, including a reorientation to tourism to pay for popular
revolutionary achievements as important sources of legitimacy. The only
conceivable reason for economic hardship in Cuba above all others was the
embargo.
During both crises, emphasis was given to historical examples where Cuba
was able to overcome any obstacles, such as Playa Giron. The threat to
national independence had the highest priority, requiring continuing
commitment from all Cubans. The use of words such as sacrificio [sacrifice]
suggested the seriousness of the situation. The possible loss of independence
was interpreted as a loss of collective as well as individual self-esteem, and
subjugation known from Cuba's colonial past, evoking feelings of cultural
inferiority and inequality. These were implicit issues that Cubans had fought
and were still fighting against, legitimating the system as a current expression
of these. In both 1980 and 1994, the central signifier in relation to which all
other signifiers were interpreted was the patriotic revolution and its ideological
fabric. In relation to this master signifier, the discourse suggested in 1994 that
a transition to a liberal democratic system would also mean the loss of the
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revolution as an inherently communist system. Committment was called for in
order to allow Cuba to survive as independent, maintaining its socio-economic
model despite the global trends towards neoliberalism. For this reason, an
ideological change would have also meant a complete reinterpretation of the
Cuban historical patriotic project valued by many Cubans: the slogan
iSocialismo 0 Muerte! in 1980 and iPatria 0 Muertel were taken seriously.
The meaning and causes of migration also had a direct impact on the
legitimacy of the system. Leaving aside the impact of the preceding migratory
crises of 1959 and the early 1960s, including Peter Pan and Camarioca 1965,
that are not part of this analysis, the perception of the issue shifted
significantly between 1980 and 1994. In 1980 the combination of a higher
number of seriously committed revolutionaries, together with a better
economic situation, may have led the system to interpret emigration and those
involved as criminal scum betraying their country to join its enemy. Already at
the end of the crisis in 1980, this interpretation started shifting towards
something not threatening the stability of the country, nor the loyalty of others.
By the end of 1980, and most clearly in 1994, therefore, Cuban migrants were
increasingly reclassified as ordinary economic migrants. In 1994 the extreme
hardship of the 1990s Special Period led desperate Cubans, encouraged by the
policies of the United States, to migrate along with many others from the
developing, exploited world. The United States was reported to be
contradicting itself: promoting illegal emigration while fearing a large exodus
of migrants, unpopular with US voters, on whose behalf the US government
had built a heavily guarded anti-immigrant wall between Texas and Mexico.
The discourse reported the difficulties of migrants in settling down, facing
cultural discrimination, job insecurity and poor working conditions. Hence,
during both crises, emigration was interpreted as complicated, which
implicitly and subtly discouraged it underneath the official non-problematic
posture of the Govenment.
In 1994, the discourse warned that all who wanted to emigrate would not be
allowed to do so, as they were gradually losing their politically motivated
immigration privileges in the United States. In 1994, the emphasis was on the
normality of the migratory phenomenon and its non-problematic perception in
Cuba, if committed without criminal means. The discourse in 1994 also
argued that the restrictive measures for illegal emigration were to protect
public assets, rather than Cuba trying to lock its people in. Cuba in fact wanted
the United States to fulfil their quota for legal immigration. For these reasons,
the migratory crisis and the issue in general was not a delcgitimating issue for
the revolution, as the discourse interpreted them in ways supporting the
system's legitimacy. Nor was it a problem for Cuba in 1980, as migration was
portrayed as against the domestic interests of the United States, allowing Cuba
to get rid of the worst elements of its society to refine its truly loyal, heroic
and morally superior base of revolutionaries.
Both in 1980 and 1994, emigration was articulated as not posing a threat to the
country's stability nor to the loyalty of the majority of Cubans. In 1994, some
of the migrants were transferred to Guantanarno Bay and elsewhere, where
they had to await their fate and the media reported their difficult position,
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which subtly communicated to all Cubans the difficulties connected with
illegal emigration. In 1994, the discourse also made references to Mariel, as a
threat to the United States rather than Cuba as part of Cuban national memory.
The discourse suggested the possibility of organising another boatlift at any
time, thus threatening Cuba's adversary rather than its own stability. Despite
the less insulting and derogatory language used in 1994, the discourse also
contained assumptions of the criminal character and derogatory interpretation
of those involved in the disturbances and emigration, even if to a much lesser
degree than in 1980. Implicitly, the system interpreted the perpetrators,
especially in 1980, as weak. and cowardly, as a possible reaction to such a rare
phenomenon of a societal division, which it was not used to as a system
emphasising unity, and discouraging political activity beyond the control of
the state and its ideology. During both crises, emigration was certainly not
interpreted as a symptom of declining support.
During both crises, the discourse communicated with a confident tone, with
messages well reflecting popular concerns, and addressing the most pressing
issues of the time from a historical perspective: los hombres aman a quien los
dirige confirmeza yjusticia ...Jose Marti [...men love those that lead them with
firmness and justice ..Jose Marti] (Granma, y. 30, n. 164, 13 August 1994b,
Susana Lee: 8). The underlying message was the same during both years: the
situation was being taken care of and victory was near. The discourse during
both periods contained frequent assumptions of the moral superiority of the
righteous Cuban position, which was a crucial source of legitimacy proving
the continuity of the Revolution as a project with a just cause, and a sacred
realisation of the patriotic dream. The ability of the system to respond to
popular feelings and preoccupations can be seen as one of its components,
which encouraged political involvement and had personnel assigned to
research public opinion and attitudes subsequently reflected in the media. This
could have been a factor in encouraging the loyalty of the population through
political communication, contributing to the over-all stability of the system.
During both crises, Castro played an important role as an opinion leader, with
his unique wit to put events and ideas into the context of his perceptions,
steering public opinion and providing directions to his political aides. In 1994,
despite his unordinary way of addressing the public by apologising for the late
hour of the transmission, and use of humour when describing his reasons for
attending the August disturbances to receive his "quota of stones and insults",
he also demonstrated and exemplified the readiness to defend the revolution
by standing in front as a heroic revolutionary. In this way, he demonstrated his
genuine nature as during the fights in the Sierra Maestra, once again reviving
the legend. The discourse during both periods relied on a significant amount of
his public speeches, which provided the most influential interpretations of
current issues, and demonstrated his continuing presence as an important
source of legitimacy, trust, confidence and loyalty, stemming from his
personality and past mythification along with Che Guevara and the heroes of
the 1958 independence campaign. By reviving the Revolution, Castro was
reviving the immense popular support on which it was originally based, and
which had granted its success. His unquestioned historical legitimacy in the
context of Cuban national memory, combined with his charismatic rhetoric
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skills in touch with his audience, provided a crucial link between the existing
system and the Revolution, thus stressing its legitimacy.
The unproblematic interpretation of both crises in the discourse was based on
the argument that these small scale events were encouraged by imperialist
counter-revolutionaries, and only provided a good opportunity to awaken the
revolution's supporters, who represented the vast majority of the public. This
delegitimated these crises in the eyes of the supporters of the system. Rather
than representing internal instability, the criminal acts and emigration of 1980
and 1994 were interpreted as further examples of provocations orchestrated
and financed from abroad, in order to destabilise independent Cuba, similar to
the covert Playa Giron invasion pretending a revolt in the Cuban army and
organised by the United States. The discourse emphasised in both cases the
defensive position of Cuba, facing constant attacks from the United States
despite Cuba's non-aggressive position. During both crises, the discourse
referred to extraordinary demonstrations of popular support and firm
revolutionary spirit as an important source of legitimacy. During both years,
the crisis was interpreted as a wake-up call for the nation. The resulting
message at the end of both crises was victorious, positive and encouraging.
Extensive attention was given to the support rallies, which were covered as a
popular response to the disturbances. Especially in 1994, these pro-
government marches were covered as an encouragement for the the system
amidst the extreme desperation of the Special Period. Even though the rallies
were centrally organised, they appeared as spontaneous rather than ritualistic,
such as the May Day march, and thus signified an important catharsis from the
economic crisis of the 1990s. They exemplified the continuing legitimacy of
the system in the eyes of the public, and were interpreted as a testimony to the
continuing vitality of the system, despite the increasing isolation of Cuba in
international politics of the 1990s. In 1994, the discourse expressed the
unnecessary nature of the ongoing migratory crisis endangering ordinary
Cubans in their daily lives, and suggested it was keen to negotiate to avoid
another Mariel, This represents an example of the non-problematic
interpretation of the two crises, and the ability of the system to overcome
potentially challenging moments.
After the crisis, the discourse reverted back to other issues in both cases,
returning to reports of encouraging developments in the country. In this way it
shifted the focus of the public to look ahead towards better times to come. In
1994, however, this change was much more gradual and mixed with the
continuing coverage of issues related to migration, while in 1980, the
discourse asserted complete victory, reported massive popular support, and
then reverted to other issues rather abruptly. In 1994, this shift was harder to
achieve as the then extreme hardship and lack of food supplies made it more
difficult to revert to normality. Even if in 1994 the discourse demonstrated the
legitimating expressions of public support, it still had to confront the largely
unreported situation on the ground where some desperate Cubans in a situation
of near famine were eating soups from banana peelings, and thus might have
had continuing doubts about the system. The hegemonic nature of the
discourse enhanced the chances that Cubans would remain loyal to the only
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model they knew well. In this case, not necessarily because of another source
of legitimacy, but simply by silencing alternatives.
Both in 1980 and 1994, the discourse focused on emphasising the positive
features of the system, i.e. the achievements of the revolution, as key sources
of legitimacy. In 1980, the comparison with the US system, perceived as
exploitative and insecure, was stressed whereas in 1994 continuing support for
the system was seen as a guarantor of luxuries unknown in many other
countries in the region and in the developing world at large. Defending the
recognised achievements of the revolution also meant defending the system
that made them possible. leading to stability based on loyal support. Stability
in Cuba was put in contrast with violence and instability in other countries.
This contrast enhanced the legitimacy of the system, despite any internal
challenges or criticism. It also made Cubans aware of the complexities of the
world and the apparently idealistic life in the United States. The discourse
interpreted the country's problems in a pro-establishment way, and gave the
public a direction for the future within the existing political structures, thus
supporting continuinty and stability.
During both years, the central signifier of e/ imperio referred exclusively to
the United States, despite the fact that Cuba was extending its cooperation
with countries built on a somewhat similar socio-political model as the United
States, who were often US strategic and political allies (more so in 1994 than
1980). Because the disturbances and hijackings were provoked by the the
United States to destroy the revolution, the historically legitimate guarantor of
the country's national independence, there were no reasons for any doubts
about the system, even after the recent collapse of other communist countries.
In both years, the hostility of the United States provided useful ammunition
for the Cuban leadership to claim legitimacy for its decisions domestically, to
protect the country and its citizens.
Shifts between the Two Periods
Mariel and the maleconazo took place in vastly different historical contexts,
which had some inevitable impact on the discourse in Cuba. The world
beyond Cuba was reported by the media through the official ideological lenses
of the communist Party. interpreting reality in a way to construct an image of
the world that would enhance the legitimacy of the system. Internal
transformations of the system were reported as supporting the historical
sources of legitimacy and most of all the future of the revolution as a symbol
of national independence and egalitarian social provision guaranteed by the
state and its ideological foundations that were to be kept despite any pro-
market changes. These represented improvements of the existing system,
rather than doubts or reconsiderations of the basic foundations on the level of
political philosophy or political economy. Unlike in 1980, the discourse in
1994 reflected the new global context and the transitions in formerly
communist countries, many of which had adopted the guidelines of
neolibcralism and capitalism. No matter how influential the Washington
Consensus was in the former Soviet Union, its former satellites or in the South
American region, it was going to fail in Cuba, which was to fulfil its historical
duty to defend the right to its own, legitimate, home-grown model.
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The neoliberal discourse abroad influenced the discourse in Cuba, which
publicly rejected it, while the country extended international trade agreements
with the European Union, encouraged tourism from capitalist countries and
increasingly spoke about improving competitivity and efficiency. The
discourse rejected the concepts of neoliberalism, labelling them unsuitable and
illegitimate for Cuba and its own path towards development, originating from
its own endogenous historical experience. The reaction of the discourse to its
neoliberal variant provides another example of its constantly evolving reactive
nature, which due to the central control over the media could have also opted
for partial or complete omission. Instead, in 1994, the discourse reacted to the
current situation abroad, and promoted the legitimacy of its own model in
response. It analysed the situation and focused the attention of the public on
the less attractive sides and weaknesses of competing models, such as
transitional problems in the former communist countries, or the inability of
neoliberal and capitalist models to bring levelled development and social
provision, often leaving the weakest members of society to self-help. From
this perspective, the poor had little to offer and could not pay for education,
provided by the state in Cuba as a basic human right.
Events and ideas beyond the discourse were interpreted within its conceivable
horizons. Their meaning was constructed and modified to be in favour of the
existing structure. Omissions in 1994 and in 1980 included alternative
arguments and analyses of reality, such as the possible reasons that led to the
collapse of the Soviet bloc. As former strategic allies that had shared similar
socio-political models, they were interpreted from within the Cuban
ideological perspective, as doing otherwise would have potentially
destabilised the system. These omissions and one-sided analysis of competing
models can be understood as one of possible factor that enhanced the
country's legitimacy during the unstable times, especially during the 1990s. In
1994, the discourse contained references to Mariel as a victory followed by
mass displays of popular support. Cuban nationalism had a stronger presence
in 1994, despite the generally highly nationalistic nature of the post-1959
discourse. In 1994, Cuba's new partnerships and trade agreements with
Western European countries and Canada did not have a delegitirnating impact
on the revolution, which strived to survive by improving the declining quality
of life of the desperate population and by maintaining social provision. To
ensure the system's future was the highest priority, above the means to
achieve this. Defending the revolution was the supreme source of legitimacy,
implicitly nationalistic rather than ideological. In addition, in 1994 the sources
of legitimacy started shifting even more significantly towards the cultural
element of the revolution as part of Hispanic America, reviving this
component of the revolution dating back to the 1960s. This reshuffled the
reasons for keeping the system above ideology. Referring to Marti's Nuestra
America, this was another reason for Cubans to remain loyal to the revolution
as the legitimate expression of Cuban-Hispanic cultural distinctiveness,
defending Cuba as a cultural community. The cultural character was enmeshed
in the ideological content of the revolution without a clear demarcation line,
thus supporting the legitimacy of the system as a whole.
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In 1994, the discourse used some insults to refer to the United States, but less
than in 1980, as the discourse shifted towards a more neutral and diplomatic
approach, reflecting the loss of security backing by the Soviets. In 1994, the
overall impression of the discourse was not as confrontational compared to
1980. Popular support, based on residual revolutionary patriotism, was
emphasised. The outcome of the crisis in 1994, as the worst year, was
understood as an important turning point when morale was renewed. This was
crucial, given that, in 1994, there were fewer committed revolutionaries than
in 1980 (Rogelio Letuse, Havana, May 2010). In both years, a key emphasis
was on the historical legitimacy of the revolution and the system, as a
successor to Cespedes, Marti, Gomez and Maceo, followed by Fidel, as the
leader of the victorious Revolution. The underlyling key source of legitimacy
was the ability of the system to fulfil the historical aspirations of the nation to
sovereignty, and its ability to defend it. Cuban patriotism and culturalism were
still highly relevant sources oflegitimacy, and therefore, so was the
underlying ideology of the system, that was to be kept.
In 1994, the meaning of socialism and the revolution was modified,
mentioning less frequently the egalitarian ethos of the system in terms of
distribution of material resources, but instead putting a major emphasis on the
egalitarian aspects of universal healthcare, education and social provision as
factors still relevant in 1994, which the system promised to maintain as
important sources of legitimacy. Education and social provision were assumed
to be strengthening the nation-building process of a developing country,
aggressed by the bloqueo. While the system could no longer prevent the
impact of the black market, tourism and other factors negatively influencing
the egalitarian ethos, it was able to guarantee with pride the achievements of
the revolution. At the same time, socialism was redefined as patriotism and a
major component of the revolution. In 1994, patriotism (or nationalism) was
the prominent source of legitimacy, relevant to all, as a result of Cuba's
endogenous historical development and opposition to the US embargo.
Socialism represented an expression of patriotism, rather than a label making
Cuba part of the socialist bloc that no longer existed, and may have appeared
obsolete or irrelevant to some. If redefined as patriotism and state-provided
benefits, then Cuban socialism (or communism) was still highly relevant. This
was the case even more so in view of the perceived chaos in formerly
communist countries. Both in 1980 and 1994, Patria retained its legitimating
force in the Cuban nation-building project, but the importance of patriotism
was somewhat more prominent in 1994. The unexpected 1980 crisis shocked
the system more than in 1994, when the economic crisis made disturbances
more predictable. The 1994 crisis represented a threat of a possible social
disintegration, which, potentially, most Cubans feared. The crisis symbolically
represented the end of the worst of the Special Period, and thus acquired a
positive meaning. Emphasis on patriotism gained more importance in the
1990s, when communism was being challenged abroad. The discourse
frequently incited anti-US nationalist sentiment, with the United States as a
symbol of the multi-party capitalist model, thus feeding the distaste for its
political model. The discourse used the embargo to legitimate the system, as
able to stand up to the embargo as a heroic revolutionary, reaffirming the
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righteous ethos. In addition, the United States appeared to have retreated in
1994, supporting the image of a victorious Cuba.
The ability of the system to deliver material prosperity had clearly disappeared
since the 1980 edad de oro. Hence, as a source of legitimacy. this disappeared
and the system had to shift emphasis elsewhere to maintain popular support.
The system promised a swift recovery. At the same time, it emphasised other
sources of legitimacy, along with the perceived value of predictability and
stability of the existing system. To some extent, the system resurfaced some
sources of legitimacy that went back to the 1959 to 1961 period. Nationalism,
culturalism, historical legitimacy, and emphasis on social provision regained
more importance than socialism or material prosperity. The major shift can be
summarised as moving from an emphasis on socialism, patriotism, anti-
Americanism, Castro and material prosperity to patriotism, social provision,
historical legitimacy, anti-Americanism, Castro, culturalism and an implicit
unpredictability of a transition symbolised by the situation in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. The system, judged by its reflection in the discourse,
shifted towards emphasising additional sources of legitimacy that had been
used before. The cultural aspect of the system was again emphasised as a
source of legitimacy relevant to all Cubans and well enmeshed in Cuban
patriotism and anti-US attitudes. The cultural was enmeshed in the ideological
without a clear demarcation line, thus supporting the legitimacy of the system
as a whole. During both crises, Castro provided a crucial link between the
existing system and the Revolution. Thus, some sources remained or were
reprioritised, while some were muted. These shifts were subtle, often
contained in suggestions or assumptions, instead of direct public
announcements, allowing the country to maintain a minimal standard of
legitimacy already perceived by Hawkins in 2001 (Ilawkins 2001: 77).
The discourse assumed that individuals with different opinions were morally
questionable individuals, or anti-social elements, and hence their contributions
were illegitimate. The discourse left out minority discourses and alternative
analyses of reality that did not fit the hegemony, which ensured the stability of
the field of meaning that sustained the system. The discourse argued that
hegemony and unity were necessary due to the disproportionate position of
independent Cuba in a war-like situation, allowing some diversity only within
its secure structures. The discourse retained its dominant position in the media,
and provided an endogenous construction of reality, which, if we speculate.
may have appealed to large sections of the Cuban public. The interpretation of
reality provided by the discourse, as the main source of the identities and
consciousness of most Cubans from an early age, may have contributed to the
approval for the actions of the leadership. It may have been a significant force
to counter moderates, the coerced, dissenters, and the outright opposition. The
discourse may have been effective due to its high level of coherence.
analysing events in depth, and carefully weaving together sources of
legitimacy into a compact, hegemonic discourse (or theory and worldview)
legitimating the system. These legitimating components were all closely
weaved together under the label of the revolution, and presented as
inseparable, continuously suggesting that dropping one would inevitably mean
the end of the whole patriotic project. The discourse provided a starting point
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for all subsequent analysis, and represented a discursive horizon, where
attempts to look beyond were discouraged. The discourse portrayed itself as
the only morally acceptable alternative to defend the interests of Cuba as an
independent nation. This may have contributed to the discouragement of a
possible transition to a pluralist political system during the 1990s in parallel
with other formerly communist countries, and the system maintained relative
stability in the post-Cold War era despite the turbulent times.
Both in 1980 and 1994, the central signifier in relation to which everything
else was articulated was the Revolution. In relation to this master signifier, the
discourse suggested in 1994 that a transition to a liberal democratic system
would also mean the loss of the revolution, as an inherently communist,
egalitarian, emancipatory and humanistic system. Commitment was called for
to allow Cuba to survive as an independent nation, maintaining its socio-
economic model despite the global trends towards neoliberalism. This link to
independence provided immediate legitimacy for the whole system as its
representation. Defending the revolution was the supreme source of
legitimacy, implicitly nationalistic rather than ideological. The ability of the
system to respond to popular sentiment and changing circumstances can be
seen as one of its key components, potentially and only partially explaining its
longevity.
Sources of Legitimacy: 1980 Mariel and 1994 Maleconaza
The examined evidence provides an insight into the mechanics and content of
the discourse, which reflected the changing sources of legitimacy to support
the system. The analysis demonstrates how the discourse was constructed in
relation to events of the time, and how it related to the deeply rooted
endogenous cultural codes on the island, and, most importantly, how it
developed and shifted crucial sources of legitimacy. On the basis of this
insight, further inferences can be made about the impact of the discourse on
the perceived legitimacy and hence stability of the system.
During both crises, claims against Cuba were examined and reinterpreted as
lies and deceptions, aimed to destroy the revolution as a noble nationalistic
and socially emancipatory project in the interests of patriotic Cubans, and
against the interests of foreign, exploitative, neocolonial-like groups. Topics
and concepts used in capitalist countries were reinterpreted, where the link
between the signifier and the signified was reconstructed to fit the
revolutionary discourse. The expression el regimen de Castro for example,
was reinterpreted as guaranteeing free healthcare and education and backed by
public support. In this way, such negative descriptors used abroad were
ridiculed. Hence, the discourse argued that, from the internal perspective, they
simply made no sense. They implicitly made clear that questioning of the
legitimacy of the system was out of place. During both crises, the discourse
interpreted such positions as misguided, misinformed, dishonest and therefore
invalid, with Cubans able to see through them. Such an approach reflected
widespread anti-US attitudes and encouraged loyalty. With the lack of widely
available competing interpretations, it would have been almost impossible for
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Cubans to imagine anything else. The discourse relied on the Cuban nation-
building context of a post-colonial society, and interpreted national
independence as the highest priority. Independence appealed to Cubans due to
their colonial past, remembered as a time of submission, corruption,
exploitation and enslavement by despised external actors. Within this context,
the historical sources of legitimacy were based on a "common sense" that the
system acted as the guarantor of this independence, appealing to popular
longing for emancipation from a history of submission. This historical context
provided an important starting point for the discourse and its patterns of
reasoning. Both in 1980 and 1994, strong emphasis on Cuba's right to
independence, which could not be challenged or negotiated in any way,
legitimated the system, with frequent references to Marti as an embodiment of
martyrdom. Independence was constructed as the highest priority, and the
most important source of dignity for Cuba as a nation, and Cubans as
individuals. Independence was valued above material well being, ideological
experimentation or pragmatic diplomacy. This view was perhaps not shared by
all Cubans, but it was a strong component of the discourse, which may have
appealed to a sufficient number of loyal Cubans, committed, in various
degrees of intensity, to the revolutionary project.
During both crises, the hegemonic discourse was highly ideologically
conditioned. Political concepts were articulated solely from the revolutionary
communist perspective. The country's communist ideology provided meaning
to other political concepts that had to be grounded in a theory. Democracy, for
example, was understood as within the scope of Cuba's own heritage of
egalitarian democracy, which required redistribution of property and a
regulation of property-relations, to achieve real democracy where citizens of
all social backgrounds were equally empowered. This was also reflected in the
political system and its practices. Government organisations were understood
as in need of being more protective, with the state acting as a policeman
against selfish individualism perceived as anti-social.
The discourse may have generated some loyalty on the basis of its endogenous
interpretations. The system may have survived the changing times of 1989
because of a number of factors, including the impact of the discourse as one
variable, enhancing the system's stability. The sources of legitimacy provided
reasons why Cubans should remain loyal. The sources remained to a large
extent the same. However the emphasis on some, their frequency of inclusion,
and their interpretation in relation to current issues varied. During crises, the
discourse relied strongly on the historical legitimacy of the system, which had
provided real benefits and was initially established on mass popular support.
The Revolution radically changed Cuban society and delivered real benefits as
a patriotic project. By the end of 1960, almost all U.S. and also Cuban-owned
firms were nationalised, while welfare provision, free healthcare and
education expanded dramatically (Hamilton 2002: 19). Shortly after the
revolution, private clubs and beaches were opened to the public, while
ordinary Cubans watched the humbling of the wealthy (Alfred Padula 1993:
19).
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During both crises, the discourse focused on Cuba as part of Latin America
and the Caribbean, contextual ising events and the system within the mix of
regional politics, references and issues. The country's media frequently
reported support abroad, political violence in other countries of Latin America,
or military involvement of the United States. With the Cuban national memory
aware of the regional historical heritage of endemic political violence, foreign
exploitation, ethnic and class conflict, and struggles for independence at the
doorstep of the regional hegemon, the discourse positioned the system in this
context. The context of foreign exploitation and lack of land reform in the
post-colonial countries of Latin America, where historically wealthy
landowners ruled over large land estates while many others lived in poverty,
worked in favour of the legitimacy of the Cuban system. The system prided
itself in having forced US corporations and large land owners out of the
country, emancipating the poor, landless and discriminated. Criticism from
Europe and the United States was, and continues to be, interpreted as a
campaign organised by the former colonisers, and implicitly conquistadores,
who first arrived in the region to claim its resources and subdue the workforce
with the sword. Critics of Cuba were interpreted as allies of the imperialist
United States, as a successor to this history of outside aggression. In this
context, the system and its practices were a legitimate response. In this
historical context, the system maintained the upper hand, compared to
criticism coming from those that were perceived as having caused havoc in the
past, and as a result lacked credibility and legitimacy. Consideration of these
contextual justifications, ideas and regional history as key components of
Cuban political culture, are crucial for truly grasping the nature of the system,
its sources of legitimacy and its ability to survive for half a century.
The siege mentality was likely to have helped the Cuban leadership in 1980
and 1994 to ensure its citizens felt the need to stick together, as their very
identities were constructed in line with the revolutionary values and
interpretation of history. Cuban non-material socialist values were articulated
as fundamentally opposed to the materialist capitalist model. This
strengthened the need for a closely tied society of trust based on the
revolutionary ideology, determining who could be trusted. The siege mentality
was a key factor, legitimating the system as a guarantor of security. The
signifier of the revolution was defined as the main guarantor of independence
and nationalistic pride, and thus the guarantor of the very being of many
Cubans. This made it worth fighting for in the spirit of [Patria 0 Muerte!, in
the form of voluntary work, armed struggle, sacrifice or resistance to
economic deprivation. This discursive horizon concealed that revolutionary
Cuba was only one possible way of being in the world. Appeals to national
pride were the central source of legitimacy in both 1980 and 1994, even
though its importance grew significantly between the two years. The
government sought to represent this national pride and acted on its behalf.
Nationalism fulfilled the usual role of maintaining a stable community and a
large political unit, and was likely to have added to the strong bonds of trust.
This unity was achievable due to the single-party system, and centralisation of
the media and mass organisations. The state acted as a powerful policeman
against selfish individualism perceived as anti-social. This construction of
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Cuban reality was sufficiently sedimented in the country's discourse since
1959, to retain its legitimacy in both 1980 and 1994.
Both in 1980 and 1994, the discourse placed great emphasis on the
achievements of the Revolution, as a key source of legitimacy. The
achievements also meant defending the system that made them possible. The
achievements in a stable Cuba were contrasted with violence abroad, such as
civil war in El Salvador in 1980 or political instability in Haiti in 1994. This
underlined the qualities of the revolution. It legitimated the system despite any
internal issues, which were also interpreted in a pro-stat us quo way, providing
a direction for the future within the existing structures of the communist
system. Because the disturbances and hijackings were driven by the United
States to destroy the revolution, the historically legitimate guarantor of Cuban
independence, there were no reasons for internal doubts. Interpretations were
constructed to fit the existing discourse reflecting public attitudes and
supporting the political system and its practices. The discourse addressed their
attitudes and concerns, organising the Cuban field of meaning in favour of
continuity. Cubans were deeply embedded in the discourse, within which they
acquired their identities, were constructed as beings, and from where they
interpreted the world.
Continuing Relevance of Historical Legitimacy
Both in 1980 and 1994, the dominant source of legitimacy along with
patriotism was historical, often remembering the past wrongs committed
against the sovereign nation. The system reinforced its legitimacy in 1984 by
presenting the results of the April 1984 elections to the People's Power, in
which according to official results, 98.6% of registered voters cast their
ballots, and so symbolically supported the system. In 1986, the country
revived its revolutionary tradition during Rectification, when it returned to
former revolutionary precepts and equality, in order to contain changes
undermining the legitimacy of the system. This provided firm ground by
reaffirming the original revolutionary ethics as the sources of historical
legitimacy of the leadership.
In 1994, the discourse interpreted the situation as a war economy in times of
peace. This interpretation did not refer only to the Special Period, but was part
of the overall interpretation of Cuban reality as under threat, which had
legitimated the necessity for institutions encouraging political involvement
and surveillance, such as the CDRs. These images of an external threat were
integrated into the internal mechanics of the discourse, which maintained the
heightened polarisation between supporters and dissenters of the system. In
1994, the discourse clearly addressed the desperation of the population by
stressing evidence suggesting economic improvements in the months to come.
It talked about growing confidence and favourable conditions, encouraging the
public as much as possible, at a time when the system could have collapsed
suddenly. The July-October 1994 crisis represented a potential social
disintegration, and hence the media impact of reports of the extraordinary
support march on 6th August and in the following months encouraged the
whole nation.
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Shifting Perception of Emigration
The interpretation of potentially delegitimating emigration shifted since the
end of the crisis in 1980, clearly redefined by 1994, towards a non-problematic
perception of migrants as economic, stressing the use of illegal emigration by
the United States as a weapon against Cuba. In 1994, migrants were
interpreted primarily as economic and the rioters as desperate Cubans,
suffering the consequences of the embargo as an attempt to destabilise the
country from the inside. Implicitly, they were victims rather than criminal
elements, unlike at the beginning of the 1980 episode. The non-problematic
interpretation of both crises was based on the assumption that the rather small-
scale events were encouraged by imperialist counter-revolutionaries, and
provided a good opportunity to awaken the revolution's supporters, who were
expected to represent the vast majority of the public. This delegitimated the
events as crises in the eyes of the supporters. In 1980, the discourse stressed
the attack from the United States receiving Cuban criminals as heroes and
political allies. In 1994, the key message was that the disturbances did not
delegitimate the system, since they were a result of the embargo representing
outside aggression. In addition, the discourse clearly warned that all those who
wished to emigrate would not be able to, since they were no longer as
welcome, having lost their heroic status in the United States, becoming instead
common Latin immigrants on an equal footing with Mexicans and others, who
had to climb heavily guarded, barbed-wired fences to seek illegal employment
- this was a new chapter in Cuban migration.
This shift in the interpretation of emigrants foreshadowed the general shifts
towards perceiving emigrants as economic migrants escaping from an
exploited developing country, increasingly losing their political significance.
They were increasingly understood as desperate 'have-nets' misled by US lies.
This shift was clear in the evidence from 1994, which indicates that the
hegemonic discourse shifted as domestic and international conditions changed.
This allowed the discourse to reflect new realities and to appeal to the attitudes
and concerns of the time.
Cuba as a Developing Country under Attack
In 1994, the nation-building project was defined more in the context of the
developing world. Cuba had its own model for leading poor countries out of
poverty and subjugation, by successfully providing stability, healthcare and
social progress with an emancipating political message, along with a national
world view stemming from its triumphant and encouraging historical
experience. The system was an example that victory in hopeless conditions
was possible, spicing up the attractiveness of its model at home and abroad.
This inspiring image remained an important source of legitimacy, most likely
capturing the hearts of many Cubans, who believed in the system and its
message in 1980, 1989 as well as in 1994. The model was especially appealing
for other developing countries, which had also once been subject to
exploitation by colonial powers, and thus welcomed a solution from a fellow
developing country. A combination of both spontaneous and centrally
organised popular support demonstrated significant loyalty of the population,
legitimating the system and possibly allowing it to survive the challenges of
1980, 89 and 94, so that even research conducted in 2009 by Gallup in Cuba
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concluded that 47% of Cuban respondents continued to approve of their
political leadership (Gallup 2009).
Cuba was interpreted as the legitimate defender of a just cause, as a
developing country and part of the Non-Aligned Movement. Cuba's medical
internationalism and involvement in military conflicts were part of this
interpretation combining the discourses of racial equality, Third World
development, economic justice, anti-racism and the unsuitability of the
capitalist model of development in the conditions of the developing world, all
implicitly legitimating the Cuban system. The system relied on reports of
international support as a complementary source of legitimacy during both
years. In both 1980 and 1994, the country was portrayed enjoying worldwide
support as a legitimate defender of developing world interests. Semantically,
Cuba was part of post-colonial processes in other developing countries, some
of which also used the labels of socialism or communism to describe their
inherently nationalistic aspirations:
"Indigenous populist traditions became absorbed by Marxist-Leninist
terminology and translated into new categories: people became
proletariat, nation became class and nationalism became socialism."
(Balfour 1990: 188).
The Continuing Relevance of el hloqueo and the US Threat
La lucha par la patria was always put forward as the highest priority,
reflecting the post-colonial nationalistic atmosphere on the island. This was
targeted against the United States, using examples from Cuban history,
demonstrating past threats of intervencion and politically motivated violence.
US involvements in other countries around the world, such as Vietnam, Iraq or
Panama, were used as examples confirming the continuing reality of the
threat, and legitimating the system's policies as responses to the situation. The
legitimacy of the system was supported by the defensive position of sovereign
Cuba, aggressed by the United States in 1961, and thereafter. The embargo
remained as the most important source of legitimacy, gaining even more
significance in 1994 as an issue angering all on the island, and perceived as
the main cause of material suffering after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The discourse during both periods contained frequent claims of moral
superiority, which was a crucial source of legitimacy proving the continuity of
the sacred revolution as a just cause backed by assumed moral purity. The
threat present only ninety miles from Cuban coast was a key theme. This
resulted in a general suspicion about anything without the system's seal of
approval. The emphasis on the right to self-rule maintained a strong sense of
national identity for Cubans, as the essence of their particular Heideggerian
being-in-the-world. Openness, as interpreted by the opposition and exiles, was
interpreted as destabilising, dangerous and immoral in the siege situation. Or
as Roque et. al commented later in 1997:
"The Cuban government ignores the word 'opposition.' Those of us
who do not share its political stance, or who just simply don't support
it, are considered enemies and any number of other scornful
designations that it chooses to proclaim. Thus, they have also sought to
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give a new meaning to the word 'homeland' that is distortedly linked
to revolution, socialism and nation. They attempt to ignore the fact that
'homeland', by definition, is the country in which one is born." (Roque
and others 1997).
Cuban patriotism, as the most important bond, maintained an imagined,
closely tied community encouraged by organisations of the state. Trust
generated by patriotic identification, with allegiance to the communist system
as a key identifier, was set against the background of an uncertain world.
Cuban national identity retained significant ideological saturation, bound to
the history of the Revolution. The psychological impact of el bloqueo
combined with the military presence of the United States, generated fear by
constantly threatening the revolution, its values and individual identities of its
supporters. This immediate necessity for continuous nationalistic mobilisation
increased the ability of the system to legitimate its rule, and justify its failures
and coercive measures. The siege-mentality legitimated a powerful state, and
radical enforcement of revolutionary norms, allowing it to survive crises.
Anti-US rhetoric stressed the negative influence of US business interests that
had frustrated the aspirations of Cubans subserviently serving mojitos to Al
Capone-like thugs and rough foreign sailors on the beautiful beaches of their
homeland. Cuba relied on both a real and imagined threat to its existence that
legitimated many of its policies, and provided an obstacle for reaching its
imagined utopia. In order to reach it, every Cuban was required to engage in a
patriotic lucha of some sort. We can only speculate to what extent the symbol
of the Revolution has been exhausted over the past five decades amongst
Cubans, some of whom undoubtedly dreamt about the affluence abroad and
may have expressed their approval for the Cuban system more because of
social pressure or coercion in the public domain. For a large part of the
population, however, the survival of the system was likely to have been a
personal question of their identity, existence and survival, especially when in
1994 Granma reported the intentions of the Miami exiles to allow three days
of killing, after taking over the island (somewhat like the executions shortly
after 1959).
Continuing Legitimacy of Fidel Castro
The historical roots of the system provided a special source of legitimacy
deeply embedded in the country's national memory. This included those that
lived the 1959 historical moment, as well as the following generations, who
were socialised by the many representations of the Revolution. This was
combined with Castro as an effective leader and persuasive speaker, using
humour, appealing arguments and supportive information, speaking from his
legitimate position as an independence hero and heir to the father of the
nation. Castro received automatic acceptance, as do the founding fathers in the
United States, the Queen in the United Kingdom, or Charles De Gaulle in
France. Therefore, if approved by Castro from a similar position in the Cuban
structure, the legitimacy of the system gained significant credibility, because
he was understood as the historically legitimate leader, and a successor to
Cespedes, Marti, Gomez and Maceo.
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Recognised as charismatic by many other experts, Castro, as the: living hero
and symbol of this struggle, enjoyed a symbolic role in Cuban political
culture. He represented a unique source of legitimacy of the existing system
due to his seal of approval as the popular leader of the people, and a valid
guarantee of the system. His personal stamp had an immense impact. The
automatic loyalty of many Cubans combined with Castro as a convincing
political speaker, able to inspire and encourage generations, represented an
important legitimating mixture. He provided a key component in both 1980,
but even more so in 1994 when the system was deeply shaken by the crisis,
but then received reports of Castro turning disgruntled protesters into a
cheering crowd. Castro's appearance in person during the 1994 disturbances in
Central Havana affirmed his image as an authentic leader with widespread
loyalty, ready for bold action. The Cuban nation-building project appears to
have remained stable during 1980, 1994 and in between, due to continuing
revolutionary allegiance, sustaining the system perceived as historically
legitimate, headed by a historically legitimate leader.
Close Communication between the Leadership and the Public
The system relied on an effective ability to listen to the people and involving
some in political processes. The resulting feed of information to the political
leadership allowed adjustments of the discourse to reflect popular concerns,
always interpreting reality in favour of the system. The discourse
communicated with the public with regards to the research of the Department
of Public Opinion of the Cuban Government (Pastor Brigos, Havana, May
2010). This skill of the system ensured its ability to adapt. It helped to
maintain the focus of the public on the embargo, instead of the system's
communist economics. This was perhaps different to other communist
countries that had struggled with poor economic performance, and had lacked
an external factor that would have helped them tum this delegitirnating issue
in their favour. Poor economic performance was not likely to have had such a
delegitimating impact on the Cuban system, which could have otherwise been
perceived as unable to deliver.
In combination with historically rooted anti-US attitudes, these two
components of the discourse, i.e. the embargo and feedback, provided
important ingredients, channelling public focus away from internal problems
towards an external enemy. The embargo provided prime argument in favour
of unity, social control, and loyalty in a war-like situation, with the people
defending their identity as expressed and summed up in the revolution,
legitimated in 1959. The discourse reflected a dialogue with the people, which
allowed it to reflect their concerns, and persuade them about the proposed
solutions and interpretation of reality, evident from the content,
contextualisation and mechanics of the discourse. The available solutions and
responses to the situation were constructed through a specific
problematisation, which supported the system's legitimacy.
The legitimacy of the system was uniquely tied to Jose Marti, but also to other
independence fighters and martyrs. The Revolution, as the origin of the
system, was interpreted as the expression of the fulfilment of the dreams of
these national heroes. This nationalistic, pro-independence philosophy pre-
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dating the Revolution remained deeply integrated into a unique mix of radical
patriotism, socialism, communism, and culturalism. The discourse suggested
that division of the various components was impossible. The system was
referred to as i Viva Cuba Libre! [Socialismo 0 Muerte! [Patria 0 Muertel
i Venceremos!, neatly summarising its meaning and demonstrating the
complete enmeshment of the separate concepts, where change of one
component would be understood as a loss of the whole structure. This unity
also encouraged opposition to the post-communist transitions during the
1990s, and enhanced the legitimacy of the system. According to a Cuban
dissident group for example, in the 1990s Cuban party members
communicated to the public that their departure from power would mean the
disappearance of Cuba as a nation (Roque et al. 1997), thus strengthening the
arguments for the legitimacy of the system.
In both 1980 and 1994, the concepts of the nation, homeland, independence,
and socialism were interpreted in a singular signifier, the revolution, and were
the major sources of legitimacy as a symbol of a righteous patriotic resistance.
During both years, however, the main emphasis remained on patriotism, as the
basis of the nation-building project requiring unity and commitment to secure
independence. Perturbadores were interpreted as against unity and hence
nation-building. National history was used to strengthen the nation-building
element, while state-provided education and social provision were
strengthening the nation-building process, which was under threat in 1994.
Both episodes at the same time provided a useful opportunity to encourage
passionate nationalism as a dominant source of legitimacy, a notion proposed
by Fernandez, and visible in the evidence (Fernandez 2000: 117).
Patriotism, as the most reliable source of legitimacy, was prioritised and
connected to other signifiers. In 1980, socialism was taken as a source of
legitimacy on its own, representing support from the Soviet Union, and
guaranteeing a number of real benefits. In 1994 the meaning of socialism
shifted more towards a symbol of patriotism, Cuban culturalism and a
guarantor of social provision. These represented important reasons for keeping
socialism as a component of the system, despite the economic problems and
Cuba's increasing isolation during the 1990s. Socialism thus represented less
the classical ideological school, and more Cuban patriotism accompanied by a
particular revolutionary worldview. Socialism was not necessarily the right
choice because it was a proven ideology, but because it was part of the
patriotic revolution, which would be de stabilised without it. Therefore, even
though socialism and its economic theory might have been questioned by
some Cubans in 1994, it was interpreted in relation to the most important
sources of legitimacy as its component to be retained. For this reason, the
emphasis on the unity of patriotism and socialism appear to have grown
between 1980 and 1994, and especially since 1989.
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6. 2. Conclusions
Conclusions about Legitimacy and post-1989 Cuba
The crucial role of legitimacy in combination with the discourse and its
internal mechanics represent a new perspective. In the 1990s, due to the
extreme hardship, the legitimacy of the system could not have been material,
but instead resulted from social security, low crime, predictability and
patriotism, which were all promoted more than ever before (and, specifically,
more than in 1980). These may have contributed to the system's survival of
the incredibly challenging times. In 1994, the discourse had to address the
collapse of communism elsewhere, without causing harm to legitimacy.
Eastern Europe was interpretedas a frightening example of what would occur
if a socialist system tried to adopt an anarchic laissez-faire model, destroying
the positive aspects of the socialist model striving for social equality and
providing universal healthcare and education. This interpretation provided a
complementary source of legitimacy only in 1994, strengthened by the
omission ofpre-1989 crimes or some of the more successful examples of post-
communist transition.
Cuba may have survived well beyond 1989 because of the combination of its
legitimating hegemonic discourse, and many other factors, such as control of
information flows, social control, discouragement of dissent, international
support, emigration, effective leadership, socialist provision, or the impact of
state organisations that fulfilled the role of politicising and mobilising the
population in favour of the system. All combined, they shed more light on the
ability of the system to remain stable over the decades. The hegemonic
discourse, however, represents a key factor allowing the system to maintain
stability without excessive amounts of force aimed at its own population.
Maintaining loyalty through the discourse may have been a better long-term
working strategy. A perceived legitimacy of the system may have been the
reason why Cubans did not protest in sufficiently large numbers to bring about
a 1989-like collapse and post-communist transition as was the case in Eastern
Europe. Transitional chaos and economic problems in ex-communist countries
were not an attractive picture for Cubans, who might have valued the
guaranteed social provision and stability of their own system, thus perceived
as legitimate. Since the Revolution was from the outset based on mass popular
support, Cubans, unlike many Eastern Europeans under the occupation of
Soviet tanks, genuinely had their own, legitimate system.
The system was legitimated by a discourse that had been constructed by the
revolutionary leaders, who successfully hegemonised the field of meaning,
which appealed to Cubans and others abroad as an alternative to the Western
discourse that achieved hegemony in major parts of the world. In the global
context, Cuba occupied a minority position, relying exclusively on the
hegemony it achieved at home. The discourse gripped Cubans in 1959 and
appeared to do so during the 1980s and 1990s, in a degree sufficient for the
country to survive the large scale changes in global politics at the end of the
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Cold War. The socialisation of the Cuban public and construction of
individual identities within the system's institutions, explain the deep roots of
the discourse, and its general internalisation. The system was based on a
particular discursive construction, which defined and sustained the Cuban
framework of meaning, the identities as well as social reality, The construction
provided the foundations of legitimacy for Cuba's political institutions and
policies. These internal mechanics and sources of legitimacy may have
enhanced the stability of the system, while also ensuring its appeal to Cubans.
The system involved Cubans in different civil and political organisations,
which at the same time provided feedback to the leadership, allowing it in tum
to respond to popular concerns and anxieties through the media, policies and
other channels. The discourse effectively reflected their attitudes, concerns
and memory of the past. This allowed the system to maintain, encourage and
stimulate sufficient levels of public support by organising the Cuban field of
meaning. Cubans were deeply embedded in this discourse, through which they
acquired their identities, were constructed as beings, and from where they
interpreted reality.
Despite some associative pro-US currents, the particular geopolitical setting of
Cuba with its identity historically opposed to the United States and distaste for
other foreign powers as contestants to the country's independence helped the
system to define itself as the Other in relation to the United States. This helped
Cuba to remain united and opposed to the liberal democratic alternative
proposed by the United States and embraced during the 1990s by many
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Latin America and
elsewhere. This would have been perhaps more appealing if it were proposed
and symbolised by Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany or France for
example, all with a less negative image in Cuba's national memory. In the
post-Cold War unipolar world after 1989, where some have predicted the end
of history with only one socio-political model represented by the United States
as the victor, Cuba strived to remain closed and opposed, instead opting for its
endogenous, non-transitional path.
The discourse positioned Cuba as an antagonist to the other America that is
the United States, which it interpreted as racist, inegalitarian, exploitative,
expansionist, aggressive and materialistic. Within such an interpretation, the
home-grown communist system automatically gained significant legitimacy as
a symbol of opposition and exhilarating defiance. The discourse denounced
US imperialism, giving meaning to more abstract concepts such as freedom, as
free from imperialism. US reality was reduced to fulfil its role in the discourse
emphasising its negative features, encouraging Cubans to remain loyal to the
system. The Cuban meaning of being was interpreted as under direct threat of
extinction, since, if US-style democracy were allowed to take over the country
once more, it would destroy Cuba's inclusive social system or existing
property relations. For these reasons, the system had to be defended in both
1980 and 1994, with both its achievements and shortcomings, as a legitimate
representation of the interests of Cubans.
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In the 1990s, the system reacted to the neoliberal discourse abroad and
rejected its concepts as unsuitable for Cuba's endogenous path to
development. The discourse analysed the situation abroad, and focused on the
less attractive parts of competing models, such as the inability of capitalist
models to offer social provision. Such interpretations and one-sided analysis
of competing models was one of the factors that enhanced the system's
legitimacy by portraying it as a more appealing alternative.
Implications for Existing Literature
The conclusions of this research have implications for the existing literature.
Patriotism remained the most important source of legitimacy during the
period, and gained further prominence above socialism in 1994. This supports
the widespread notion shared by many Cuba experts, such as Whitehead,
Kapcia, Dominguez, Valdes and others, that nationalism was the most
important underlying theme of the whole system at most times (Kapcia 2008:
84, Kapcia 2000: 234, Valdes 1992, Balfour 2009: 155-159).
A number of authors, including Huberman, Sweezy, Azicri and Kapcia have
emphasised the achievements of the revolution as a key source of legitimacy
in relation to the 1960s (Kapcia 2008c: 629). These were shaken by the
material hardship of the late 1980s and first half of the 1990s, but remained as
the established part of the system, possibly taken for granted by the younger
generations. Hawkins, Kapcia, Feinsilver and others have argued for the
continuing relevance of this source during the 1980s and 1990s (Kapcia 1995
& 2008, Ilawkins 200 I, Feinsilver 1993), and this research concludes that
achievements of the revolution (high employment, social provision, healthcare
and education) did represent one of the sources of legitimacy during the
1980s, whose importance grew even more during the 1990s, when it
represented a key source of legitimacy relevant to all Cubans. During the first
half of the 1990s, the meaning of the revolutionary system was renegotiated
and the achievements of the revolution were assigned the highest priority, a
conclusion shared with Kapcia (Kapcia 2008b: 163). Similar to the argument
of Roman, equality and social justice remained a relevant source of
legitimacy, linking the present system back to the 1960s (Roman 2003).
The threat posed by the US also remained one of the most important sources
of legitimacy, and further grew in importance during the 1990s, in close
connection with the emphasis on patriotism which it helped to incite, a
conclusion shared with Kapcia and other authors (Kapcia 2008c). The
importance of this source of legitimacy appears to have grown due to its
continuing relevance, being moved above socialism as an ideology negatively
influenced by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Socialism was thus redefined
in terms of what it meant for Cuba, Le. the achievements of the revolution.
The threat posed by the US retained its real representation in the embargo,
widely unpopular in Cuba, providing the system a defensive position as
representing the interests of the people. The related siege mentality remained
highly relevant during the 1990s, supporting a similar conclusion by
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Zimbalist, who argued that it contributed to the stability of the system during
the 80s and 90s. (Zimbalist 1992, 2000). During the 1990s, this source of
legitimacy was further strengthened by a perceived threat of the potential
return of Batistianos in the event of a political change in Cuba, which
supported the system. The system appears to have focused on calling for
support of the people, in order to defend the system as a representation of the
real benefits it provided them, a conclusion shared with Gou's notion of a an
interpretation of a "people's war" to resist US aggression since the mid-1980s
(Gott 2005: 274). It also supports the conclusion of Thomas that the system
relied primarily on anti-Americanism rather than classical Marxism (Thomas
1984: 55). The evidence also supports the argument of Perez Jr. and others
about the mutually reinforcing role of nationalism and anti-US attitudes,
promoted by the system as key sources of legitimacy dating back to Playa
Giron (Louis A. Perez Jr. 1992: 501). The system also continued to rely on a
perceived moral superiority, as a contributing and rather implicit source of
legitimacy, supporting this notion examined by Valdes, Kapcia and others.
The historical sources of legitimacy examined by Fernandez. Azicri, Perez Jr.,
Kapcia, Martinez Heredia, Thomas, Valdes, Edelstein and others retained its
hold in 1980, and gained further prominence in 1994. backing the system as
the guarantor of national independence. Historical legitimacy was at the same
time closely related to the endogenous character of the system examined by
Kapcia, Landau and others, making it relevant in the 1990s despite the decline
of socialism and communism internationally. In this context. liberal
democratic political institutions were perceived negatively as an exogenous
imposition, fought against during the 1953 and 1958 revolutionary campaigns,
a notion shared with the conclusions of Hawkins (Hawkins 2001: 80).
Historical legitimacy and the endogenous character provided the second most
important legitimating force in 1994, more prominent than in 1980. This
appealed to the sedimented revolutionary values of the public, and addressed
the material deprivation with its emphasis on anti-materialism and self-
sacrifice. This supports Hawkins's and Valdes's conclusion that revolutionary
norms were a legitimating force, which retained its hold in the 1990s
(Hawkins 2001, Valdes 1992: 213). The emphasis on the system as a
representation of Cuban culture was closely connected to the endogenous
character, labelled by Kapcia as cubanfa revolucionaria (Kapcia 1995: 23),
and became prominent especially in the 1990s as a legitimating force relevant
to the post-communist international context. at the same time functioning as a
further encouragement of Cuban patriotism. Along with Kapcia and Balfour,
this research concludes that during the 1990s, the legitimating role of
nationalism became more prominent, supported by the Revolution's historical
roots and Cuban character (Kapcia 1995: 23, Balfour 2009: 155-159).
Material prosperity and economic growth supported the system during the
1970s and beginning of the 1980s (Perez-Stable 1993b: 74-75).ln 1980, this
was clearly present in the discourse before and after the Mariel episode, during
which focus Was shifted towards patriotic sentiment as a more effective source
oflegiti~acy. The material deprivation of the 1990s forced the system to
emphasise other available sources of legitimacy, even if it did continue
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promising approaching economic recovery. Tourism in 1994 was interpreted
as a way of sustaining the revolution and all it represented for the future,
despite the negative impact on the egalitarian fabric and the tensions caused by
the black market economy, previously discussed by Kapcia (Kapcia 1995: 10-
12). Egalitarianism as a source of legitimacy was not prominent in 1980 or
1994 in terms of economic redistribution, but solely as an equal distribution of
the achievements of the revolution. It was addressed by the discourse of the
Rectification, but is not the main focus of this research. Tourism was
implicitly the way to fight the unpopular embargo, while preserving the
achievements and delivering more to the people in material terms. For this
reason, its meaning remained positive as a legitimate response to changing
circumstances.
Referring to Mariel and the maleconazo, Thomas perceived a destabilising
impact of Cuban emigration and the two crises, a notion contradicting the
conclusions of the examined evidence and its function in the system (Thomas
1998: 1484). Emigration was first in 1980 interpreted as an opportunity to
counter-attack the United States and relieve Cuba from criminal elements,
while in 1990s emigration was interpreted as a weapon against the United
States and a common developing-world phenomenon encouraged the
embargo. For this reason, it would appear that it did not have a destabilising,
delegitimating nor any negative effect on the system, allowing it instead to
siphon off the most discontented, opposed and costly individuals. This finding
also contradicts Fernandez's interpretation of Mariel as a breaking point and
its negative impact on the system (Fernandez 2000: 87-88). Instead, the
conclusions of this research support Azicri's interpretation of the 1980 Mariel
as a renewal of the system (Azicri 1988: 26-27). Despite the sudden character
of Mariel, the episode was interpreted as a victory. In 1994, the crisis was a
result of several years of tensions, and was perhaps more expected, when the
system appeared to have been on the verge of a possible collapse, and the
outcome of the episode represented a catharsis, when the faith and image of
the system were finally restored. This conclusion is shared with Kapcia, who
interpreted the period as an encouraging ending of the worst of the Special
Period (Kapcia 2008b: 160). The evidence confirmed Chavez's conclusions
about the transformation of the interpretation of migration in Cuba, where
migration was since the 1980s increasingly perceived as economic and
gradually lost its political content, thus not representing a de legitimating issue.
Fidel Castro's charismatic leadership as a legitimating force perceived by
many authors such as Hawkins, Azicri, Balfour, Cottman, Kapcia or Szulc,
seems to have remained relevant during the 1980s and 1990s. Not only did
Castro, as a national icon close to the people, set the national debate about
how to understand what was happening during numerous televised and public
speeches, , but his role was most evident during the 1994 episode. During this
time, Castro was praised publicly on national television for his magician-like
intervention during the riots, facing the crowd on his own and turning the
rioters in his favour, confirming Kapcia's argument of Castro's ability to avoid
using the police force or armed forces on a large scale (Kapcia 2008c: 644).
To what extent these forces might have been deployed, however, is not
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possible to deduce from the evidence, as the discourse would have been
unlikely to have reported government ordered repression, potentially sending a
delegitimating image of alienation. The important role of Castro in setting the
terms of the hegemonic discourse seem to contradict arguments by Fagen and
Gonzalez about the declining charismatic authority of Fidel since the 1960s
(Fagen 1972, Gonzalez 1974). The claim would seem more relevant to the
2000s following his withdrawal from the public eye, but appears to have no
substantial ground during the 1980s and 1990s, especially during crucial
moments such as the two crises.
Finally, despite the underlying emphasis on moral incentives since
Rectification, often assigned to El Che, in the consulted evidence there appear
to have been no substantial references to Guevara in the discourse as a source
oflegitimacy, thus not supporting Kapcia's argument about emphasis on
Guevara in the 1990s as a re-emerging source of legitimacy (Kapcia 2000:
210-211). He was, however, by all means a constant national hero and a model
revolutionary at most times, strongly present in Cuban historiography,
symbolism and monuments to the Revolution.
Inferences about the Longevity of the Cuban System
In the global context, Cuba occupied a minority position, relying exclusively
on the hegemony it achieved at home. The discourse gripped Cubans in 1959
and appears to have done so during the 1980s and 1990s, contributing to the
country's ability to survive the end of the Cold War. For a large part of the
population, the survival of the system might have been a personal question of
their identity, existence and survival. During both crises, the discourse was
also effective due to the centralisation of the system's communications. The
discourse was effective due to its high level of coherence, analysing events in
depth and carefully weaving together strands of Cuban patriotism, culturalism,
communism and national history into a compact hegemonic discourse (or a
worldview), legitimating the system and providing a starting point for all
subsequent analysis. These legitimating components were all weaved together
so closely under the singular, symbolic label of the revolution that they were
presented as inseparable, continuously assuming that dropping one would
inevitably mean the end of the whole national project. Legitimacy for Cuban
communism did not come only from social provision and other real
advantages, but equally importantly from a semantic unity between the
signifiers la patria, la revolucion and comunismo understood as one. Such a
combination of factors closely knit together, and combined with the complete
control of the media, provided little potential for the post-Cold War wave of
transitions to pluralist democracy and capitalism. This was one of the possible
factors, which may have allowed Cuba to remain stable under its communist
system, despite the declining appeal of communism in the rest of the world.
Due to the popular character of the Revolution and its effective consolidation
and institutionalisation since 1959, it was hard to imagine anything else,
especially in the context of censored information flows.
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Given the limited choice of discourses in the single-party system, most Cubans
lived in a constrained environment where the discourse retained its dominant
position, providing an endogenous construction of reality. Similar to other
discourses in the United States, Europe or elsewhere, the hegemonic Cuban
discourse contained populist simplifications of highly complex phenomena as
well as dogmatic political communication, concealing alternative solutions in
an environment where it achieved absolute hegemony. The role of discourses
is after all to convince, rather than to reveal the full range of possible options
and choices. Persuasion of the public may have been possible due to a
reflection of popular attitudes and concerns, stressing endogenous sources of
legitimacy, thus achieving a system ruled by Gramscian hegemony based on
consent. The discourse may have appealed to a sufficient part of the
population and encouraged their continuing loyalty, supporting the legitimacy
of the regime, allowing it to survive the two challenging moments in 1980 and
1990, as well as the transitional wave of 1989 that completely redefined the
character of international politics and the way communism would be
perceived. The potential impact of the examined sources of legitimacy
provides one possible answer for understanding Cuba's survival of 1989, as
well as the 1980 and 1994 crises. The detailed examination also demonstrates
how the system coped with the changing context.
Alternative explanations of the longevity and stability of non-liberal political
systems are possible, but the impact of political communication combined
with other factors and the particular character of the system are a plausible
way of understanding the long-term stability of the Cuban system. Cuban
social reality operated on the basis of the discourse, which gave the system its
raison d'etre. The system was supported by the discourse, which
problernatised reality in a particular way to ensure the continuous
interpretation of key issues at home and abroad in its favour. By weaving
together a number of strands of different sources of legitimacy, the Cuban
construct continued to organise the field of meaning from a dominant position,
thus achieving hegemony and systemic stability. The discourse successfully
maintained its hegemonic position and the communist ideological component,
which it refused to drop despite the adverse developments in other formerly
communist countries after 1989. Cuba adopted a new constitution in 1992,
which allowed it to involve creyentes [religious believers], as well as
increasingly focusing on involving the younger generations and transmitting
the legacy of the Revolution. In this way it minimised the generational gap
that would have destabilised the country more, as university students took to
the streets and led many anti-governmental protests in Eastern European
communist states during the turbulent times of 1989. Cuba remained under the
leadership of Fidel Castro as the revolution's general-in-chief, who provided
symbolic continuity of the system. The discourse successfully interpreted the
historical experience of Cuba, warning of the return to liberal-capitalist
Batista's Cuba, while constantly reminding of the achievements of the
revolution with the system as their guarantor. It effectively addressed public
concerns about the main raison d'etre of the revolution.
163
Cuba avoided an open transition from above, such as Greece under
Karamanlis after the collapse of the regime of the colonels in 1974. The
system avoided unrestrained circulation of information on a large scale, and
replaced it with its own discourse. Tightly controlled political communication
continued reaching Cubans on a daily basis, always arguing in favour of the
legitimacy of the system. The government appears to have avoided large-scale
repression, which was instead aimed at a small group of dissidents. By
avoiding large scale repression and focusing on the discourse instead, the
system may have been able to encourage sufficient numbers of loyal Cubans,
overseeing the moderates and pragmatics, thus avoiding another revolution. In
other words:
"The contradictions, the tensions, and the criticisms existing in Cuba
today have to do with the search for larger and better spaces in the
political system created through the revolution and not outside of it. It
is recognized by the majority of the population that the system has
permitted the conformation and viability of that which is most
important and that which has been the object of a search 0f more than
100 years: the system has given life to a national Cuban project which
recovered the interests of Cuba as a nation." (Carranza Valdes &
Weber 1991: 17).
Fidel Castro and the Cuban elite provided effective leadership, never out of
step with the public, always reflecting current issues from a position in favour
of the system. This was likely to have been possible due to the feedback
through its political and social organisations, and research into public opinion.
Cuban authorities managed to maintain the opposition in conflict with a
significant part of population: the political culture of a country-under-siege
required revolutionary unity, where dividing opposition was perceived as anti-
patriotic. The impact of the hegemonic discourse may have been significant in
view of interpretations by other experts, who perceived the important role of
the largest part of the population as middle-ground, or "resigned" with the
fervent supporters and outright opposition representing marginal parts of
Cuban society:
"Evidence would seem to indicate that most of those in the middle
group seek simply to survive, but given the opportunity, would take
great risks to leave Cuba. The nature of Cuban society is such,
however, that political passivity is interpreted as opposition.
Consequently, the large mass in the middle is manipulated-skilfully
one might add-in such a way as to make them appear to support the
regime." (Thomas et a1. 1984: 52).
In this sense, the role of the hegemonic discourse may have been crucial in
inciting at least some level of loyalty in those in the middle.
Castro and the Sierra Maestra veterans maintained their image as representing
public opinion, and avoided the loss of connection experienced by Batista for
example. The discourse celebrated past victories and the leadership avoided a
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major political or military loss during the 1980s and 1990s, avoiding the
negative impact of loss experienced by the regime of the colonels in Greece
during a brief engagement in Cyprus in 1974, or the military debacle of the
Argentinian military regime after the loss of the Falkland Islands war in 1982.
Mass emigration was interpreted in the discourse within the context of anti-
patriotic scum at the beginning of 1980, shifting to an interpretation as an
ordinary phenomenon in the developing world in 1994. Unlike emigration
from Eastern Germany, it was thus not perceived as an indicator of large scale
dissent and discontent. By reporting on regional instability and political
violence taking place in Latin America and the Caribbean, the discourse
implicitly praised the stability of the Cuban system, placing Cuba into a
regional perspective.
While some authors writing in the 1990s, such as Mesa-Lago, Baloyra &
Morris, Del Aquila and others, have predicted a collapse of Cuba, the system
appears to have survived for a number of possible reasons, one of which may
have been its ability to reinterpret its underlying sources of legitimacy as the
basis of loyalty of its people (Cannelo Mesa-Lago 1993; Baloyra & Morris
1993; Del Aguilla 1994). This perspective provides a possible explanation of
how Cuba survived not only 1989, but also internal crises of 1980 and 1994.
The mechanics, origin and content of its discourse, combined with its ability to
adjust to changing circumstances, may have contributed to the system's
survival. 1994 represented a significant catharsis, leading the system out of the
challenging times with a clearer idea of the system represented then and for
the years to come. The survival of 1989 and the longevity of the system have
been approached by other authors, but this research demonstrates the possible
role of the discourse and its sources oflegitimacy as one of the possible
factors to explain this puzzle. The prominence of the sources of legitimacy
stands out even more significantly during the first half of the 1990s, when the
system could not have relied on its ability to deliver in economic terms, but
could still emphasise others sources of legitimacy to avoid a collapse.
In Conclusion: New Insights into the System
By examining two crises, it appears that the hegemonic discourse was able to
successfully interpret crises, stressing popular support. The system managed to
avoid their destabilising potential and maintained itself as a legitimate
expression of public opinion. The two episodes were remembered as
something not negative for the system, but as proofs of its vitality and
relevance. The discourse rallied support in subtle as well as blunt ways,
reinforcing certain attitudes and reassuring the public in view of frightening
challenges, while also maintaining its hegemonic position based on a
Gramscian encouragement of consensus. As such, they represent examples of
successful interpretations sustaining the hegemony.
The system appears to have been able to maintain stability by encouraging
loyalty, through the discourse, which contained endogenous sources of
legitimacy. The shifting sources of legitimacy put forward by the discourse
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were certainly not the sole factor in the stability of the system, as is evident
from the existing literature, but played a significant role in a system that had
previously siphoned off most of the dissenters and delivered real benefits to
those who stayed. This research argues that the shifting sources of legitimacy
significantly contributed to the stability of the system as its crucial
components, especially in an environment with no radically diverging and
widely available alternative discourses. The population was exposed to a
discourse reflecting its attitudes and concerns, which significantly increased its
impact. This research provides an insight into the mechanics of the discourse
from within and through the eyes and attitudes of the Cuban public, allowing
us to understand the system from within. By focusing on the internal
mechanics of the discourse and its sources of legitimacy, this research
provides new explanations of why the system may have survived the
incredibly challenging times. The research demonstrates what made the
system tick, by focusing on its internal mechanics, patterns of reasoning,
endogenous concepts and political culture. The findings provide a way of
explaining how Cuba was able to survive internal moments of destabilisation,
as well as the wave of neoliberalism during the 1990s. The evidence presented
and analysed demonstrates how the discourse used crucial sources of
legitimacy, and how it prioritised and shifted them over time. The conclusions
help us understand why Cuba may have remained closed and opposed to
alternative political models, and followed a different non-transitional path
compared to other former communist countries.
The discourse in 1980 and 1994 contained both differences and continuities,
with the system retaining the basics of its communist socio-political and
economic model. Instead of large scale political persecution, the discourse
allowed the system to maintain the loyalty of a significant part of the
population by interpreting events from its dominant position in a way that
supported the established system. The discourse was based on three main
pillars: Cuban patriotism, achievements of the revolution and a particular
version of Cuba's historical experience, all built into a coherent whole of the
hegemonic Cuban discourse. The discourse provided effective leadership, by
focusing on the victorious outcomes of each crisis and on future improvements
of the system. During both crises, the discourse referred to unprecedented and
extraordinary demonstrations of revolutionary spirit as an important source of
legitimacy. The resulting message at the end of both crises was victorious.
Especially in 1994, pro-government marches were reported as a great
encouragement amidst the extreme desperation of the Special Period. The
rallies were spontaneous rather than ritualistic, such as the May Day march,
and thus signified an important catharsis from the economic crisis. They
demonstrated clearly the continuing legitimacy of the system in the eyes of the
public, even if they may have involved significant participation based on what
Thomas labelled "opportunistic conformity" (Thomas 1998: 1484).
By examining and comparing a case before and after 1989, we gain further
insights into how the system reflected transitions and the decline of
communism and socialism abroad. If these were discredited internationally,
and Cubans were likely to have learned this if not from the official media then
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from other communication channels, the system had to rely on different
sources of legitimacy communicated through endogenous codes that would
remain relevant and effective in the new circumstances to encourage sufficient
loyalty. This enhances our understanding of the long-term stability of the
system. We can see how the system interpreted crises and issues, such as
neoliberalism, in order to give them a meaning sustaining the discursive base
of the system without contradicting it. In this way, we gain an alternative
perspective on Cuban political history arising from the alternative research
method of discourse analysis, allowing us to understand better the system from
the point of view of its audience. We may understand better the possible
reasons why some Cubans may have remained loyal. The conclusions do not
exclude all alternative explanations, but rather complement them. A possible
interplay of factors such as a combination of political repression, siphoning off
dissenters, centralised media and the political nature of mass organisations,
may complement the findings of this research. The highly coherent and
consistent discourse may have played its rather important role in this mixture
of possible factors in the context of the communist single-party system. In
fact, this context was most likely to have increased the impact of the
hegemonic discourse, allowing for a controlled and nearly complete
hegemony, thus increasing its impact on the audience.
Examining the sources of legitimacy and the mechanics of the discourse, this
research demonstrates how the discourse may have effectively employed
relevant sources of legitimacy to transmit the endogenous ideology through
the use of language, by the means of assumptions, culturally relevant
semantics and endogenous codes. In combination with alternative
explanations, we can understand better the general longevity of the system
since 1959. This provides an answer to how Cuba dealt with crises and,
potentially, why it may have survived 1989 as a communist country adapting
to new circumstances. The discourse facilitated the legitimation of the system
by emphasising sources of legitimacy relevant to the Cuban public as a unique
historical and cultural community by reflecting and appealing to their
attitudes, fears and concerns, reassuring the public and creating a Gramscian
hegemonic consensus. The research demonstrates how the discourse reflected
and reacted to the post-Cold War situation to ensure continuity. It provides
other collateral insights into the system, such as the impact of its close
communication flows with the public, the impact of centralised
communications as well as the ability to cope with potentially delegitimating
issues.
The discourse employed specific mechanics of argumentations, and effectively
defended the system by drawing on specific sources of legitimacy that made
sense on the island. In order to achieve this, the system had to rely on what
this research labelled as hegemonic Cuban discourse, referring to a national
discussion, reflecting public concerns and appealing to widely held attitudes.
The discourse reflected public concerns received through various channels,
such as research into public opinion, or feedback received through mass
organisations and the communist party. This may have encouraged the loyalty
of a sufficient part of the population. The longevity of the Cuban system since
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1959 and especially after 1989 has surprised many. Despite analyses that have
examined Cuban history, political culture or institutions, a detailed analysis of
the communication between the elites and the public was missing. This
research addresses this gap, and argues that the system has relied on sources of
legitimacy to defend and represent the 1959 Revolution at different times.
The crucial role of the sources of legitimacy demonstrates how there were
deployed to reflect new realities. This represents a new way of looking at the
system in comparison to other studies that have examined the role of
emotions, Castro's charisma or material provision. The focus on sources of
legitimacy combines the possible influence of these and other factors to
explain the inner functioning of the Cuban system and its survival of 1989.
During the crises, these sources of legitimacy were the most prominent, as
these were decisive times. The system not only survived these crises and
interpreted them as total victories, but it is also evident that it shifted the
deployed sources of legitimacy and their inner mechanics before and after
1989. In 1980, socialism represented more of a pragmatic and profitable
alliance with the USSR and COMECON as well as implicit nationalism and
resistance to the United States, Fidel's charismatic leadership played a lesser
role. The mechanics of the discourse at this time differed from the situation in
1994, when nationalism and particularly patriotism became the driving sources
oflegitimacy relevant to the new post-Cold War context. Socialism was
reinterpreted in terms of a safety net against transitional anarchy, guaranteeing
valued achievements of the revolution including social provision and
healthcare taken as given in 1980. In this way, the system returned to some of
its original 1959-60 driving forces to make itself current and encourage
popular allegiance with sources of legitimacy that were still relevant to the
highest possible number of Cubans. To an extent, this represents a return to
several source of legitimacy of 1959-60. In 1994, Cuba shifted from a socialist
country to an exploited developing state striving for independence and
economic equality in international terms. In 1994, material provision was not
stressed due to the horrific conditions of the Special Period. At the same time,
Fidel's charismatic leadership regained its value, and especially during his
intervention at the malec6n in 1994. These were all significant shifts. This
confirms other evidence in the literature, which focused on the 1991 Party
Congress that had confirmed the perceptions about how to save the revolution,
but which had later, during the 1997 Congress, moved towards debates about
what parts of the revolution had to be saved. This represented a
reinterpretation of the essence of the system that increasingly focussed on the
1959-60 experience, and the original source of legitimacy as a valued national
heritage, relevant under most circumstances.
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pobres de EE. Vu. y contra estados en vias de desarrollo: 7.
13 April 1980, year 16, n. 90, Marines U.S.A., Nicolas Guillen: 1.
14 April 1980, year 16, n. 91, E/ aprendizaje sera brutal, Georgina Jimenez:
6.
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19 April 1980, year 16, n. 96,j Que se vayan!: 1.
22 April 1980, year 16, n. 99, Noticias de Mariel: 1.
24 April 1980, year 16, n. 101, Furiosa reaccion yanqui contra el puente
maritima es/ablecido entre Mariel y la Florida por residentes Cubanos
en Es/ados Unidos: 1.
25 April 1980, year 16, n. 102
a Histericas declaraciones y maniobras yanquis: 1.
b Hay valores humanos que no pueden ser cambiados par casas
materiales, Jose A. Benitez: 2.
26 April 1980, year 16, n. 103
a Noticias de Mariel: 1.
b El pueblo y Marti: otra coincidencia, A propos ito de una lIamada
telefonica, Hector Hernandez Pardo: 3.
27 April 1980, year 16, n. 104, Noticias de Mariel: 1.
29 April 1980, year 16, n. 106, El desconcierto yank; no puede ser mas
completo: 6.
30 April 1980, year 16, n. 107,j Manana con Fidel todos a la plazal: 1.
2 May 1980, year 16, n. 109
a Este pueblo merece un lugar en la historia, Este pueblo merece un
lugar en la gloria, Este pueblo merece la victoria: 1.
b Los oradores de la gigantesca concentracion del 1° de mayo: 2·7.
c De nuevo las calles vacias: 7.
d Hermanos en la lucha yen la victoria: 2·7.
3 May 1980, year 16, n. 110
a En estos dias se ha estado librando una batalla de masas coma jamds
se habia estado en la historia de la Revolucion, Fidel Castro: 1·3.
bEl verdadero pueblo frente a la oficina de intereses yanquis: 5.
14 May 1980, year 16, n. 120,jEI sabado a la marcha del pueblo
combatiente!: 1.
16 February 1994, Los pueblos estdn aprendiendo en la calle 10 que es el
imperialismo, 10 que es el capitalismo, 10 que es el neoliberalismo
(speech transcript): 3·7, year 30, n. 37
22 April 1994, year. 30, n. 80
a Comienza hoy la conferencia La nacion y la emigracion: 1
b De la reorganizacion de los organismos de la Administracion Central
del Estado: 2·3
10 May 1994, yera 30, n. 93, Electo Mandela presidente de Sudafrica: 1
11 May 1994, year 30, n. 94
a Exhorta Mandela a la reconciliacion.: 1,4
b Vicente Elias y la intima consumacion de un sue no, Nidia Diaz: 4
c Rearmados paralizan transporte en el norte de Nicaragua, Nidia Diaz:
4
13 May 1994, year 30, n. 94, El triunfo de Mandela: una prueba de que se
pueden obtener grandes victoria: 1
21 May 1994, year 30, n. 102
a Tenemos potencial turlstlco, pueblo preparando, alto espritu de
hospitalidad, voluntad de hacer bien las cosas, Iralda Calzadilla: 1
b Ondea en Cuba la nueva bandera sudafricana: 1
c Ahora nos corresponde a los revolucionarios convertirnos en
defensores de estos aeuerdos, Fidel Castro: 5
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21 May 1994, year 30, n. 102, Ahora nos corresponde a los revolucionarios
convertirnos en defensores de estos acurdos, Fidel Castro: 5
11 June 1994, year 30, n. 117, Congreso colombiano demanda cese del
bloqueo contra Cuba: 1
22 June 1994, year 30, n. 124, Se opone Canada a aislar a Cuba, Orlando
Oramas Leon: 1
1 July 1994, year 30, n. 130, No he visto en ustedes desaliento; observo la
moral de estos tiempos, Alberto Nunez & Jose A. de la Osa: 1
2 July 1994, year 30, n. 131, Record nacional en la extraccion de petroleo:
600 000 t en el semestre, Ortelio Gonzalez Martinez: 1
12 July 1994, year 30, n. 137, El 26 en la Isla de la Juventud: 1
21 July 1994, year 30, n. 143, Asistio Fidel a Secretariado Ampliado de la
CTC, Silvia Martinez: 1
22 July 1994, year 30, n. 144, La Casa Blanca espera luz verde de Consejo de
Seguridad para invasion a Haiti: 1, year 30, n. 145
27 July 1994, year 30, n. 148, Cumpliremos el mandato martiano de no dejar
caer jamds la espada de la libertad: 1
4 August 1994, year 30, n. 154
a A ganar las batallas de la produccion de alimentos y de la zafra,
Roger Ricardo Luis: 1
b Debemos convertir el patriotismo en respuestas mas ejicaces, Fidel
Castro: 4-5
5 August 1994, year 30, n. 155, Salgamos al combate con la certeza
inconmovible de la victoria, Raul Castro: 4-5
6 August 1994, year 30, n. 157
a No ha sido en vano la cantidad de semillas de patriotismo que se ha
sembrado en estos mas de 35 ahos: 4-7
b No ha sido en vano la cantidad de semillas de patriotismo que se ha
sembrado en estos mas de 35 ahos: 4-7
7 August 1994, year 30, n. 158, La Patria convoca Hoy en la Plaza, A las seis
de la tarde. Presentes!: 1
8 August 1994, year 30, n. 159
a La calle fue, es y sera siempre de los revolucionarios y la Patria sera
eternmente de los que la dejienden y la honran, Oria de la Cruz: 1
b El cielo y las calles seguirdn siendo de los revolucionarios: 2
c La calda de un heroe reajirma a la Patria, Orfillo Pelaey e Isabel
Moralea: 3
d Las ratas que tiran piedra se esconden, Maria Julia Mayoral: 2, year
30,n.159
e Las armas no eran de juguete, Sara Mas: 2
f Morir por la Patria es vivir, Isabel Moralea: 3
g El gran culpable de este crimen es el gobierno de los Estados Unidos,
(speech transcript) Raul Castro Ruz: 4-5
9 August 1994, year 30, n. 160,
a Si alguien debe sentir miedo son los traidorzuelos, los anexionistas de
este siglo, (speech transcript) Raul Castro Ruz: 3
b Siempre saldremos a defender la Patria, Maria Julia Mayoral: 8
c A la primera linea del combate, de todos los combates: 1
d Testimonio de una madre: Hizo 10 que tiene que hacer un cubano
digno, Haydee Leon Moya: 8
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e Presidente Raul sepe/io del combatiente Gabriel Lamoth Caballero,
Haydee Leon Moya: 1
f El Malecon que conocemos, Orla de la Cruz e Isabel Morales: 8
10 August 1994, year 30, n. 161
a Una jornada de historia y para la historia: 1
b Un ultimo adios del pueblo guantanamero: 1
c Una leccion amarga para irresponsables, Guillermo Cabrera Alvarez:
7
d sr" aniversario del26 de Julio: 7
12 August 1994, year 30, n. 163
a La muerte no intimida cuando hay coraje, aria de la Cruz: 2
b Sfntesis btografica del teniente de navlo Roberto Aguilar Reyes: 2
c El instrumento principal con que Estados Unidos compulsa la
emigracion mas iva de Cuba es el criminal bloqueo, Jose A. de la Osa: 1
d Otro asesinato: 1
e Evoluciona satisfactoriamente el subojicial Alejandro Javier, Silvia
Martinez: 3
fTrituradora cubana noqueo a EE. Ull.: 1
gLas piernas cortas de una nueva mentira, Nidia Diaz: 4
13 August 1994, year 30. n. 164
a Si ensayan la lfnea de la amenaza, la linea del miedo, se van a
estrellar contra el pueblo de Cuba: 2-6
b Porque as! 10 quieren mil/ones de cubanos, Susana Lee: 8
c Comparecencia de Fidel en Hoy Mismo: Discutir en serio el asunto
implica ponerle jin al bloqueo, a esa politica de constante exhortacion
al terrorismo, a los crlmenes y a las salidas ilegales del pals: 1
d Actos manana en Marie Iy Camaguey, Enrique Aticnzar Rivero: 8
14 August 1994, year 30. n. 165
a Un canto a la PatriaJrente al mar, Sara Mas: 1
b De por Vida con Fidel UjotaCe - En el mismo lugar de reciente
jornada contra el odio: 8
15 August 1994, year 30, n. 166
a Ante el crimen no cabe otra alternativa que la mano dura del pueblo,
(speech transcript) Pedro Perez Betancourt: 2-3
b Informacion del Ministerio del Interior: 7
c Ningun imperio, por poderoso que este sea, nos hard ciaudicar,
Enrique Atienzar Rivero e Isabel Moralea: 1
d jQue cesen los asesinatos de nuestros hijos!, (speech transcript) Esther
Montea: 3
e La orden de defender la Revolucion siempre estd dada, (speech
transcript) Julian Rizo Alvarez: 4-5
f Lamenta Perez de Cuellar decision sobre Haiti: 7
20 August 1994, year 30, n. 171
A Veremos como sale ahora Estados Unidos de las nuevas estupideces
que estd cometiendo: 3
b Estamos desarrollando la batalla por la cohesion de las fuerzas y la
elevacion de la combatividad en todos los ordenes y todos los frentes,
como corresponde al momento que vivimos, (speech transcript) Raul
Castro Ruz: 4-5
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23 August 1994, year 30, n. 172, Con nosotros es necesario discutir como
cortar el tronco y no las ramas, Nicanor Leon Cotayo: 3
24 August 1994, year 30, n. 173
a iQue va a pasar?, Luis Baez Delgado: 4-5
b Asumiremos el reto de estos tiempos, Lino Oramas: 5
26 August 1994, year 30, n. 175, Habla una estrategia ... , 24th August TV and
radio transcript, Fidel Castro Ruz: 1-7
3 September 1994, year 30, n. 181
a Cita con la Patria el miercoles en la Escalinata: 1
b No es facil hablar de detener el exodo masivo sin ir a las causas,
Susana Lee: 4
c Lo que piensa un veterano y experto periodista de origen cubano, Lino
Oramas: 5, year 30, n. 181
8 September 1994, year 30, n. 184, Multitudinario apoyo estudiantil a la
Revolucion en Escalinata universitaria, Octavio Lavastida: 1
10 September 1994, year 30, n. 186
a Exhortacion del Gobierno de Cuba a los ciudadanos que intentan
viajar al exterior por medios propios y sin tramites legales: 1
b Califica Alarcon de importancia apreciable acuerdo entre Cuba y
Estados Unidos, Jose A. de la Osa: 1
14 September 1994, year 30, n. 188
a Informacion del Gobierno de Cuba a la opinion publica nacional e
internacional: 1
b Poner en orden las ideas, Armando Hart Davalo: 4
c Una nota discordante que entrarecerd la atmosfera en la comunidad
cubana, Susana Lee: 3
15 September 1994, year 30, n. 189, Porque la salud es de todos, Alberto
Nunez Betancourt: 2
16 September 1994, year 30, n. 18
a Normalizar las relaciones migratorias es muy importante porque han
sido un arma constante de Estados Unidos contra la Revolucion, Susana
Lee:2
b Solo falta la orden para la invasion a Haiti: 1
11 October 1994, year 30, n. 207, La independencia por la cual lucho el Padre
de la Patria es la misma que defendemos hoy, Jorge Luis Batista: 1
18 October 1994, year 30, n. 212, Cuba, la democracia representativa y el
nuevo orden mundial, Roberto Regalado: 4
27 October 1994, year 30, n. 219, Resolucion de la ONU contra el bloqueo de
EE. UU. a Cuba: 8
29 October 1994, year 30, n. 221, lntegran las fuerzas de la cosecha cahera,
Juan Varela Perez: 1
9 November 1994, year 30, n. 228, General yank; pretende lanzar sobre los
campos de minas a balseros cubanos que deseen regresar: 1
26 November 1994, year 30, n. 241
a La presencia de ustedes aqul demuestra que las idas justas vtven, que
las ideas nobles viven: 1
b Declaracion: 1
14 December 1994, year 30, n. 253, IX Forum: respuestas concretas a la
diversidad de problemas: 1
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Granma by author where available:
Atienzar Rivero, Enrique (1994) Actos manana en Mariel y Camaguey: 8, 13
August, year 30, n. 164
Atienzar Rivero, Enrique & Moralea, Isabel (1994) Ningun imperio, por
poderoso que este sea, nos hard claudicar: 1, 15 August, year 3D, n. 166
Batista, Jorge Luis (1994) La independencia por la cual lucho el Padre de la
Patria es la misma que defendemos hoy: I, 11 October, year 30, n. 207
Benitez, Jose A. (1980) Hay valores humanos que no pueden ser cambiados
pOI' cosas materiales, 25 April, year 16, n. 102: 2.
Betancourt, Pedro Perez (1994) Ante el crimen no cabe otra alternativa que la
mano dura del pueblo, (speech transcript): 2-3, 15 August, year 30, n.
166
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189, 15 September
Calzadilla, Iralda (1994) Tenemos potencial turlstico, pueblo preparando, alto
espritu de hospitalidad, voluntad de hacer bien las cosas: I,21 May,
year 30, n. 102
Castro Ruz, Fidel
(1980) En estos dias se ha estado librando una batalla de masas como
jam as se habia estado en la historia de la Revolucion, 3 May, year 16, n.
110: 1-3.
(1994) Ahora nos corresponde a los revolucionarios convertirnos en
defensores de estos acurdos: 5, 21 May, year 30, n. 102
(1994) Debemos convertir el patriotismo en respuestas mas eficaces: 4-
5, 4 August, year 30, n. 154
(1994) Habia una estrategia ... , 24th August TV and radio transcript: 1-
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Castro Ruz, Raul (1994)
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August, year 30, n. 155
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(speech transcript): 4-5, 8 August, year 30, n. 159
Si alguien debe sentir miedo son los traidorzuelos, los anexlonistas de
este siglo, (speech transcript): 3, 9 August, year 30, n. 160
Estamos desarrollando la batalla por la cohesion de las fuerzas y la
elevacion de la combatividad en todos los ordenes y todos los frentes,
como corresponde al momento que vivimos, (speech transcript): 4-5, 20
August, year 30, n. 171
Cruz, OrIa de la (1994)
La calle fue, es y sera siempre de los revolucionarios y la Patria sera
eternmente de los que la defienden y la honran: l, 5 August, year 30, n.
155
La muerte no intimida cuando hay coraje: 2, ]2 August, year 30, n. ] 63
Cruz, OrIa de la & Morales, Isabel (1994) El Malecon que conocemos: 8,9
August, year 30, n. 160
Delgado, Luis Baez (1994)
lQue va a pasar?: 4-5, 24 August, year 30, n. 173
Diaz, Nidia (1994)
Vicente Elias y la intima consumacion de un sueho: 4, 11 May, year 30,
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Rearmados paralizan transporte en el norte de Nicaragua: 4, 11 May
year 30, n. 92
Las piernas cortas de una nueva mentira: 4, 12 August, year 30, n. 163
Gonzalez Martinez, Ortelio (1994) Record nacional en la extraccion de
petroleo: 600 000 t en el semestre: 1, 2 July, year 30, n. 131
Guillen, Nicolas (1980) Marines U.S.A., 13 April, year 16, n. 90: 1.
Guma, Jose Gabriel (1980) Ami/car Gonzalez, un mecdnico enamorado de su
trabajo, 9 January, year 16, n. 7: 1.
Hart Davalo, Armando (1994) Poner en orden las ideas: 4, 14 September,
year 30, n. 188
Hector Ilemandez Pardo (1980) Declaraciones de Carter: Retrato de cuerpo
entero, 10 April, year 16, n. 87: 6.
Jimenez, Georgina (1980) El aprendizaje sera brutal, 14 April 1980, year 16,
n. 91: 6.
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Un canto a la Patria frente al mar: 1, 14 August, year 30, n. 165
Las armas no eran de juguete: 2, 8 August, year 30, n. 159
Mayoral, Maria Julia (1994)
Las ratas que tiran piedra se esconden: 2, 8 August, year 30, n. 159
Siempre saldremos a defender la Patria: 8, 9 August, year 30, n. 160
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transcript): 3, 15 August, year 30, n. 166
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Moya, Haydee Le6n (1994)
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8, 9 August, year 30, n. 160
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year 30, n. 124
Oramas, Joaquin et al. (1980) Luis Asi piensan los Cubanos, 10 April, year 16,
n. 87: 2-3.
Oramas, Lino (1994)
Asumiremos el reto de estos liempos: 5,24 August, year 30, n. 173
Lo que piensa un veterano y experto periodista de origen cubano: 5,
year 30, n. 181,26 August, year 30, n. 175
Osa, Jose A. de la (1994)
El instrumento principal con que Estados Unidos compulsa la
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Pages, Ralsa et al. (1980) Dispuesto nuestro pueblo a defender la patria hasta
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Pardo, Hector Hernandez (1980) El pueblo y Martl: otra eoincidencia, A
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Pelaey, Orfillo & Moralea, Isabel (1994) La calda de un heroe reafirma a la
Patria: 3, 8 August, year 30, n. 159
Regalado, Roberto (1994) Cuba, la demoeracia representativa y el nuevo
orden mundial: 4, 18 October, year 30, n. 212
Perez, Juan Varela (1980) Las moliendas de fin de ano son ejemp/os de los
niveles que deben alcanzarse desde ahora, 2 January, year 16, n. 1: 1.
Ricardo Luis, Roger (1994) A ganar las batallas de la produccion de
alimentos y de la zafra: 1, 4 August, year 30, n. 154
Rizo Alvarez, Julian (1994) La orden de defender la Revolucion slempre estti
dada, (speech transcript): 4-5 , 15 August, year 30, n. 166
Talleria, Evello (1980), Pleno respaldo popular al editorial del Granma que
define la posicion de Cuba ante los hechos registrados en la embajada
de Peru, 8 April, year 16, n. 85: 1.
Varela Perez, Juan (1994), Integran lasfuerzas de la cosecha cahera, 29
October 1994, year 30, n. 221: 1
Granma Internacional by date:
5 January 1994, year 29, n. 1
a Analizan medidas para mejorar situacion de finanzas internas: 1
b Mejor atencion al turista, Rodolfo Casals: 7
c "Cubana" vuela a 28 ciudades de America y Europa. Gabriel Molina:
7
d 40 contra el bloqueo: 15
e Ineursiona Suchel en mereados de America Latina y Europa, 1. 0.: 6
f Favorables condiciones para aumentar inversiones britdnicas, Juaquln
Oramas: 6
g Exigen levantamiento del bloqueo de Estados Unidos contra Cuba: 1
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h Sin el socialismo y sin la Revolucion no seriamos siquiera un pais
independiente, speech transcript, Fidel Castro Ruz: 13
11 January 1994, year 29, n. 7, Seguridad nacional y derechos humanos, Jose
D. Reraza Chapeau: 15
12 January 1994, year 29, n. 2,
a Un DELTA enre la Sierra y el Mar, Jose A. Martin: 1
b Cuba tratard de revertir su situaclon economica en 1994: 1-2
9 February 1994, year 29, n. 6, Venta a Brasil de medicamentos cubanos par
30 000 000 de dolores: 1
2 March 1994, year 29, n. 9, Crece conjianza de empresarios: 1
9 March 1994, year 29, n. 10
a Par que faltan los medicamentos en las farmaciasi, Nicanor Leon
Cotayo: 1,6-7
b Dos caras tiene Michael, Gabriel Molina: 7
16 March 1994, year 29, n. 11
a Muy secreta, Sullivan: 1,4
b La cofradia del embuste: Luis Baez Delgado: 5
21 March 1994, year 29, n. 16
a Visitantes 0 balseros? / El octavo circulo del injierno, Gabriel Molina:
1,2
b Temas de emigrados / La psicologia del miedo: 3
24 May 1994, year 29, n. 19, iVictoria de los derechos del hombre!: 1
29 June 1994, year 29, n. 26
a Gobierno canadiense reanudard asistencia economica a Cuba: 1
b Nuestro servicio de salud conserva su vitalidad: 1
6 July 1994, year 29, n. 27, Cuba crece, Susana Lee: 2
17 August 1994, year 29, n. 33
a Salgamos al combate con la certeza inconmovible de la victoria,
speech transcript, Raul Castro Ruz: 12-13
b Nosotros no podemos seguir de guardianes de las fronteras de
Estados Unidos: 1
c El dolor une y convoca: 6
d Contudente respuesta a gesto desesperado del enemigo: 6
31 August 1994, year 29, n. 35
a De "perseguldos de Castro" a perseguidos de los Estados Unidos: 1
b Entrapados en su pro pia trampa, Nidia Diaz: 3
c Agosto se lleno de amigos, Arsenio Rodriguez: 2
d Anuncian modificaciones en politica migratoria cubana, Ruben
Cortes: 3
e Envla EE. Ull. a emigrados cubanos i/egales a la base de Guatdnamo:
3
/ Anuncia Clinton nuevas medidas de presion contra Cuba: 3
7 September 1994, year 29, n. 36, El bloqueo compulsa salidas i/egales, Fidel
Castro: 1
28 September 1994, year 29, n. 36, La alimentacion del pueblo es la (area
principal en estos momentos, Raul Castro: 1
12 October 1994, year 29, n. 36, Mercados agropecuarios, Una nueva
concepcion: 1
30 November 1994, year 29, n. 48,2700 viajeros en busca de justicla, Por
Cuba solidaridad: 1
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7 December 1994, year 29, n. 49, No es embargo ni bloqueo iES GUERRA!: 1
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Verde Olivo by date:
13 April 1980, 15/80
a Los sucesos de la embajada del Peru, Jorge Luis Blanco: 10-11.
b Editorial del periodico Granma, La posicion de Cuba: 10-15.
20 April 1980, 16/80
a Title on front page: 1.
b La respuesta del pueblo uniformado, Luis Lopez: 4-5.
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c Playa Giron, Las operaciones aereas de la CIA, Jose M. Miyar
Barruecos: 26-38.
27 April 1980, 17/80, El pueblo en accion, Eduardo Yassels: 4-5.
4 May 1980, 18/80
a Mariel: Una respuesta a la demagogia yanqui, Fragmentos de notas
de Granma de los dias 26, 27 y 28 de abril: 8-11.
b Lajuventud en la marcha combatiente, Coronel Manuel Lopey Diaz:
12-13.
11 May 1980, 19/80,iLa marcha del pueblo combatiente va!, Fidel Castro: 8-
15.
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15/80: 10-11.
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8-15.
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May, 18/80: 12-13.
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Rivera, Armando Lopez (1980) [Paraiso 0 infierno, 8 June, 23/80: 16-17.
Yassels, Eduardo, (1980) El pueblo en accion, 27 April, 17/80: 4-5.
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List of Conducted Interviews
April-May 2010
Dr. Rogelio Letuse, Havana University (Three meetings)
Dr. Jorge Renato Quitart Ibarra, University of Havana
Dr. Jesus Pastor Garcia Brigos, Institute of Philosophy, Havana
Dr. Ricardo Hernandez Otero, Institute of Linguistics and Literature, Ilavana
Dr. Arnaldo Silva Le6n, Former Member of the Central Committee of the
CCP
Dr. Luis Suarez Salazar, Institute for International Relations, llavana
Mr. Fidel Aguirre Gamboa, Subdirector, Editora Politica, Ilavana
Dr. Edelberto Leiva, University of Havana
Mr. Carlos Moreno, Cuban Communist Party, Havana
Mr. Frantisek Fleisman, Consul, Czech Embassy, Havana
Other individuals interviewed in Cuba or UK included: Orlando Borrego;
Cuban Methodist Pastor in Santa Clara; Two Jehovah's Witnesses in Casilda;
and others during a combined time of two months spent during two research
visits in Cuba.
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